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ABSTRACT 
A NATION RATED? 
SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF A SCHOOL RESOURCE: THE 
ROLE OF ACCOUNTABILITY RATINGS IN METROPOLITAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
by  
Michael A. Miner 
The University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, 2020 
Under the Supervision of Professor Marcus L. Britton 
 
 
Overview. This dissertation examines how school accountability ratings are associated 
with school segregation, how they shape public perceptions of school quality and how they 
influence parents’ enrollment decisions. In theory, school ratings were developed to raise 
achievement for all students by identifying poor performing schools and intervening to improve 
them. Across the United States, school segregation concentrates Black, Latinx and lower income 
students in schools with low average test scores. As such, school ratings may both reflect and 
even reinforce educational inequalities associated with school segregation because a component 
of the rating relies on performance on standardized exams. To the extent that ratings reflect 
which groups of students attend which schools rather than how effectively schools serve their 
student populations, the system may be problematic. Scholars have yet to understand the 
association of school ratings and school segregation. This is an important consideration, not only 
because ratings may reflect broader patterns of inequality, but also because they may serve as a 
resource for stakeholders, including public officials and parents who may rely on ratings as an 
indication of school quality. Internationally, the publication of school ratings has led to lower 
enrollment and school closures, but it is unclear how ratings are associated with segregation or 
how they impact parent’s perceptions and attitudes within the United States. This dissertation 
addresses three key questions: Are school ratings associated with school segregation? If so, by 
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what metric (i.e. within- or between-district segregation)? Do ratings influence parent’s 
perceptions and attitudes? I answer these by examining school report cards and school 
segregation across 112 metropolitan regions. By using original data from a survey experiment, I 
am also able to examine causal effects of school ratings on parents’ perceptions and attitudes. 
Findings show that in more segregated metropolitan regions, schools with higher proportions of 
Black students have higher probabilities of receiving a lower school rating relative to a higher 
one. Moreover, I show that parents’ perceptions of school quality are significantly less favorable 
when shown a school profile with a lower school rating and that parents’ are less likely to enroll 
their children in a hypothetical school with a lower rating (C-F). 
Intellectual Merit. Segregation researchers argue that the distribution of resources and 
their effect on students’ educational outcomes is poorly understood (Reardon and Owens 2014). 
This project contributes to the scholarly literature in two ways. First, I conceptualize school 
ratings as a resource vital to the educational experience of students which impacts students, 
families and schools differently in patterns that are reflective of existing social inequality. 
Second, I contribute to sociological understanding of the relationships among race/ethnicity, 
class, schools, variations in accountability policies in general, and perceptions of school quality 
and enrollment decisions. These are significant contributions because they have the potential to 
transform future school segregation research as well as the design and dissemination of 
educational accountability metrics. 
Broader Impacts. Findings from this research provide benefits to scholars across multiple 
disciplines allowing sociologists, educational researchers, methodologists and policy makers to 
effectively collaborate. The scientific contributions of this research include the expansion of 
theory and the treatment of accountability policies as a resource that plays a key role in parental 
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decision making, which, in turn, may influence school segregation patterns. Methodologists 
likely gain a richer understanding of how perceptions vary and depend on conditions of school 
quality indicators. Results from this study offer empirical evidence for the implementation and 
dissemination of alternative accountability metrics that are reliable and accurate estimates of how 
well schools and districts serve their students. This should prove informative to educational 
researchers and policy makers. The scope of this research has the potential to impact anyone 
conducting research on the association of school segregation and educational policy as well as 
those studying housing and public perceptions. 
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 “Breaking the silence—talking about class and coming to terms with where we stand—is a necessary 
step if we are to live in a world where prosperity and plenty can be shared, where justice can be realized 
in our public and private lives. The time to talk about class, to know where we stand, is now—before it is 
too late…”  
– bell hooks 
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A NATION RATED? SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF A SCHOOL 
RESOURCE: THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTABILITY RATINGS IN METROPOLITAN PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS 
 
In 2007, the United States Supreme Court limited the use of voluntary racial classifications by 
school districts in determining student assignments to schools in an effort to lessen the effects of 
de facto segregation (Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 
2007) (hereinafter, Seattle).  De facto segregation has long been distinguished by the Court from 
de jure segregation, segregation in Southern and border states along with the District of 
Columbia that historically adopted explicit state laws requiring or permitting segregation by race 
(Clotfelter 1999; Clotfelter 2004; Reardon and Owens 2014). While de facto segregation at the 
local level is often a result of overt and covert actions to maintain high levels of segregation (e.g. 
redlining and housing discrimination, see Rothstein 2015), the plurality of Justices in Seattle 
viewed educational segregation in the case not as a product of governmental policies, but of 
individual choices. The dissenting voice of Justice Breyer however, offered a third possibility, 
arguing that,  
 ““state action” that is not explicitly racially segregative may nonetheless lead to greater 
levels of residential segregation. If legal decisions and government policy actually cause 
residential segregation by changing the structure of incentives that drive private choices, 
then evidence of segregation resulting from state action might necessitate judicial 
remedy.” (Liebowitz and Page 2014: 672; Mickelson et al. 2017: Chapter 7; Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 2007). 
 
At minimum Justice Breyer’s dissent from Seattle suggests that if educational policy causes 
segregation by influencing private decisions then there may be evidence of segregation resulting 
from state action. Below I provide a historical overview of educational policy and school 
segregation trends in the United States. I argue that contemporary accountability ratings are 
likely unevenly distributed across schools and districts in a manner that reflects broader 
inequalities in metropolitan America. At the same time, school ratings may be serving as a signal 
 
2 
 
of school quality to key stakeholders, whether or not they are an accurate indication of how well 
students are able to learn within their school.  To test these claims, I assess (1) the association of 
school accountability ratings and school segregation and (2) the causal effects of school ratings 
on parents’ perceptions of schools and attitudes toward enrollment decisions. 
In 1983, the United States Department of Education published A Nation at Risk, 
effectively positioning education in America as an economic and national policy concern. This 
new perspective garnered the interest of legislative leaders across the entire political spectrum. 
As a result, there was a culmination of individual state efforts to hold schools accountable for 
meeting academic standards, which in turn, directly contributed to federal efforts aimed at 
making accountability a requirement of federal aid (Mehta 2013). In 2015, President Obama 
signed the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) into law which reauthorized the original 1965 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) signed by President Johnson. The 
immediately prior reauthorization of the law was the 2002 implementation of the No Child Left 
Behind Act (NCLB) under the Bush administration (U.S. Department of Education 2019). While 
the current law (ESSA) provides states with more authority over their accountability system in 
regard to setting their own goals for student achievement, the previous law (NCLB) was the first 
to mandate that all states publish accountability report cards based, in part, on individual student 
test scores that reflect the overall school as a whole (No Child Left Behind Act of 2002).  
Currently, each state has flexibility in developing a unique report card or rating system 
(e.g., A-F; 0-100; 1-5; etc.; see Appendix B), as well as determining its own measurement of 
student variables (Education Commission of the States 2018).  By the 2013-2014 school year, all 
states constructed their accountability categories by employing some variation of an index that 
measured “essential indicators.” During that time, Mikulecky and Christie (2014) note that all 
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states measured student achievement and graduation rates, most accounted for the academic 
growth (42 states), and many accounted for the reduction of achievement gaps between different 
student group populations (36 states), while less than half included postsecondary readiness (20 
states).  
In theory, school ratings were developed to raise achievement for all students by 
identifying poor performing schools and implementing varying degrees of intervention (No 
Child Left Behind Act of 2002). In discussions of accountability policy however, controversy 
has primarily centered around standardized exams, as research consistently shows that 
performance differs by student demographics (Huntington-Klein and Ackert 2018; von Hippel, 
Workman and Downey 2018). Across the United States, school segregation concentrates Black, 
Latinx and lower income students in schools with low average test scores (Logan 2010; Logan, 
Minca and Adar 2012). To this point, school ratings may both reflect and even reinforce 
educational inequalities associated with school segregation if a primary component of the rating 
relies on performance on standardized exams. Segregation researchers have argued that the 
distribution of resources and their effect on students’ educational outcomes is poorly understood 
(Reardon and Owens 2014).  I contribute to this theoretical discussion by conceptualizing school 
ratings as a resource vital to (1) the educational experience of students and (2) parents’ 
perceptions of schools and attitudes toward enrollment decisions. 
A contemporary mechanism of school segregation may be the ratings schools receive 
from their respective states, such that they are unequally distributed across schools and school 
districts.  The evidence shows that families in search of housing tend to develop opinions of 
neighborhoods and school districts that are driven by schools’ performance (Frankenberg 2013), 
but if ratings primarily reflect which groups of students attend which schools rather than how 
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effectively schools are able to serve their student populations, this system may be problematic.1 
Even more, if school ratings can be predicted ex ante based on easily observable measures of 
student demographics, the design itself (Ehlert, Koedel, Parsons and Podgursky 2016: 478) may 
provide a structure of incentives that drive private choices, potentially reinforcing segregation. 
As other evidence has shown, White families tend to avoid schools with high proportions of non-
White and especially Black students (Kozol 2005; Billingham and Hunt 2016). If ratings divert 
attention away from the disparities in other resources associated with school segregation, there is 
reason to suspect that school ratings may further perpetuate White and middle class families’ 
avoidance of neighborhoods where these schools are located. 
In the subsequent sections, this dissertation addresses the following five questions: 
1. To what extent do levels of racial/ethnic segregation within school districts predict school 
accountability ratings in the United States? 
2. To what extent do levels of racial/ethnic segregation between school districts predict 
school accountability ratings in the United States? 
3. Is there an interaction effect between school demographic characteristics and levels of 
racial/ethnic segregation that predict school accountability ratings in the United States? 
4. Do school ratings impact parents’ perceptions of schools? 
5. If school ratings impact parents’ perceptions of schools, how do they impact parents’ 
attitudes toward enrollment decisions? 
 
1 While school ratings may overlap with the plethora of online school rating systems (e.g. GreatSchools.org, an 
embedded feature on prominent home search websites such as Zillow.com and Trulia.com; see also Niche.com), 
state ratings are distinct in their measurement and weighting criteria. Even if private actors are producing their own 
quality indicators of schools, they may be weighted or influenced by external variables outside of the control of 
schools. For instance, some also account for perception surveys and display school ratings next to various 
neighborhood factors such as, crime and safety and diversity (https://www.niche.com/about/data/). 
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Together, these questions fill a significant lacuna in the literature. Scholars have yet to 
understand the distribution of school ratings and the possible association with school 
segregation. This is an important consideration, not only because student achievement is 
stratified within the student population, but also because school ratings may reflect broader 
inequalities in families and communities rather than how effective schools are at educating their 
student populations. Internationally, the publication of school ratings, in particular, has led to 
lower student enrollment and school closures (Koning and Van der Wiel 2013; Nunes, Reis and 
Seabra 2015). It is less clear within the United States, however, if school ratings are unequally 
distributed and if they are associated with school segregation levels or if they impact parent’s 
decision-making. 
The ultimate intention of this project is to inform best practices for designing, 
disseminating and interpreting measures of school quality by school authorities, elected officials 
and parents. This research accomplishes the overall objective by pursuing the following specific 
aims. Aim #1: Assess the association of school report cards and levels of within- and between-
district school segregation. This aim is completed by analyzing school ratings that are 
disseminated through state report cards along with student demographic data available through 
the National Center for Education Statistics: Common Core of Data. Aim#2: Offer new evidence 
and discovery on the potential impacts of school ratings on perceptions of school quality and 
enrollment decisions. Building on knowledge gained from the empirical analyses described 
above, I collected new survey data using an experimental design. The between-subjects 
experimental design investigates how parents respond to school accountability ratings (A-F), net 
of varying school quality measures such as achievement on standardized exams and student 
growth. The primary objectives of the second aim are to assess the degree to which 
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accountability policies influence parents’ perceptions of school quality and impact the likelihood 
that parents will choose to enroll their child in a hypothetical school.  
Findings reveal a significant interaction effect between school demographic 
characteristics and levels of between-district segregation that predict school accountability 
ratings. In more segregated metropolitan regions, these data show that schools with higher 
proportions of Black students have higher probabilities of receiving a lower school rating relative 
to a higher one. This association raises serious questions about the equitability of the report card 
system implemented across the United States, not only because it appears to be penalizing an 
already disadvantaged group of students and schools, but also because it may be reinforcing 
patterns of segregation by deterring potential families from moving into certain school districts. 
The second part of this dissertation examines part of this latter claim, about perceptions of the 
school quality as well as the extent to which these policies influence parents’ decision-making to 
enroll their children in schools. Experimental findings show that net of adequate yearly progress 
across school performance metrics, parents’ perceptions of school quality is significantly less 
favorable when shown a school profile with a lower school rating. Similarly, parents indicate that 
they are less likely to enroll their children in a hypothetical school with a lower rating (C-F). 
Considered together, the results presented in this dissertation provide comprehensive 
benefits to scholars and practitioners across multiple disciplines allowing sociologists, 
educational researchers, methodologists and policy makers to effectively collaborate. The 
scientific contributions of this research include the expansion of theory and the treatment of 
educational accountability policies as a resource that plays a key role in parental decision-
making, which, in turn, may influence school segregation patterns. Methodologists should gain a 
richer understanding of what school accountability ratings measure and how perceptions vary 
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and depend on conditions of school quality indicators. Results from this study offer empirical 
evidence for the implementation and dissemination of alternative accountability metrics that are 
reliable and accurate estimates of how well schools and school districts serve their students. This 
should prove informative to social scientists and policy makers. The scope of this project has the 
potential to impact anyone conducting research on the association of school segregation and 
educational policy as well as those studying housing and public perceptions. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Educational policy and the implementation of accountability ratings 
Historically, the role of the federal government in education was quite limited through the 
middle of the twentieth century. Following the Second World War however, the role of the 
federal government in education grew substantially beginning with Sputnik and through the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the passage of ESEA in 1965, the findings of the 
Coleman Report (1966), and the development of the United States Department of Education in 
1979. Together, these efforts broadened the scope of the federal government in education (Mehta 
2013; Superfine 2005). 
Since the publication of A Nation at Risk in 1983, there have also been increased efforts 
to hold schools more accountable. The emphasis on “excellence” and “high standards” in the 
report represents a rhetorical and practical shift in the educational landscape from the child-
centered view of education that characterized the 1960’s to the current standards-based emphasis 
on material to be mastered by all students. At the core of A Nation at Risk was the move toward 
emphasizing accountability based on quantifiable results (Mehta 2013; Oakes 1985). 
 
8 
 
There are three important laws that followed the culmination of individual state efforts to 
hold schools accountable for meeting academic standards. First, in 1994, President Clinton 
signed Goals 2000 into law. This represented the first federal attempt to promote educational 
reform on a national scale. Goals 2000 provided financial aid to states and districts in exchange 
for submitting accountability measures to the federal government (Superfine 2005). Second, in 
2002, President Bush further extended Goals 2000 and signed into law the No Child Left Behind 
Act. This was the first federal law that mandated annual testing for all students in mathematics 
and reading each year for grades third through eighth and once in grades tenth through twelfth. 
To be sure, similar test-based systems existed in 49 states prior to NCLB (Mehta 2013). NCLB 
however, required states to bring all students up to levels of proficiency through adequate yearly 
progress (AYP) and produce a detailed timeline for how every student group would reach 100 
percent proficiency by the year 2014 (No Child Left Behind Act 2002). Schools and districts that 
repeatedly failed to meet goals set by AYP faced loss of funding, conversion of the 
administration or school, and even closure.  
In theory, NCLB was intended to improve education for all students. Part of NCLB 
focused on holding schools accountable for student subgroup populations as a way to guarantee 
that schools did not ignore certain groups of students. Under the law, failure of any group was 
defined as failure of the entire school (Gaddis and Lauen 2014; No Child Left Behind Act of 
2002; Sims 2013). In practice, however, critics of quantification have shown the law to be 
especially consequential for disproportionate numbers of students of color, those in poverty and 
residents of rural and urban communities (Caven 2019; Darling-Hammond 2007; Gay 2007; 
Ravitch 2010; Ravitch 2013). In sum, NCLB is noted as limiting the educational curriculum and 
unfairly holding schools accountable for circumstances such as limited resources and events such 
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family and neighborhood poverty that are outside of schools control (Kozol 2005; Gay 2007; 
Mehta 2013; Ravitch 2010).  
By 2012, the United States Department of Education recognized that most schools would 
not meet the proficiency mandate set under NCLB – to have all students 100 percent proficient 
by 2014. As such, the Obama administration began granting releases to states and districts that 
designed comprehensive plans to close achievement gaps and increase academic outcomes. 
These efforts led to the third and current federal law. In 2015, President Obama signed Every 
Student Succeeds Act into law. Essentially ESSA reauthorizes NCLB and provides states with 
more authority over their accountability measures (e.g., the law allows states to include 
weighting metrics and various school culture measures of their own choosing—see Appendix B).  
Nevertheless, ESSA continues the mandate that all states publish accountability report 
cards that are based, in part, on student achievement. According to the Department of Education, 
ESSA “[e]nsures that vital information is provided to educators, families, students, and 
communities through annual statewide assessments that measure students' progress toward those 
high standards” (U.S. Department of Education 2019). While the new law certainly allows 
greater flexibility among states in their development of their rating system (e.g., A-F; 0-100; 1-5; 
etc.; see Appendix B), all states must comply or risk losing federal funding, and construct their 
accountability categories by employing some variation of an index that measures “essential 
indicators.” In the United States, all states account for student achievement in the construction of 
their school ratings, but research consistently shows that performance differs by student 
demographics (Huntington-Klein and Ackert 2018; von Hippel et al. 2018). Because school 
segregation concentrates Black, Latinx and lower income students in schools with low average 
test scores (Logan et al. 2012), school ratings may be more of an indication of broader 
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racial/ethnic and socioeconomic inequality rather than the extent to which schools are able to 
provide quality education to their students. Less is known however, about how school ratings are 
distributed across schools and districts. 
 
Assessing the unequal distribution of a school resource  
Since the Coleman Report (1966), scholars have emphasized that schools and districts have 
various resources that are beneficial to their students. The existing literature documents that the 
distribution of resources differs by student groups and schools. These resources include: school 
funding in the form of property tax revenue, the social and cultural capital of parents and 
enrolled students, advanced curriculums, skills and credentials of teachers as well as the physical 
facilities in schools (Carter 2005; Duncan and Murnane 2014; Kozol 1991; Hochschild and 
Scovronick 2003; Lareau 2003; Lareau 2011; Logan et al. 2012; Reardon and Owens 2014; 
Oakes 1985). Sociologists have argued that the distribution of resources and their effect on 
students’ educational outcomes is poorly understood (Clotfelter et al. 2003; Reardon and Owens 
2014). I contribute to this scholarship by conceptualizing school ratings as an additional 
contemporary school resource that may affect students, families and schools differently if ratings 
and students are distributed unevenly across schools and districts in patterns that reflect existing 
social inequality. In addition to the distribution of resources discussed above, existing inequality 
includes, but is not limited to differences in funding as well as neighborhood and metropolitan 
housing segregation. 
For instance, the evidence shows that both neighborhood and school segregation are 
intertwined in complex ways and that their association has strengthened over time (Frankenberg 
2013; Ong and Rickles 2004; Owens 2020). Indeed, across the nation most students attend their 
 
11 
 
neighborhood school, and this is especially the case at the primary level (Goldsmith 2016; 
Richards and Stroub 2013). While school and neighborhood segregation are associated, it is 
useful to conceptualize the two as partially distinct phenomena for at least two reasons.  First, 
the research shows that wealthier children are more likely to withdraw from neighborhood 
schools (Saporito and Sohoni 2007). Secondly, school attendance boundaries have been 
gerrymandered over time (Clotfelter 2004; Frankenberg 2013; Richards and Stroub 2015). Both 
of these trends exacerbate school segregation to an extent over and above what might be 
expected based on neighborhood segregation measures alone. These trends also lead to a 
concentration of poverty in neighborhood schools among predominantly minority students and 
additionally zone students in and out based on demographics.  School segregation has the 
strongest impact on determining educational achievement.  In fact, in estimating annual test 
gains, school factors are most critical (Carlson and Cowen 2015), but the long-term effects of 
neighborhood segregation have been shown to predict educational attainment later in life. Owens 
(2010) shows that living in a poor neighborhood decreases the chance of completing high 
school and that having high achieving neighbors increases the odds of completing a bachelor’s 
degree. Similarly, Goldsmith (2009) demonstrates that students concentrated in predominately 
Black and Latinx schools are less likely to earn a high school degree or bachelor’s, relative to 
similar students in predominately White schools.  The prevailing argument is that school 
segregation still largely exists because of the inaction to enforce antidiscrimination in housing 
policy and the failure to attempt to integrate neighborhoods (Frankenberg 2013; Ong and Rickles 
2004; Owens 2010). With that said, throughout this dissertation, I argue that if school ratings are 
unevenly distributed across schools and districts, they likely reflect and potentially reinforce 
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patterns of existing social inequality in the broader metropolitan landscape (e.g. 
neighborhood/housing segregation; see also Reardon, Fox and Townsend 2015). 
 
School ratings and school segregation 
School segregation affects students by both shaping the total quantity of resources available in 
the system and by the allocation of those resources in schools and districts (Reardon and Owens 
2014). Accordingly, if school and school district racial/ethnic and socioeconomic composition 
affects the allocation of ratings among schools, then it is expected that segregation will lead to 
disparities in student outcomes that will be reflected in assigned ratings. Despite previous 
characterizations of “the end of segregation” (Glaeser and Vigdor 2012) or of the time period of 
1968-71 through 1990 as one of a “regime of desegregation” (see Logan, Oakey and Stowell 
2008), scholars have recently argued these terms might be dated when considering rulings made 
by the Supreme Court which have largely limited local efforts to reduce school segregation 
(Logan, Zhang and Oakley 2017; Miliken v. Bradley 1974; Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 2007). To shed light on what scholars are now calling the 
era of “post desegregation,” I briefly discuss the historical legal landscape and its effects on 
changes in levels of school segregation (see Appendix A for a complete list of pertinent opinions 
and rulings). 
Changes in levels of school segregation over the past 65 years have been inconsistent 
across time and place in pace and direction (Reardon and Owens 2014), and these trends begin 
with legal declarations throughout modern history. In 1954, the Supreme Court of the United 
States unanimously agreed in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka Kansas (hereinafter, 
Brown) that separate was inherently unequal overturning precedent set in Plessy v. Ferguson 
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1896 that maintained separate and equal spaces. The Court however, largely left enforcement of 
the ruling untouched with its infamous timeline of “all deliberate speed,” declared the following 
year in Brown II. As a result, the evidence suggests that school segregation remained largely 
unchanged in the immediate years after Brown (Clotfelter 2004; Orfield and Eaton 1996). 
 It wasn’t until the following two decades that serious action was taken by Congress and 
the Supreme Court. In 1964, the United States Congress passed the Civil Rights Act, which 
entailed two key aspects pertaining to schools and desegregation efforts. In it, Congress 
authorized the Attorney General of the United States to initiate class actions against school 
districts failing to comply with Brown. It additionally provided the Secretary of Education (est. 
1979; at the time, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare) to withhold federal funding if 
schools excluded on the basis of race. Fourteen years after the Supreme Court ruled in Brown, 
they issued a clear directive that schools must desegregate “root and branch.” The ruling in 
Green v. New Kent County emphasized that schools must make every effort to not only 
desegregate their students, but their teachers, transportation and facilities as well. The Court 
further extended the efforts to desegregate with the ruling in Swann requiring school districts to 
racially balance to the extent possible, even if that required bussing. As evident in time-series 
analyses, sociologists focused on historic change in school segregation show significant declines 
in Southern states’ within-district segregation rates between 1970 and 1980. This trend was 
observed throughout the United States, but especially pronounced in the South (Logan et al. 
2017).2 
 
2 Using the Dissimilarity Index, sociologists show that Southern states’ within-district segregation in 1970 was 83.8, 
but , by the beginning of the following decade (1980), segregation had fallen to 47.3. Similarly, within-district 
segregation for non-Southern states decreased from 74.5 in 1970 to 56.1 by 1980 (Logan et al. 2017: 1068, Table 8). 
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 In large part, the first two decades of Supreme Court rulings after Brown applied to the 
19 Southern and border states along with the District of Columbia that had explicit laws 
permitting or requiring segregation on the basis of race. This is noted by the Court as de jure 
segregation. While it is certainly the case that segregation in the Southern United States at the 
time far exceeded the levels observed in any other region, the evidence does show that 
segregation existed throughout the country. These trends were recognized by the Court in 1973. 
The final decision that marked school desegregation efforts declared in Keyes v. Denver was, if 
segregation resulted from the actions taken by local authorities or school officials, that the 
district must desegregate. This ruling was the first to apply to other regions of the United States 
that did not have de jure segregation (Clotfelter 2004; Orfield and Eaton 1996; Wells and Crain 
1997).3   Without contest, the social scientific literature demonstrates that the 1954 to 1968 
period after Brown maintained high levels of school segregation and the post-Green era, from 
1968 to 1974 showed declining rates of school segregation. While these trends were especially 
pronounced in de jure states, the decline was evident throughout the nation (Clotfelter 2004; 
Hochschild and Scovronick 2003; Reardon et al. 2012; Reardon and Owens 2014; Wells and 
Crain 1994). 
 Key issues did arise, however. While the within-district segregation rates were declining 
during the period, the between-district segregation rates were on the rise based on factors that 
contributed to between-district segregation such as housing loans available to Whites, covert 
discrimination, strategic location of low-income projects, increased suburbanization, as well as 
 
3 Some scholars argue that de facto segregation at the local level is often a result of overt and covert public actions 
to maintain high levels of segregation and should be viewed as form of de jure segregation (Rothstein 2015). 
Scholars point to a number of factors such as housing loans available to Whites, covert discrimination, strategic 
location of low-income projects, increased suburbanization, as well as White flight (Massey and Denton 1993; 
Rothstein 2015). 
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White flight (Massey and Denton 1993; Rothstein 2015). This trend was particularly evident in 
non-Southern states in which school districts are plentiful and often small relative to the much 
larger school districts in the South. As a result, for non-de jure states, those not in Southern and 
border states, the declines of within-district segregation were offset by the increase of 
segregation between school districts (Clotfelter 1999; Clotfelter 2004; Reardon and Owens 
2014). For instance, in non-Southern states, measures of segregation between-districts steadily 
increased while measures of segregation within-districts decreased (Logan et al. 2017). This 
trend is often noted as de facto segregation. 
Efforts to desegregate across school district boundaries were however largely blocked as 
part of the Milliken v. Bradley ruling in 1974 (Hereinafter Milliken). In Milliken, the Court 
declared that school districts were not responsible to participate in interdistrict efforts unless 
plaintiffs could prove discriminatory acts by the state or district (Clotfelter 1999; Clotfelter 2004; 
Reardon and Owens 2014). Consequently, the school segregation literature since the 1980s has 
been less clear. 
 On the one hand, some scholars have characterized the epoch as one of resegregation 
(e.g. Orfield and Eaton 1996; Orfield and Lee 2004; Orfield and Lee 2005; Orfield and Lee 
2007). To them, Milliken and subsequent rulings in the 1990s (e.g. Board of Education v. Dowell 
1991; Freeman v. Pitts 1992 and Missouri v. Jenkins 1995) that allowed schools to be removed 
from Court-ordered oversight have resulted in an increase in school segregation. On the other 
hand, other scholars have made the argument that school segregation throughout the 1990s and 
up through 2010 has changed very little. In fact, Logan et al. (2017) show that school 
segregation, both within- and between-districts, has remained relatively flat or declined slightly 
in and outside of the South (see also Stroub and Richards 2013). At the core of the disagreement 
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is how one measures school segregation. For those that tend to see school segregation as 
increasing, they rely on measures of exposure and isolation indices to support their argument. 
Others that show only modest increases in the early 90s and declines in the 1998 to 2009 period 
rely on measures of evenness (Stroub and Richards 2013). While scholars contend that the 
measures are correlated, they argue that the two are conceptually distinct (Reardon et al. 2012; 
Reardon and Owens 2014). Exposure measures necessarily reflect the relative size of the group 
populations, whereas evenness measures do not. That is, exposure and isolation measures are 
sensitive to the overall racial composition of the school district and metropolitan area. This is a 
significant difference, as the demographics in the United States have changed over time with 
large increases in non-White and non-Black populations (Clotfelter 2004). Evenness measures 
capture changes in distribution of students in schools. For instance, if a school district is 80 
percent Black and if all schools are 80 percent Black, there would be low unevenness, but high 
isolation or Black-Black exposure.  
Most scholars are in agreement that the school segregation levels in the United States 
today are far lower as a result of Brown and the subsequent rulings. For those that use measures 
of evenness, the current emphasis is on between-district segregation, as recent evidence shows 
that relative to within-district segregation, this measure remains remarkably high, especially in 
non-Southern states. The evidence also shows however, that once school districts are released 
from Court oversight as a result of achieving “unitary” status (a status declared by the Court that 
recognizes a district as serving all students, rather than as maintaining separate systems by race, 
Board of Education v. Dowell 1991: Appendix A) or recognized as not liable for undoing de 
facto segregation (Freeman v. Pitts 1992) that the district does not maintain the same levels of 
integration it achieved under supervision (Reardon et al. 2012). In sum, the sociological literature 
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maintains that school segregation has declined significantly since 1954, but that the trends varied 
by region and across time. Today, the largest difference in school segregation is between-
districts. According to Clotfelter (2004) “… Brown started the engine and Green and Swann 
stepped on the accelerator, Milliken and Dowell applied the brakes (Pp 196).”  
 
Assessing why school segregation is predictive of school ratings 
There are a number of reasons to suspect that school ratings may be unevenly distributed across 
schools and districts in a manner that reflects broader inequalities in American society associated 
with residential and school segregation. Given their reliance on performance on standardized 
exams, school ratings likely reflect existing patterns of racial/ethnic and socioeconomic 
disparities in achievement. While the Black-White (Quinn 2015; Yeung and Pfeiffer 2009), and 
Latinx-White (Reardon and Galindo 2009) test score gaps have slightly narrowed in recent 
decades, they have persisted since Brown and remain significantly wide, with Black children on 
the lowest slope of achievement.  Reardon and Galindo (2009) indicate that, at the start of 
Kindergarten, there exist large gaps in reading and mathematics among Black and Latinx 
students relative to White students. More specifically, as students’ progress through education, 
the Latinx-White gap narrows and the Black-White gap widens (Quinn 
2015; Reardon and Galindo 2009). In terms of socioeconomic disparities, findings from the 
seasonal effects literature demonstrate that net of race/ethnicity, socioeconomic gaps in 
achievement widen throughout the summer months but remain steady throughout the school year 
(Condron 2009; Downey 2008; Downey et al. 2004; Downey et al. 2008; Hippel et al. 2018).  
These early gaps are shown to set off wider gaps in subsequent years (Yeung and Pfiffer 2009).  
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This literature suggests that racial/ethnic background tends to influence individual 
academic outcomes (Hogrebe and Tate 2010; Quinn 2015; Reardon and Galindo 2009; Sirin 
2005; Stiefel, Schwartz and Chellman 2007; Yeung and Pfeifer 2009) and that the racial/ethnic 
composition of schools tends to influence overall academic achievement (Caldas and 
Bankston1997; Crosnoe 2005; Hanushek and Rivkin 2009; Helig and Holme 2013; Logan 2010; 
Logan et al. 2012).  In addition, the concentration of students by race/ethnicity and income has 
been shown to exacerbate inequality in academic outcomes due to the unequal distribution of 
resources among schools as well as the stratification of resources deriving from factors outside of 
schools that students bring with them (e.g., differences in family educational attainment, 
poverty/wealth and neighborhood characteristics). For instance, schools with large shares of 
White children provide students with greater access to learning opportunities, while schools with 
larger proportions of non-White children provide students with more limited opportunities. 
Predominantly non-White schools are more likely to be overcrowded and are more likely to be 
staffed by inexperienced and less effective teachers because they are less able to attract and 
retain teachers with greater experience (Kozol 1991; Kucsera, Siegel-Hawley and Orfield 2015; 
Mickelson 2001; Musu-Gillette et al. 2016). By creating resource-rich school environments for 
White students and resource-poor environments for Black students, school segregation 
intensifies stratification between racial/ethnic groups. When White and Black children attend 
racially segregated schools, the evidence shows that on average, White students are surrounded 
by peers that possess more resources (i.e., concentrated advantage), while Black students are 
concentrated in environments that possess fewer (i.e., concentrated disadvantage) (Coleman 
1966; Condron et al. 2013). Together these factors exacerbate racial/ethnic gaps in academic 
achievement (Logan et al. 2012). As Goldsmith (2011: 509) noted, “…in terms of educational 
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outcomes, the students typically enrolled in minority-concentrated schools are a liability for each 
other, and the students typically enrolled in White-concentrated schools are an asset for each 
other.” In short, school segregation is an impediment to equal educational opportunities and a 
key contributor to the racial/ethnic achievement gaps (Card and Rothstein 2009; Condron et al. 
2013; Logan et al. 2012). While achievement scores are one component of state accountability 
rating systems, the association of school segregation and overall school ratings remains 
unexamined.  
Combining the discussion above on educational policy and school ratings with the 
segregation literature, it is expected that school ratings will be differentially distributed across 
schools and school districts serving different groups of students in patterns that reflect existing 
inequalities in academic achievement. First, given the evidence that suggests that segregation 
affects the total quantity and allocation of resources in schools and districts, and the fact that in 
the era of accountability schools are rated and held accountable, in part, for individual student 
achievement on standardized exams, the expectation is that schools will have lower ratings when 
they are located in (a) more segregated districts (within-district segregation) and (b) more 
segregated metropolitan areas (between-district segregation). Specifically,  
 
Hypothesis 1: Schools’ categorical rating will decrease as the racial/ethnic segregation 
within school districts increase. 
 
 
Hypothesis 2: Schools’ categorical rating will decrease as the racial/ethnic segregation 
between school districts increase. 
 
 
Second, because the school segregation literature largely shows that relative to within-
district segregation, between-district segregation remains especially pronounced, it is reasonable 
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to assume that the distribution of vital resources between school districts is more unequal than 
within school districts. If this is the case, it is anticipated that between-district segregation will 
have a larger negative effect on school ratings relative to within-district segregation. This 
association reflects broader patterns of inequality in the allocation of resources between-districts 
being more unequal than within-districts. In other words, it suggests that forces producing 
educational inequality between racial/ethnic groups primarily operate between school districts, 
rather than within school districts (Reardon et al. 2019). Accordingly, 
 
Hypothesis 3:  Racial /ethnic segregation within school districts will be less important in 
 accounting for the association with school ratings than the racial/ethnic segregation 
 between school districts. 
 
 
 
In addition to the unequal distribution of resources, some scholars have focused on the 
role of racial/ethnic concentration in the perpetuation of inequality. As discussed above, this 
stream of research finds that across the United States, non-White groups of students are 
concentrated in schools with lower average test scores (Logan et al. 2012), which is a key 
measure contributing to the overall rating a school receives from its respective state. The 
evidence suggests two specific patterns. First, higher shares of Black student enrollment, rather 
than variations in general minority enrollment (e.g. percent of Latinx student enrollment) 
primarily impact the achievement of non-Latinx Blacks and Whites (Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin 
2009; Goldsmith 2011). Second, the evidence shows that the impact of the concentration of 
Black students operates at multiple levels. At the school-level, previous research finds that high 
levels of the concentration of Black students has a negative effect on student achievement 
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(Caldas and Bankston 1998).4 At the metropolitan-level, scholars have shown that regions with 
larger concentrations of Black students produces larger gaps in achievement between White and 
Black students, net of other characteristics (Reardon et al. 2019). Together, the disparities in 
achievement gaps appear to be jointly shaped by the distribution of resources and students at 
both the school- and metropolitan-level. If school ratings primarily reflect existing inequalities 
and higher levels of segregation indicates a more unequal distribution of essential resources, it is 
expected that the association of lower school ratings in (a) more segregated districts (within-
district segregation) and (b) more segregated metropolitan areas (between-district segregation) 
will depend on schools’ Black student population (see also, Hanushek and Rivkin 2009). Stated 
differently, the negative association of school ratings and measures of segregation will be 
strengthened by schools’ Black student enrollment in more segregated metropolitan regions. 
Thus, 
 
Hypothesis 4: The negative association between schools’ Black population and overall 
rating will be stronger in metropolitan areas with higher levels of between-district Black-
White segregation (i.e., there will be an interaction between the school composition and 
levels of metropolitan segregation). 
 
 
 
To the extent that the accountability ratings are associated with the demographic composition of 
schools and school districts, the rating system itself may ultimately undermine the ability of 
schools to raise achievement for their students. 
 
 
4 See also, Condron et al. 2013. At the state-and school-level, these scholars find that increases in Black–White 
dissimilarity and Black isolation contribute to widening Black-White gaps in both math and reading. Notably, 
Condron et al. (2013) find that increases in the exposure of Black to White students are associated with reductions in 
achievement gaps. 
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Ratings shaping perceptions of school quality 
While school ratings may reflect racial/ethnic segregation and broader patterns of inequality, 
they also serve as an important resource to key stakeholders, including public officials, school 
administrators, and especially parents who may perceive ratings as an indication of school 
quality. To the extent that school ratings actually measure the quality of education students 
receive by incorporating various measures of student growth over time (e.g. Ehlert et al. 2016), 
then there may be less concern about the possibility that school ratings affect perceptions of 
school quality.  If this is the case, school ratings should affect perceptions of quality, because 
they provide stakeholders with an accurate depiction of the degree to which schools are making 
efficient and effective use of various kinds of resources, including state funding and, most 
importantly, student enrollment.  However, to the extent that school ratings merely reflect 
inequalities in the broader society and misrepresent the consequences of these inequalities as if 
they are valid indicators of school quality, their potential effect on perceptions of school quality 
and stakeholders’ decision-making about which schools to invest in becomes much more 
concerning. 
Accountability systems were developed to hold educational institutions responsible for 
student outcomes using various mechanisms of performance report cards connected with explicit 
rewards and sanctions (Deming and Figlio 2016). Within higher education, ratings have been 
shown to be a powerful force in shaping decision-making, enrollment patterns and influencing 
perceptions of organizational prestige (Bowman and Bastedo 2009; Bastedo and Bowman 2010; 
DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Epseland and Sauder 2007; Scott 2013). Within this literature, 
sociologists and educational researchers alike find that ratings influence future assessments of 
reputation and have a significant effect on college choice. For instance, the evidence shows that 
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ranking as a top-tier institution on the front page of the U.S. News Rankings provides a 
substantial increase in admissions the following year (Bowman and Bastedo 2009). Similarly, an 
increase in the performance ratings of hospitals has been shown to attract more patients (Pope 
2009). 
Within primary and secondary education, international studies have shown that 
publicizing school quality indicators in newspapers affects enrollment patterns in the 
Netherlands (Koning and Van der Wiel 2013) and in Portugal (Nunes et al. 2014). In the United 
States, previous qualitative evidence suggested that parents rely on their personal networks to 
determine the quality of a school (Holme 2002). However, more recent experimental work 
during the era of NCLB shows that parents are more likely to choose high scoring schools for 
their children when provided information from standardized exams (Hastings and Weinstein 
2008; Hastings, VanWeelden and Weinstein 2007). Taken together, school ratings may be 
serving as a signal of school quality, whether or not they are an accurate and appropriate 
indicator of how well schools are able to serve their students net of differences in resources.   
This literature largely suggests that ratings not only influence future assessments but also 
future enrollment patterns because they are seen by the public as legitimate, which may impact 
perceptions of school quality. Considered in this vein, one can conceptualize elementary school 
ratings as a vital resource that may shape parents’ perceptions of schools and attitudes toward 
enrollment decisions. To the extent that the accountability ratings influence perceptions and 
attitudes net of satisfactory progress on academic indicators of school quality, the system itself 
may ultimately undermine the ability of lower rated schools to attract and retain high performing 
students. Because previous evidence shows that people perceive a greater difference among 
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school ratings based on the format (e.g., letter grade relative to performance index; Jacobsen, 
Snyder and Saultz 2014), the expectations are that: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Lower school ratings (letter grades) will be associated with lower 
 perceptions of school  quality. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Lower school ratings (letter grades) will be associated with lower 
 perceptions of likely enrolling.  
 
 
METHODS  
Secondary data utilizing a unique data set 
Specific aim #1: To assess the association of school report cards and levels of within-district 
and between-district school segregation. To evaluate this aim, I draw primarily on two kinds of 
data: school accountability report cards distributed by individual states and data on the 
demographic composition of schools. Data for the dependent variable, school rating, come from 
school report cards for public schools across 14 states that utilize similar rating scales (e.g. 1-5, 
A-F; see Appendix C for details). I compiled this unique dataset and it includes school ratings 
from the following states: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah and Wisconsin. Data on 
student demographic information come from The National Center for Education Statistics 
(NCES) Common Core (CCD) which annually reports school-level characteristics for individual 
public schools and districts.  The focus on the metropolitan regions located within these 14 states 
limits the generalizability of the findings. That is, I am unable to make national claims with these 
data. I discuss more limitations in the discussion and sections below. 
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Dependent Variable: Measurement of School Ratings 
The outcome of principal interest in these analyses is an ordinal indicator of school rating. In the 
2017- 2018 school year, these 14 states rated schools within their state on an ordered scale that 
consisted of five distinct categories. Whereas, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, Texas and Ohio utilized an A-F system, 
South Carolina, Utah, and Wisconsin employed an alternative 1-5 scale.5  For each state, each 
category has a range in which the accountability score can fall and are based on annual goals set 
by statewide data. The overall accountability score is the result of the accountability index, 
which is a combination of several different measurements and components for which there is 
sufficient data (Education Commission for the States 2018). Appendix B demonstrates the 
variation across different state indicators in the United States, and Appendix C shows the precise 
measurements by each of the 14 states in which data was available and is included in this 
dissertation. The outcome pools the states’ school ratings for the 2017-2018 school year. To 
examine the outcome, school ratings are treated as an ordered variable on a 5-point scale. 
Hereafter, I refer to all ratings in the ensuing sections as being on the comparable 5-category 
scale and report all findings as the distribution of A, B, C, D and F ratings. 
The analysis includes public schools located in the metropolitan regions of these 14 states 
and is limited to elementary students attending nonvirtual schools. Schools that received 
alternative ratings are also excluded from the analysis.6  Following others (Logan et al. 2004; 
 
5 South Carolina descriptively rated their schools on a five-point scale from “unsatisfactory” to “excellent.” 
Similarly, Utah descriptively rated their schools on a five-point scale from “critical needs” to “exemplary.” 
Wisconsin used a five-star system and rated their schools as 1-star: “fails to meet expectations”  and 5-stars: 
“significantly exceeds expectations.” 
6 At the state-level, NCES indicated 3,905 virtual or supplementary virtual schools. Alternatively rated schools 
included online academies (e.g. e-learning centers), technical/vocational academies, and corrections. The category 
often includes schools with few students tested in the grades and schools without tested grades. May also include 
new schools and schools that serve 100 percent “at-risk” populations.    
 
26 
 
Logan 2012; Logan et al. 2012; Logan et al. 2017), I limit these data to include elementary 
grades, Pre-Kindergarten thru sixth to reduce bias from segregation effects of students in higher 
grades that are drawn from a larger catchment area and those that choose to attend specialized 
high schools outside of their zoned school.7 The final sample includes 10,369 schools. For the 
outcome variable, Figure 1 provides descriptive statistics for the overall sample. Roughly 51 
percent of the schools included in this sample received an A (20.2 percent) or B rating (31.1 
percent). Nearly one third of the sample received a C rating (31.7 percent) and about 17 percent 
of the schools received the lowest state ratings (D: 11.9 percent; F: 5.0 percent).  
 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Focal Independent Variables 
Within-District School Segregation. The focal independent variables in the analysis are the 
levels of 1) within-district segregation as well as 2) between-district segregation. Data for these 
measures come from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) Common Core (CCD) 
which reports school-level characteristics for individual public schools and districts. These data 
include information regarding the total number of students eligible for free/reduced lunch, grade 
specific characteristics such as the racial/ethnic composition as well as characteristics on 
personnel (e.g. student/teacher ratio). This dissertation uses the most recent full version of data 
compiled by NCES for the 2016-2017 school year. To construct the first key independent 
 
7 Compliance with NCES reporting is voluntary. As such, there may be gaps in statewide reports of student 
composition. 
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variable, within-district school segregation, I aggregate the grade specific characteristics from 
NCES up to the school-level. Following others (Logan et al. 2017), only schools with five or 
more Black, Latinx and White students are included in the analysis. I operationalize the evenness 
dimension using the dissimilarity index, focusing on the dissimilarity from non-Latinx whites, 
xDw 
 
= 100(
1
2
∑|
𝑥1
𝑋
−
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where xDw is the dissimilarity between the distribution of group x (Black, Latinx) across n 
schools in the school district and corresponding distribution of non-Latinx Whites, wi is the non-
Latinx White student population of the school and W is the non-Latinx White student population 
of the school district. The final analysis includes 885 school districts. 
Between-District School Segregation. To construct the second focal independent variable, 
between-district school segregation, I aggregate the school specific characteristics discussed 
above to the district-level. Only school districts with two or more elementary schools are 
included in the analysis (Logan et al. 2017; see also Appendix S for sensitivity analyses). Here 
too, I utilize the dissimilarity index to operationalize evenness between school districts at the 
metropolitan-level. Based on the above equation, xDw is the dissimilarity between the distribution 
of group x across n school districts in the metropolis and corresponding distribution of non-
Latinx Whites, wi is the non-Latinx White student population of the school district and W is the 
non-Latinx White student population of the metropolis. Because educational policy differs by 
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state, the final analysis excludes metropolitan regions that cross state boundaries. The final 
analysis includes 112 metropolitan regions with at least 100 Black and 100 Latinx students. 8, 9 
 Measuring segregation with the dissimilarity approach that I have described here 
provides a measure of school segregation that is standardized across different levels of analysis 
where the relative group sizes are different. For within-district measures, the index is based on 
relative shares of students belonging to each racial group in each school for each district. For 
between-district measures, the dissimilarity index is based on information about the relative 
shares of each group in each school district in the metropolis. In total, I calculate four 
dissimilarity index measures for Black-White and Latinx-White students at both the district- and 
metropolis-level. Because I multiplied each of these four measures by 100, the overall index can 
be interpreted as the percentage of the population of group x who would have to either move to 
another school district (e.g. between-district segregation) or switch schools (e.g. within-district 
segregation) in order to achieve complete school integration. Values range from 0 to 100, with 
100 indicating total separation.  
 
[ Insert Table 1 here] 
 
 
8 I include Charlotte/Gastonia/Rock Hill, NC/SC and Texarkana, TX/Texarkana in the analysis however because 
they encompass states contained in the analysis. Eau Claire, WI; Brownsville/Harlingen/San Benito,  
TX; McAllen/Edinburg/Mission, TX; Santa Fe, NM; and  Prescott, AZ were removed from the final analysis based 
on metropolitan demographic considerations. 13 MSAs were removed because they crossed state boundaries. This 
includes: Augusta/Aiken, GA/SC, Duluth/Superior, MN/WI, Evansville/Henderson, IN/KY, Fort Smith, AR/OK, 
Huntington/Ashland, WV/KY/OH, La Crosse, WI/MN, Louisville, KY/IN, Memphis TN/AR/MS, Minneapolis/St. 
Paul, MN/WI, Norfolk/Virginia Beach/Newport News, VA/NC, Parkersburg/Marietta, WV/OH, 
Steubenville/Weirton, OH/WV, Texarkana, TX/Texarkana, AR, Flagstaff, AZ/UT. 
9 I conduct several additional sensitivity analyses to assess the extent to which results presented below are robust to 
different criteria to including specific schools in the analysis sample.  Appendix U includes a series of models with 
more restrictive inclusion criteria. The table includes a restriction to these data for metropolitan regions with at least 
1) 500 Black students, 2) 1,000 Black students, 3) 5,000 Black students, and 4) 10,000 Black students.  The primary 
associations remain substantively the same, including the key interaction association, suggesting that the findings 
presented below are not dependent on the inclusion criteria described above. 
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As shown in Table 1, the average total metropolitan-level segregation between Black and White 
children is highest in the Midwest at 62.8 percent. Conventional standards for classifying 
segregation using dissimilarity values indicate that values above 60 are high, values between 30 
and 60 are moderate and values below 30 are low (Denton and Massey 1989; Kantrowitz 1973; 
Massey and Denton 1988; Massey and Denton 1993; Reardon and Owens 2014). Table 1 also 
shows that school segregation is nominally higher within school districts, relative to between 
school districts, but that this varies by region. Specifically, the average segregation indices across 
groups in Southern states shows that within-district segregation is higher than between-district 
segregation, while the opposite trend is evident in the West and Midwest regions of the United 
States. This pattern has been documented elsewhere (Clotfelter 2004: 63) and is described above 
as an outcome of district size and Supreme Court mandates. These variables are used to test 
Hypotheses 1 through 4. Figure 2 and Figure 3 provide a visual of the spatial density for both 
Black-White and Latinx-White metropolitan segregation within the metropolitan regions of the 
14 states included in this analysis. For an account of segregation indices by each metropolis 
included in the sample, please reference Appendix D. 
 
[ Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
[ Insert Figure 3 here] 
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Additional independent measures. I include several school- and district-level controls in the 
models that may be associated with school segregation and school ratings, including charter 
status, specific type of rating system used in each state (e.g.,  A-F or 1-5), poverty, 
demographics, geographic region, local funding, racial/ethnic composition and the percent White 
population 
School-level controls. At the elementary-level, most children in the United States still attend 
traditional public schools (Goldsmith 2016; Richards and Stroub 2013). However, in recent 
decades, there has been a growth in charter schools, and findings on their effects on achievement 
have been mixed across context, space and among different groups of students (Logan and 
Burdick-Will 2015; Zimmer et al. 2019) with some scholars indicating that enrollment in charter 
schools is a function of school and district segregation (Bifulco and Ladd 2006; Renzulli 2006). 
As such, all analyses control for schools with charter designation to assess the association of 
traditional public schools’ demographics and accountability ratings. Charter status is a binary 
variable reported by NCES, with charter equal to one and non-charter equal to zero. I control for 
charter status across all models. While the 14 states included in these data follow a similar 5-
point scale, they do vary in specific type. I address this difference across all models by including 
a binary control variable for states that employ an A-F system set equal to one and states that use 
an alternative 5-point scale equal to zero. Additionally, I control for different proportions of 
student race and ethnicity at the school-level. Exploratory analyses for race and ethnicity 
revealed that categorical specifications rather than continuous accounts provide a better fit to 
these data. For both Black and Latinx student populations, categories were constructed using 
their respective standard deviations resulting in four distinct categories for Latinx and five 
categories for Black students. The result suggests that different proportions and specifically, 
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schools’ with larger portions of Black and Latinx students are more predictive of school ratings 
relative to schools with relatively fewer Black and Latinx students. According to Table 2, ratings 
and racial composition categories appear to follow a distinct pattern, such that lower rated 
schools have higher proportions of Black students relative to higher rated schools. According to 
these data, 10 percent (7.78 percent + 2.22 percent) of schools receiving F ratings have Black 
student populations that make up 62 percent or more of the schools’ total enrollment. In contrast, 
only about 5 percent (3.43 percent + 1.19 percent) of schools receiving A ratings have a Black 
student population that comprises more than 62 percent of total enrollment. Thus, predominantly 
Black schools were about twice as likely to receive an F as opposed to an A rating.  More 
generally, schools that received higher ratings had proportionally fewer Black students on 
average than those with lower ratings.  
Combining the two highest categories of percent Latinx, Table 2 shows that roughly 15 
percent (9.54 percent + 5.34 percent) of schools receiving an A rating have Latinx student 
populations that are 55 percent or more of total enrollment, while nearly 23 percent (13.78 
percent + 8.67 percent) of the schools receiving an F rating have a Latinx student population 
above 55 percent.  Accordingly, predominantly Latinx schools appear more likely to receive an F 
as opposed to an A rating. The pattern is similar to Black student composition and school ratings, 
but Latinx student composition and school ratings is a weaker, non-monotonic relationship 
across the five categories. Other contextual factors in schools such as poverty have been shown 
to impact student performance (Hogrebe and Tate 2010). Thus, it is reasonable to expect that 
such factors may also impact the extent to which school segregation is associated with school 
ratings. I control for poverty in two ways. First, using data from NCES, I control for school 
poverty by combining the total count of children eligible for free lunch and the total count of 
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children eligible for free or reduced lunch (FRL) and dividing by the total school population. 
Because I multiplied this measure by 100, the overall school poverty rate can be interpreted as a 
percentage.  To address the potential of overcontrol bias, I estimate models with and without 
controls for school and district poverty. These models are presented in the appendix.10 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
District- and metropolitan-level controls. Second, I account for district-level poverty using the 
EDGE School Neighborhood Poverty Estimates.11 This survey relies on household economic 
data based on income data from families with children ages five to 18 who were surveyed over a 
five-year period as part of the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey and public 
school point locations. It is an estimate of the income-to-poverty ratio for the neighborhood 
around public school locations and provides an indicator of local economic conditions in 
neighborhoods where students live (Geverdt and Nixon 2018). The original estimates reflect the 
percentage of family income that is above or below poverty, ranging from zero to a top coded-
value of 999. I reverse code this variable so that higher values correspond to a higher degree of 
neighborhood poverty. I then aggregate these measures to the district-level. 
 
 
10 Including these variables slightly increase the negative association of the focal relationship (.01). Nonetheless, the 
substantive associations observed and discussed in the final models remain and are discussed below.   
11 This measure is moderately (r = 0.53; p<.01) and positively associated with school poverty estimates based on 
FRL estimates. 
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[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Because racial and ethnic demographics are unevenly distributed across the country and because 
court ordered mandates to desegregate schools and districts have been primarily in the Southern 
United States, I control for the region in which the metropolis is located. Following others 
(Clotfelter 1999; Clotfelter 2004; Logan et al. 2004; Orfield and Monfort 1992), region for these 
data is a categorical variable for South (74 percent), Midwest (18 percent) and West (8 percent).   
Restricting the analysis to metropolitan regions in states with 5-category rating scales limits the 
generalizability of these findings.  In particular, Southern states are overrepresented in these data 
(74 percent), while Midwestern and Western states are underrepresented, and states located in 
Northeast region are not represented at all. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Previous literature has demonstrated that school funding is differentially distributed among 
school districts. Because a significant and growing portion of school funding comes from local 
taxes, districts with more expensive housing have higher rates of taxes and subsequently higher 
revenues from school taxes. This contributes to the trend that some districts have more money to 
spend per year on each student relative to other schools. Moreover, differential access to school 
funding provides some districts with greater ability to attract and retain a high quality teaching 
staff (Hochschild and Scovronick 2003; Ostrander 2015), which has the potential to impact 
individual school ratings. Using data from the Public Elementary-Secondary Education Finance 
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Data Survey of School System Finances from the Census of Governments, I estimate models 
with and without a control for the revenue from property taxes in total dollars. According to the 
descriptive statistics, district funding from property taxes ranges between zero and 1.2 million 
dollars. I normalize the distribution of funding by employing the natural log transformation of 
property taxes. There is a notable trend in the descriptive statistics. Specifically, there is a fairly 
strong relationship and a distinct trend with school funding and school ratings. In these data, 
schools with lower school ratings receive less funding on average relative to schools with higher 
ratings. 
Sociologists and educational researchers alike have argued that exposure to students from 
different racial and ethnic backgrounds has long-term effects in challenging the tendency for 
segregation to be perpetuated across institutions and throughout students’ lives (Braddock and 
McPartland 1989; Orfield and Eaton 1996; Wells and Crain 19976). If racial/ethnic group 
members are a minority of a metropolitan region, they tend to experience high levels of exposure 
to the majority regardless of the pattern of evenness (Massey and Denton 1988: 287). To account 
for the extent to which children of different racial/ethnic backgrounds within school districts are 
surrounded by other children from other racial/ethnic backgrounds, I control for the percent of 
White children at one of two levels in all models, at the district- and at the metropolitan-level. 12  
For models of within-district segregation I control for the percent of White children at the 
district-level by aggregating school demographic variables in NCES up to the district, dividing 
by the total student population within the district and multiplying by 100. For models of 
 
12 After calculating exposure indices with these data, I find that Black-White and Latinx-White segregation within 
school districts is negatively associated with Black-White exposure (-0.55*) and Latinx-White exposure (-.52*). 
Black-White and Latinx-White segregation between school districts is positively associated with Black-White 
exposure (.30*) and Latinx-White exposure (.15*). Accordingly, exposure indices are not included in the subsequent 
models. 
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between-district segregation, I control for the percent of White children at the metropolitan-level 
using the method just described, aggregated to the metropolis.13 
Lastly, I generate two dichotomous variables based on court case data compiled by the 
American Communities Project at Brown 
University(https://s4.ad.brown.edu/Projects/USSchools/). These data include 358 court cases that 
resulted in desegregation plans in 850 school districts. It also includes 207 school districts that 
implemented desegregation plans under pressure from the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare (HEW) since 1978. Like others (Logan et al. 2017), I treat HEW actions as equivalent to 
mandates to desegregate. The two variables I generate include “prior mandate” which is equal to 
one if a school district was under a mandate to desegregate between the years of 1980 and 1989 
or zero if not, and “recent mandate” which is equal to one if a school district was under a 
mandate to desegregate since 1990 and zero if not. After restricting these districts to the states in 
this analysis, the descriptive statistics show that 767 schools are located in districts with 
mandates to desegregate since 1990 and that 297 schools are in districts that were under mandate 
prior to 1990.  
 
 
ANALYTIC STRATEGY  
Within-District School Segregation 
The focus of aim#1 is to assess the relationship between school ratings and school segregation. 
Given the ordered character of the dependent variable for school ratings, I first examine the 
 
13 In addition, I effectively control for the percent non-Black, non-Latinx students, by controlling for the focal group 
(e.g. Percent Black categories in the models estimating the effects of B-W (D) segregation) and the other group (e.g. 
Percent Latinx in the models that estimate the “effect” of B-W (D) school segregation)). 
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relationship among school ratings and within-district school segregation using a two-level 
mixed-effects ordered logistic regression model and Stata 15’s meologit commands with 
several postestimations.  
This model contains both fixed and random effects and allows for levels of nested 
clusters of random effects. In terms of a latent linear response, observed ordinal ratings yij can be 
expressed as: 
y*ij = x ij β +z ij u ij +ɛ ij 
and 
y*ij =
{
 
 
 
 
1 𝑖𝑓                                                      y
𝑖𝑗
∗ ≤ k1   
2 𝑖𝑓                                            𝑘1  <  y𝑖𝑗
∗ ≤ k2  
.                                                                              
.                                                                              
𝐾 𝑖𝑓                                             𝑘𝐾−1  <  y𝑖𝑗
∗  
 
 
where latent variable y*ij  represents the underlying continuous measure on which the school 
rating is based in school i in district j, xij are the covariates, β is the regression coefficients for the 
fixed effects and zij are the covariates corresponding to the random effects, u ij (StataCorp 2013). 
Regressing school ratings on the independent variables produces the fixed effects, the estimated 
cutpoints and the estimated variance components. The fixed effects are interpreted in the same 
manner as output produced from an ordered logistic regression. That is, this model predicts the 
natural log of the odds of being in a category less than or equal to k, as a function of a vector of 
independent variables, k – 1 cutpoints. Since the ratings implemented by these states assigns 
each school to one of five distinct categories, k is equal to 5 and thus, there are k-1 = 4 
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thresholds, k1 through k4. This is the most parsimonious approach, given the hypotheses and 
these data (Heeringa, West and Berglund 2010; Long and Freese, 2014).14    
 
Between-District School Segregation 
Second, I examine the relationship among school ratings and between-district school segregation 
with a three-level mixed-effects ordered logistic regression model. Similar to the assessment of 
within-district school segregation, this model contains both fixed and random effects and allows 
for levels of nested clusters of random effects. Following the above equation, the observed 
ordinal ratings are similarly expressed, but they are clustered within an additional level. Here one 
can note y*ijm as the school rating of school i in district j in metropolitan region m. The covariates 
for the fixed effects with regression coefficients are given by β, while zijm are the covariates 
corresponding to the random effects, u ijm (StataCorp 2013; Raman and Hedeker 2005). 
Below I present the results in several ways. First, I present smoothed values from a 
kernel-weighted local polynomial regression of schools’ racial/ethnic composition on levels of 
within- and between-district segregation. Second, I employ a series of mixed-effects ordered 
logistic regression models which includes interactions between school racial/ethnic composition 
and levels of within- and between-district segregation. Third, I present the average marginal 
effects associated with changes in schools’ student population demographics and the broader 
 
14 Ordered logistic regression relies on the proportional odds assumption, such that the parameters do not change for 
different categories (Long and Freese, 2014). To test the parallel line assumption in a single-level ordered logit 
model one can use Stata 15’s brant and oparrallel command options. However, no such test exists in Stata for multi-
level ordered regressions. While the LR test for the multi-level models suggest that the proportional odds 
assumption is not violated, additional informal indications using alternative models (e.g. gologit2 with robust 
clusters) that relax the assumption produces similar results (Fullerton and Xu 2016). I include figures produced from 
gologit2 in the appendix. 
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metropolitan region. Fourth, I present the regression results as predicted probabilities using tests 
of significance based on delta-method standard errors followed by the marginal differences in 
these predicted probabilities (Long and Mustillo forthcoming; Mood 2010; Mustillo, Lizardo and 
McVeigh 2018; Williams 2009).  
 
RESULTS 
Are school ratings associated with school segregation? If so, by what metric (i.e. within- or 
between-district segregation)?  
 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
 
Figure 4 shows smoothed values from a kernel-weighted local polynomial regression of Black-
White within-district segregation on the percent Black student population by school rating. 
Figure 5 shows similar values of Black-White between-district segregation on the percent Black 
student population by school rating. While all five school ratings, from A through F, follow 
broadly similar trends in Figure 4, Figure 5 shows a divergence among schools based on their 
levels of Black-White between-district segregation and Black student population. Specifically, 
Figure 5 shows that as levels of between-district segregation increase, schools with Black 
populations that exceed 50 percent are shown to align more strongly with the failing category 
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(F). Contrastingly, schools that receive an A correspond more strongly with lower levels of 
between-district segregation. 
 
 [Insert Figure 6 here] 
 
[Insert Figure 7 here] 
 
Figure 6 and Figure 7 present similar values for Latinx children and Latinx-White within- and 
between-district segregation. The trendlines shown in Figure 6 are indistinguishable. At few 
thresholds of between-district segregation and Latinx student population, depicted in Figure 7, 
there is a divergence among the school ratings, such as around 50 and near 90 percent Latinx 
student population. For instance, these thresholds suggest that schools that receive an A appear to 
correspond more strongly with lower levels of between-district segregation. Relative to the 
trends shown with Black-White between-district segregation and Black student composition 
however, the pattern of these trendlines are less clear. Figure 8 and Figure 9 present values for 
White children and Black-White between-district segregation. Here too, the trendlines for both 
measures are relatively indistinguishable. There appears to be a notable exception, however. For 
schools that receive an A rating with relatively low levels of White student composition (i.e.,  
below 35 percent) in metropolitan regions with low levels of Black-White segregation (i.e. D < 
30).  Collectively, these findings suggest that the association between school ratings and 
segregation may be most pronounced for measures of between-district segregation and that it 
depends on schools’ racial makeup. 
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[Insert Figure 8 here] 
 
[Insert Figure 9 here] 
 
Figures 5 through 9 suggest that school ratings may be unevenly distributed across schools, but 
that this association differs by student demographics and measures of school segregation. 
Nevertheless, are these differences significant? If so, by what metric (i.e. within- or between-
district segregation)?   
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Within-District School Segregation 
Table 5 and Table 6 present results from the multi-level ordered logistic regressions of within-
district segregation with covariates, including school- and district-level controls. Across both 
models in Table 5, there is evidence that relative to schools with low proportions of Black 
student populations (i.e. 0-19 percent), schools with high proportions of Black student 
populations (i.e. 42-62 percent) have lower odds of being in a higher rated category relative to a 
lower one, net of additional covariates.  Specifically, Model 2 predicts that the odds of a higher 
rating relative to a lower one decreased by about 75 percent for predominantly Black schools 
(i.e. 83-100 percent Black) when compared to schools in which less than one-fifth of the students 
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(i.e. 0-19 percent) were Black (100*(e (-.1.37) -1) = -74.59).  Table 5 shows that relative to schools 
without a recent mandate to desegregate, schools located in districts with a recent mandate (i.e. 
1990-2003) have higher odds of being in a higher rated category relative to a lower one. Model 2 
in Table 5 accounts for school funding in the form of district-level property taxes. The 
coefficient for property taxes is positive and significant, suggesting that schools located in 
districts with higher levels of property taxes have higher odds of being in a higher rated category 
relative to a lower one. This finding is significantly noteworthy from a policy perspective and 
warrants future research. For just a five percent increase in property taxes, the odds of a higher 
school rating versus a lower one are increased by approximately 73 percent (100*(e (.11*5) -1) = 
73.33), controlling for other variables. According to the coefficients in Table 5, the interaction 
between varying proportions of Black students and within-district Black-White segregation is not 
significant.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Table 6 assesses similar associations for schools’ percentage of Latinx students and within-
district Latinx-White segregation. Across both models in Table 6, there is evidence that, 
compared to schools with low proportions of Latinx student populations (i.e., 0-4 percent), 
schools with higher proportions of Latinx student populations (i.e., 56-80 percent) have lower 
odds of being in a higher rated category relative to a lower one, net of additional covariates.15 
More precisely, Model 2 predicts that the odds of a higher rating relative to a lower one 
 
15 The coefficient for schools with high proportions of Latinx student populations (i.e. 81-100 percent) is marginally 
significant under a one-tailed test (i.e. 0.1) in Model 2, but not Model 1. 
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decreased by about 56 percent for schools with 56-80 percent Latinx student composition when 
compared to schools with 0-4 percent Latinx student composition (100*(e (-.83) -1) = -56.40).  
Like in Table 5, the coefficients for segregation and the interaction effect between the two do not 
produce statistically significant associations. In sum, these data appear to fail to support 
Hypothesis 1, that schools’ categorical rating will decrease as the racial/ethnic segregation within 
school districts increase. 
 
Between-District School Segregation 
Table 7 and Table 8 present results from the multi-level ordered logistic regressions of between-
district segregation with covariates, including school-, district- and metropolitan-level controls. 
Across models in Table 7, there are statistically significant negative interaction effects between 
higher proportions of Black students and between-district Black-White segregation. Specifically, 
as segregation levels increase, schools with higher proportions of Black student populations (i.e., 
20-41 percent through 83-100 percent) relative to schools with lower proportions of Black 
student populations (i.e. 0-19 percent) show lower odds of being in a higher rated category 
compared to a lower one, net of additional covariates. The interaction variables show notable 
patterns. The coefficient for B-W Between (D) * 83-100 percent Black, show that given a 
moderate level of metropolitan segregation, schools with higher concentrations of Black students 
receive lower ratings relative to higher ratings, and this is increasingly the case as metropolitan 
segregation increases.  For instance, in metropolitan regions with average levels of segregation in 
these data (D = 36), the predicted odds of a higher rating relative to a lower rating decrease for 
schools with higher proportions of Black students (i.e. 83-100 percent Black) by about 55 
percent (100*(e (.27-.03*36) -1) = -55.5).  For moderately segregated regions (D = 45), the predicted 
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odds of a higher rating relative to a lower rating decrease for schools with higher proportions of 
Black students (i.e. 83-100 percent Black) by 66 percent  
(100*(e (.27-.03*45) -1) = -66.04). Similarly, for highly segregated metropolitan regions (D = 65), 
the predicted odds of a higher rating relative to a lower rating decrease for schools with higher 
portions of Black students (i.e. 83-100 percent Black) by nearly 81 percent (100*(e (.27-.03*65) -1) = 
-81.36).   
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
Model 2 in Table 7 accounts for property tax revenue at the district-level and slightly reduces the 
total number of schools and districts observed in Model 1 (e.g. from 10,369 schools and 112 
districts to 9,138 schools and 102 districts). Again, the coefficient is positive and significant, 
suggesting that schools located in districts with higher levels of property taxes have higher odds 
of being in a higher rated category relative to a lower one. As the percent of students who qualify 
to receive free and reduced lunches (FRL) increase, the odds of a higher rating compared to a 
lower rating decrease. Consequently, for a 10 percent increase in FRL, the odds of a higher 
school rating versus a lower one is decreased by approximately 9.5 percent  
(100*(e (-.01*10) -1) = -9.52), net of other variables.  Relative to schools located on the West coast 
of the United States, schools in the Southern region show lower odds of a higher rating relative 
to a lower one.  
Notably, there is a positive association with the percent of White students at the 
metropolitan-level. In fact, as the percent of White students in the metropolis increase, the odds 
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of a higher rating compared to a lower rating increase, net of additional covariates. This finding 
is likely important for policy makers and merits additional research. For just a one percent 
increase of White students in the metropolis, the odds of a higher school rating versus a lower 
one increases by approximately 43 percent (100*(e (.36*1) -1) = 43.34), controlling for other 
covariates. Compared to traditional public schools, charter schools in these data show higher 
odds of receiving a higher rating compared to a lower rating.16 More precisely, the odds of a 
higher ratings relative to lower one are increased by about 36 percent for charter schools when 
compared to traditional public schools (100*(e (0.31) -1) = 36.34).   
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
Table 8 assesses similar associations for Latinx students and between-district Latinx-
White segregation. Like Table 6, Table 8 shows significant negative coefficients for schools with 
higher proportions of Latinx students. Compared to schools with low proportions of Latinx 
student populations (i.e. 0-4 percent), schools with higher proportions of Latinx student 
populations (i.e. 56-80 percent and 81-100 percent), have lower odds of being in a higher rated 
category relative to a lower one, net of additional covariates.  In Model 2, the odds of a higher 
rating relative to lower one are decreased by about 44 percent for schools with 56-80 percent 
Latinx student composition when compared to schools with 0-4 percent Latinx student 
composition (100*(e-.59 -1) = -44.57) and decreased by 71 percent for schools with 83-100 
percent Latinx population (100*(e-1.24 -1) = -71.06).  Like in Table 5, the coefficients for 
 
16 Across Model 1 and Model 2 in Table 7, there is no evidence that the type of rating a school receives (e.g. A-F 
relative to 1-5) is driving the observed associations. 
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segregation and the interaction effect between the two do not produce statistically significant 
associations.  
Model 2 in Table 8 accounts for property tax revenue at the district-level and slightly 
reduces the total number of schools and districts observed in Model 1 (e.g. from 10,369 schools 
and 112 districts to 9,138 schools and 102 districts). The property tax revenue coefficient is 
again positive and significant. Like in Table 7, this suggests that schools located in districts that 
receive greater amounts of property taxes have higher odds of being in a higher rated category 
relative to a lower one. For a five percent increase in property taxes, the odds of a higher school 
rating versus a lower one is increases by approximately 92 percent (100*(e (.13*5) -1) = 91.55). 
The effect of school poverty is negative and significant. In fact, as the percent of students who 
qualify to receive free and reduced lunches (FRL) increase, the odds of a higher rating compared 
to a lower rating decrease. Relative to schools located in the Western part of the United States, 
schools in the Midwest show higher odds of a lower rating relative to a higher one. For schools 
in the Midwest, the odds of a higher rating relative to lower one are decreased by about 45 
percent compared to schools in the West  (100*(e-.59 -1) = -44.57). Again, there is a positive 
association with the percent of White students at the metropolitan-level. Similar to findings in 
Table 7, Model 2 in Table 8 shows that as the percent of White students in the metropolis 
increase, the odds of a higher rating compared to a lower rating increase, controlling for 
additional variables. Compared to traditional public schools, charter schools show higher odds of 
receiving a higher rating compared to a lower one.17 
 
17 Across Model 1 and Model 2 in Table 8, there is no evidence that the type of rating a school receives (e.g. A-F 
relative to 1-5) is driving the observed associations. 
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Considered together, findings from Table 5, Table 6, Table 7 and Table 8 provide 
evidence that school ratings are unevenly distributed across schools and districts. While there 
appears to be a lack of support for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, there is support for 
Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4. Specifically, racial /ethnic segregation within school districts 
appear to be less important in accounting for the association with school ratings than the 
racial/ethnic segregation between school districts. Indeed, the negative association between 
schools’ Black student population and overall rating is stronger in metropolitan areas with higher 
levels of between-district segregation. The significant interactions in Table 7 between 
race/ethnicity and segregation suggests that the distribution of school ratings depend on the 
various concentrations of Black students. Relative to the racial/ethnic composition and 
segregation interaction at the district-level (within-district segregation), the coefficients at the 
metropolitan-level (between-district segregation) suggest that the distribution of vital resources 
between school districts is more unequal than within school districts. That is, Table 7 suggests 
that the effect of school racial composition on the overall school rating depends on the broader 
segregation levels. 
In recent years, scholars have cautioned against using the coefficient from an interaction 
term in nonlinear models to draw conclusions (Long and Mustillo forthcoming; Mood 2010; 
Mustillo, Lizardo and McVeigh 2018; Williams 2009). Below I show the average marginal 
effects associated with differences in schools’ student composition categories.18  Then I present 
the regression results from Table 7 and Table 8 as predicted probabilities using tests of 
 
18  In the Appendix, I show Table 9 and Table 10 with a continuous measure of Black student and Latinx 
composition, respectively. Appendix Q and Appendix R show the average marginal effects associated with a one 
standard deviation increase in percent Black by Black-White between-district segregation and a one standard 
deviation increase in percent Latinx by Latinx-White between-district segregation. It is generated using the same 
covariates shown in Table 7 and Table 8, but in order to show a standard deviation change, I replace the categorical 
variable for student composition with the linear formations. This replacement shows substantively similar 
associations to models using the categorical version of this variable. 
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significance based on the delta-method for calculating standard errors (Long 2009; Xu and Long 
2005).  
 
[Insert Table 9] 
 
Table 9 shows the average marginal effects associated with categorical comparisons of 
schools’ Black student composition by various levels of metropolitan-level Black-White 
segregation. Across all metropolitan regions included in the analyses, schools with larger shares 
of Black students decreases the probability of receiving an A or B rating and increases the 
probability of receiving a D or F rating. For instance, compared to schools with 0-19 percent 
Black students, schools with 20-41 percent Black students decrease the probability of receiving 
an A rating by .034 (-.034; p < 0.01) and increase the probability of receiving an F rating by .012 
(p < 0.01). Similarly, compared to schools with 0-19 percent Black students, schools with 83-100 
percent Black students decrease the probability of receiving an A rating by .089 (-.089; p < 0.01) 
and increase the probability of receiving a D rating by .066 (p < 0.01) and an F rating by .057 ( p 
< 0.01). This trend remains throughout the table when comparing schools with high proportions 
of Black students relative to low proportions. For schools with majority Black students, there are 
no significant differences between the highest thresholds (i.e. schools with 83-100 percent Black 
relative to schools with 63-82 percent Black). 
For metropolitan regions with medium to high levels of segregation (i.e. D > 30), the 
associations described above are strengthened. For example, relative to schools with 0-19 percent 
Black students, schools with 20-41 percent Black students decrease the probability of receiving 
an A rating by .054 (-.054; p < 0.01) and increase the probability of receiving an F rating by .021 
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(p < 0.01). This suggests that in more highly segregated metropolitan regions, schools with 
relatively moderate levels of Black students (e.g. 20-41 percent) have an increased probability of 
receiving an F which is nearly double the probability of receiving an F rating when all 
metropolitan regions are considered. This trend remains throughout the table. Consider schools 
with 0-19 percent Black students compared to schools with 83-100 percent Black students. Here, 
there is a decrease in the probability of receiving an A rating by .145 (-.145; p < 0.01) and an 
increase in the probability of receiving an F rating by .108 ( p < 0.01). In more segregated 
regions, Table 9 suggests that as schools’ Black student composition increases, the probability of 
receiving a higher school rating decreases and the probability of receiving a lower school rating 
increases (see also Appendix Q for linear form). In metropolitan regions with low levels of 
Black-White segregation, there is no evidence that changes in schools’ Black student population 
impacts the probability of a higher or lower school rating. This indicates that variations in 
schools’ Black student populations in and of themselves do not produce significant differences. 
Instead, Table 9 suggests that the association between school demographic characteristics and 
overall school rating depends on the broader levels of metropolitan segregation.  
 
[Insert Table 10] 
 
Table 10 shows the average marginal effects associated with categorical comparisons of 
schools’ Latinx student composition by various levels of metropolitan-level Latinx-White 
segregation. The first section of the table shows all metropolitan regions included in the analyses. 
Like Table 9, Table 10 shows that schools with larger shares of Latinx students decreases the 
probability of receiving an A or B rating and increases the probability of receiving a C, D or F 
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rating. Relative to schools with 0-4 percent Latinx students, schools with 56-80 percent Latinx 
students decrease the probability of receiving an A rating by .114 (-.114; p < 0.01) and increase 
the probability of receiving an F rating by .039 (p < 0.01). Likewise, compared to schools with 0-
4 percent Latinx students, schools with 81-100 percent Latinx students decrease the probability 
of receiving an A rating by .126 (-.126; p < 0.01) and increase the probability of receiving a D 
rating by .068 (p < 0.01) and an F rating by .045 ( p < 0.01). This trend remains throughout the 
table when comparing schools with high proportions of Latinx students relative to low 
proportions (see also Appendix R for linear form). Similar to Table 9, Table 10 shows no 
significant differences between the highest thresholds (i.e. schools with 81-100 percent Latinx 
relative to schools with 56-80 percent Latinx). 
Considering regions with medium to high levels of segregation (i.e. D > 30), the 
associations described above are similar though less pronounced for some categories. For 
instance, compared to schools with 0-4 percent Latinx students, schools with 56-80 percent 
Latinx students decrease the probability of receiving an A rating by .116 (-.116; p < 0.01) and 
increase the probability of receiving an F rating by .051 (p < 0.01). The difference between these 
categories is slightly strengthened in relation to considering all metropolitan regions. However, 
the difference between schools with the highest proportions of Latinx students and schools with 
the lowest proportions is slightly decreased. Specifically, relative to schools with 0-4 percent 
Latinx students, schools with 81-100 percent Latinx students decrease the probability of 
receiving an A rating by .104 (-.104; p < 0.01) and increase the probability of receiving a D 
rating by .055 (p < 0.01) and an F rating by .042 ( p < 0.01).  This may suggest that in more 
segregated metropolitan regions, schools with relatively high levels of Latinx students (e.g. 81-
100 percent) have a less negative impact on the probability of a higher rating relative to a lower 
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rating. This is distinct from the trends shown above for schools with higher proportions of Black 
students. In fact, the final portion of Table 10 may provide some insight. In metropolitan regions 
with low levels of segregation, the vast difference appears to be between schools with the highest 
levels of Latinx student populations (e.g. 81-100 percent) relative to schools with lower 
proportions of Latinx students. For instance, relative to schools with 0-4 percent Latinx students, 
schools with 81-100 percent Latinx students decrease the probability of receiving an A rating by 
.108 (-.108; p < 0.01) and increase the probability of receiving a D rating by .056 (p < 0.01) and 
an F rating by .032 ( p < 0.01).  This indicates that variations in schools’ Latinx student 
populations in and of themselves may produce significant differences that does not depend on the 
broader levels of metropolitan segregation. In less segregated metropolitan regions, schools with 
larger portions of Latinx students appear to have a lower probability of receiving a higher rating. 
I expand on these findings below, but caution the reader on their generalizability given that no 
metropolitan regions in these data include areas that meet conventionally high values of 
segregation for Latinx-White (e.g. D >60; Denton and Massey 1989; Kantrowitz 1973; Massey 
and Denton 1988; Massey and Denton 1993; Reardon and Owens 2014). 
 
[Insert Figure 10] 
 
Figure 10 graphs the unequal distribution of school ratings. It shows how the predicted 
probability of school ratings (A-F) varies by Black student concentration and between-district 
Black-White segregation (i.e., the interaction effects from Table 7). These predictions are 
computed from the regression results in Table 7 when control variables are held at their mean 
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values (Long and Freese 2014). The X-axis represents the predicted probabilities of the different 
school ratings on the Y-axis (A-F).  
Figure 10 shows a six-panel graph of schools with categorical thresholds for Black 
student concentration and two continuous measures of between-district Black-White segregation 
(i.e., the interaction effects from Table 7). The top left graph in Figure 10, panel 1, shows the 
predicted probabilities of school ratings for schools with 0-19 percent Black students located in a 
metropolis with a segregation index equal to 0.19 Here, the predicted probability (pp = .246, ub = 
.293, lb = .206) of a school receiving an A rating is substantially higher than the predicted 
probability of a school receiving a D (pp =.101, ub = .121, lb = .081) or F (pp =.045, ub = .057, 
lb = .033) rating, where "ub" is the upper bound of the confidence interval and "lb" is the lower 
bound. In other words, the probability of schools with 0-19 percent Black students in 
metropolitan regions with no segregation in receiving an A rating is more than twice as high as 
the probability of receiving a D rating. This trend remains similar for the following two panels on 
the top half of the six-panel display. Regardless of the level of metropolitan segregation, schools 
with low shares of Black students do well (i.e., most receive a B or C letter rating, and many also 
receive A ratings). This is evident in the top left and top middle panel, panel 1 and panel 2. This 
suggests that, in and of themselves, high levels of segregation do not produce substantial 
differences. Similarly, comparing the top left panel (panel 1) l to the top right panel (panel 3) 
shows that having a larger share of Black students also doesn’t make much difference either, 
given low levels of metropolitan segregation. 
 
19 In the appendix, I present the cross-tabulations of the data by selected points to demonstrate the total amount of 
schools in these data that meet the fixed covariates. I use STATA 15.1’s margin commands and specify values for 
covariates to be fixed with the at(atspec) option. Appendix also includes additional at(atspec) options representing 
similar patterns shown in Figures 10-13. 
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Notably, the bottom left graph in Figure 10, panel 4, shows the predicted probabilities of 
school ratings for schools with 40-62 percent Black students located in a metropolis with a 
segregation index equal to 70. Here, the predicted probability of a school receiving an A (pp 
=.120) rating has decreased and the predicted probability of a school receiving an F (pp =.106) 
rating has increased, relative to the previous three-panels. While the predicted probability of a 
school receiving an A rating appears to be substantially different than the predicted probability of 
a school receiving a B or C rating, the probability is indistinguishable from a school receiving a 
D or F rating. The final panel, panel 6, in the bottom right corner presents the predicted 
probabilities of school ratings for schools with 83-100 percent Black student concentration 
located in a metropolis with a segregation index equal to 70. This graph shows that the predicted 
probability of receiving an A (pp =.061, ub =.093, lb = .029) rating has decreased and differs 
substantially from the chance of receiving a C (pp =.335, ub = .369, lb = .299) or D (pp =.249, ub 
= .293, lb = .206) rating. Most notably, the predicted probability of a school with these 
characteristics receiving an F rating is .195, which is more than two times greater than the 
predicted probability of receiving an A (pp =.061) rating.  Relative to the top middle panel (panel 
2), the bottom right (panel 6) and bottom left panel (panel 4) show clearly that schools with more 
Black students have higher predicted probabilities of receiving a lower rating, given higher levels 
of metropolitan segregation. Conversely, consider the top left (panel 1), top right (panel 3) and 
bottom middle panels (panel 5), collectively these demonstrate that changes in schools’ Black 
student composition does not have a significant impact on overall school rating, given low levels 
of segregation. 
 
[Insert Figure 11 here] 
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Figure 11 shows a six-panel graph of schools with categorical thresholds for Latinx 
student concentration and two continuous measures of between-district Latinx-White segregation 
(e.g. the interaction effects from Table 8). The top left panel in Figure 11, panel 1, shows the 
predicted probabilities of school ratings for schools with 0-4 percent Latinx students located in a 
metropolis with a segregation index equal to 0.20  Figure 11 shows that the predicted probability 
of a school with these characteristics receiving an A (pp =.278, ub = .305, lb = .203) rating is 
higher than the predicted probability of a school receiving a D (pp =.089 ub = .116, lb = .061) or 
F (pp =.039, ub = .054, lb = .023) rating. Put differently, the probability of schools with 0-4 
percent Latinx students in metropolitan regions with no segregation in receiving an A rating is 
more than three times as high as the probability of receiving a D rating. This trend remains 
similar for the following two panels on the top half of the six-panel display. 
The bottom middle panel of Figure 11, panel 5, shows the predicted probabilities of 
school ratings for schools with 81-100 percent Latinx students located in a metropolis with a 
segregation index equal to 0. Here, the predicted probability of a school receiving an A (pp 
=.113) rating has decreased, and the predicted probability of a school receiving an F (pp =.114) 
rating has increased, relative to the previous four-panels. The final panel in the bottom right 
corner, panel 6, presents the predicted probabilities of school ratings for schools with 81-100 
percent Latinx student concentration located in a metropolis with a segregation index equal to 
50. This graph shows that the predicted probability of receiving an A (pp =.177, ub = .225, lb = 
 
20 See Appendices for the cross-tabulations of the data by selected points to demonstrate the total amount of schools 
in these data that satisfy the fixed covariates. I use STATA 15.1’s margin commands and specify values for 
covariates to be fixed with the at(atspec) option. 
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.130) differs substantially from the likelihood of receiving a C (pp =.327, ub = .354, lb = .300), D 
(pp =.138, ub = . 170, lb = .108) or F (pp =.070, ub = .093, lb = .048) rating. 
Below I provide four additional figures that contain the marginal differences in the 
predicted probability of school ratings for schools that receive an A and schools that receive an F 
rating for both Black student concentration and Latinx student concentration and their respective 
between-district segregation indices.  
 
[Insert Figure 12 here] 
 
Figure 12 presents the predicted probabilities of schools for each categorical threshold for Black 
student concentration and two levels of between-district Black-White segregation. Figure 12 
shows two trendlines. The solid line represents metropolitan regions with a segregation index of 
.5, while the dashed line represents metropolitan regions with a segregation index of 71.5. Figure 
14 shows a significant and widening gap in the predicted probability of receiving an A rating as 
both measures increase. Specifically, the likelihood of receiving an A rating decreases rapidly as 
the Black student composition increases in metropolitan regions with high rates of segregation 
(i.e. D = 71.5). For schools with 83-100 percent Black students located in highly segregated 
metropolitan regions, the predicted probability of receiving an A is .059, which is substantially 
lower than the likelihood of schools in similarly segregated metropolitan regions with 0-19 
percent Black students (pp =.237) and schools with 20-41 percent Black students (pp =.170). 
This is a distinct trend relative to schools with varying levels of Black student populations 
located in metropolitans with low segregation levels (i.e. D =. 5). In fact, for the latter trendline, 
the predicted probabilities of receiving an A rating are indistinguishable.  
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[Insert Figure 13 here] 
 
Figure 13 presents similar trendlines for schools’ predicted probability of receiving an F 
rating. Like Figure 12, Figure 13 shows two trendlines. The dashed line represents metropolitan 
regions with a segregation index of .5, and the solid line represents metropolitan regions with a 
segregation index of 71.5. Figure 13 shows a substantial and widening gap in the predicted 
probability of receiving an F rating as both measures increase. In fact, the probability of 
receiving an F rating increases as the Black student concentration increases in metropolitans with 
high rates of segregation (i.e. D = 71.5). For schools with 83-100 percent Black students located 
in highly segregated metropolitan regions, the predicted probability of receiving an F is .201, 
which is statistically substantially higher than the likelihood of schools with 0-19 percent Black 
students (pp =.048) and schools with 20-41 percent Black students (pp =.072). In other words, 
the difference in receiving an F is more than four times greater for schools with higher Black 
student compositions relative to schools with lower proportions (pp=.048*4) = .019). Similar to 
Figure 12, Figure 13 represents a notable trend relative to schools with varying levels of Black 
student populations located in metropolitans with low segregation levels (i.e. D = .5). Here too, 
the trendline representing low levels of segregation shows that the predicted probabilities of 
receiving an F rating are indistinguishable. I expand on these findings below.  
 
[Insert Figure 14 here] 
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Figure 14 presents the predicted probabilities of schools with each categorical threshold 
of Latinx student concentration and two-levels of between-district Latinx-White segregation. 
There are two trendlines. The solid line represents metropolitan regions with a segregation index 
of 0, and the dashed line represents metropolitan regions with a segregation index of 55.  
Because of the confidence interval overlap on each level, Figure 14 shows indistinguishable 
trendlines representing the predicted probability of receiving an A rating across various Latinx 
student compositions for both high and low metropolitan segregation.  In other words, the 
evidence shows that, unlike Figure 12, the interaction of schools’ proportion of Latinx students 
with broader metropolitan segregation does not produce substantially different predictions. 
 
[Insert Figure 15 here] 
 
Figure 15 shows the predicted probabilities of schools with each category of Latinx student 
composition along with measures of between-district Latinx-White segregation. The two 
trendlines represent metropolitan regions with a segregation index of 0 and with a segregation 
index of 55. Like Figure 14, Figure 15 shows indistinguishable trendlines among the segregation 
indices, representing the predicted probability of receiving an F rating across each category of 
Latinx student composition. Here too, the evidence shows that unlike Figure 13, the interaction 
of schools’ proportion of Latinx students with broader metropolitan segregation does not 
demonstrate substantial differences. 
To summarize, the findings from aim#1 provide answers to several questions posed at the 
beginning of this dissertation. First, the results show that neither measures of within- or between-
district segregation predict school ratings when considered solely as a focal independent 
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variable. In other words, the findings show no support for Hypothesis 1 or Hypothesis 2. 
However, there is evidence of an interaction effect between school demographic characteristics 
and levels of racial/ethnic segregation that predict school accountability ratings. To be clear, the 
findings show that school ratings are associated with schools’ Black student composition and 
that this association strengthened depending on levels of between-district Black-White and the 
broader metropolitan landscape. In more segregated metropolitan regions, the data show that 
schools with higher proportions of Black students have higher probabilities of receiving a lower 
school rating relative to a higher one. Figure 12 and Figure 13 capture the most extreme 
outcomes of the accountability system – receiving an A and receiving an F overall letter grade. 
Here, there is a distinct pattern which documents the importance of the interaction of school 
demographics and metropolitan segregation. The findings do not show the same association for 
schools’ Latinx student populations or between-district Latinx-White segregation. It is important 
to note however, that between-district Latinx-White segregation does not exceed a dissimilarity 
index of 55 (e.g. Table 1) in these data, whereas between-district Black-White segregation 
reaches a maximum of 72.3 in some regions. This suggests that between-district Latinx-White 
segregation in these data do not meet the criteria indicative of high segregation (e.g. values 
above 60) (Denton and Massey 1989; Kantrowitz 1973; Massey and Denton 1988; Massey and 
Denton 1993; Reardon and Owens 2014). With that said, within-district Latinx-White 
segregation does exceed a dissimilarity value of 60, but the evidence does not suggest similar 
associations when considered at the district-level (e.g. Table 6; Figure 6). Notably, this finding 
must be considered within the limits of these data. These data are a subsample of the United 
States and while research primarily finds stable trends in Latinx-White segregation, there is 
evidence from other metropolitan regions not included in this analysis (e.g. including but not 
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limited to, Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA; Salinas, CA; Minneapolis-St. Paul-
Bloomington, MN; Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA) that show increasing rates of 
Latinx-White segregation (Logan and Stults 2011: Table 4: 12-13). 
Due to the lack of evidence shown by using measures of within-district segregation, these 
results suggest that patterns of inequality in the allocation of resources are more unequal between 
school districts, rather than within (Reardon et al. 2019). School demographics in isolation do 
not appear to be driving association. Instead, the divergence among the trendlines reflects a 
jointly shaped unequal distribution of resources and students at both the school- and 
metropolitan-level. This association raises serious questions about the equitability of the report 
card system implemented across the United States, not only because it appears to be penalizing 
an already disadvantaged group of students and schools, but also because it may be reinforcing 
patterns of segregation by deterring potential families from moving into certain schools and 
districts. The second part of this dissertation examines part of this latter claim, about perceptions 
of the school quality as well as the extent to which these policies influence parents’ decision-
making to enroll their children in schools. 
 
 
METHODS  
Primary data utilizing an experimental design  
Specific aim #2: To offer new evidence and discovery on the potential impacts of school ratings 
on perceptions of school quality and enrollment decisions. The second major component of the 
dissertation is designed to assess how different overall school ratings influence (a) parents’ 
perceptions of school quality and (b) their attitudes toward enrolling their child or children in a 
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hypothetical school. Data for this study rely on primary data collection utilizing the online 
survey platform, Qualtrics, and the solicitation of respondents via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk), a mechanism similar to the solicitation of a traditional panel.21 Qualtrics was ideal for 
survey development because it has a built-in feature that allows for the randomization of 
exposure groups and can simultaneously fix the question order and hold constant the school 
performance metrics. Qualtrics also has a random number generator that was used to maintain 
confidentiality and to ensure that respondents from MTurk received payment. Following the 
completion of the survey, respondents received a random code that they could copy and paste 
into MTurk for payment. Based on previous compensation rates and online discussion boards, 
the recommended rate of paying a survey respondent was between $6.00 and $7.25 an hour 
which translates to between $0.10 and $0.12 a minute (https://www.mturk.com/pricing). Because 
the Federal minimum wage in the United States is $7.25 an hour and the expectation was that the 
survey would take between 3 and 5 minutes to complete, I paid a compensation rate of $0.60 per 
respondent.22, 23 
Because this study focuses on the extent to which ratings impact parents’ perceptions of 
school quality and enrollment decisions, respondents were limited to adult parents in the United 
States with children under the age of 21. I assessed if respondents fit this criterion in three ways. 
First, the consent form included two eligibility requirements that respondents agreed to – I am at 
 
21 A blind proposal was submitted to the Time-Sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences Short Studies Program 
(SSP) (Druckman and Freese 2012; Quadlin 2019). Unfortunately, the study was not accepted due, in part, to the 
population parameters of identifying parents in the United States. 
22 Additional Amazon fees ($0.24 for each respondent). 
23 Prior to launching the survey, I conducted 9 cognitive pre-tests to investigate the reliability and validity of the 
experiment. This process confirmed that overall school rating may impact decisions of enrollment, a finding that is 
consistent with international research (Koning and Van der Wiel 2013; Friesen et al. 2012). Put differently, net of 
neutral indicators of “School and District Performances” such as “Adequate Yearly Progress” in closing the 
achievement gap, overall rating appeared to drive decision-making on this sample. 
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least 18 years old and I am a parent of a child/children between the ages of 0 and 21 years old. 
Second, through a parameter identification built into Amazon’s qualification criterions, I was 
able to restrict the panel of respondents to parents located in the United States.24  Third, the first 
question on the survey asked respondents Are you a parent [Please select one]. Respondents that 
selected “No” in response to this question were sent to the end of the survey and excluded from 
the data. A power analysis revealed that 385 parents provides a 95 percent confidence interval 
and 5 percent margin of error.25  In early 2020, 461 respondents self-selected to participate in the 
experiment, and of those who opted-in, 414 fully completed the study. The completion rate is 
89.8 percent. Descriptive statistics for the sample are reported below. 
While this sample is indeed limited in its generalizability (i.e. does not maintain a 
nationally representative panel of respondents), employing an experimental design provides 
internally valid causal inferences of how ratings influence parents’ perceptions of school quality 
and attitudes toward enrollment decisions (Pedulla 2016; Quadlin 2018). Moreover, MTurk is 
becoming a widely used tool by social scientists to recruit panel participants and to provide 
empirical evidence to stimulate future research in their respected areas of expertise (Buhrmester, 
Kwang and Gosling 2011; Cusatis and Garbarski 2018).  
 
 
24 Qualification criterions include many variables including but not limited to, parental status, location, finances, 
employment, political ideology, marriage status, device-types. In combination with criterion types, requesters are 
able to select sub-categories such as gender or online purchase types 
https://www.mturk.com/help#how_use_premium_qualifications). 
25 I use the following equation to calculate the sample size needed for a 95 percent confidence interval with a 5 
percent margin of error (e): 
𝑧2𝑝(1−𝑝)
𝑒2
𝑧2𝑝(1−𝑝)
𝑒2 𝑁
  I substitute z with the z-score 1.96, and N with the United States parent 
population estimate: 33,552,189 (U.S. Census Bureau. 2013-2017). After calculation, I find that I must recruit 
384.15 parents. I round to the nearest whole number and find that the minimum sample size needed is 385 parents. 
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[Insert Table 11 here] 
 
 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
I collected new survey data using a between-subject experimental design to investigate how 
parents respond to school ratings (A-F), net of school performance measures. Respondents were 
randomly assigned to be exposed to one of five school ratings (i.e. A-F) that described a 
hypothetical school profile. To optimize the analysis using this design, participants were 
presented the same questions in the same order (Charness, Gneezy and Kuhn 2012). While the 
overall school rating was experimentally manipulated, each participant viewed the same four 
“School and District Measures of Performance” (Student Achievement on Standardized Tests, 
Growth in Student Achievement Over Time, Closing Achievement Gaps With Other Students 
and On-Track to Graduation) and corresponding “Adequate Yearly Progress” notation (see 
Appendix X for Survey Instrument). To be clear, the between-subject experimental design 
exposed respondents to only one treatment (i.e.,. one school rating). This is distinct from a 
within-subject experimental design in which respondents are exposed to more than one of the 
treatments. In general, scholars have noted between-subject designs as more conservative in their 
estimations and have cautioned against carry-over and spurious effects from within-subject 
designs (Charness et al. 2012). Prior to viewing a random school profile of Cedar Elementary 
each respondent was provided with the following statement: 
“School. The following page shows report card data for Cedar Elementary School. 
Cedar Elementary is a public school. The performance of Cedar Elementary has been 
measured by the school's performance index scores and is listed for each area. Each 
category is rated as below, adequate or exceeds yearly progress. The overall rating is a 
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weighted combination of these measures. The overall rating scale is A-F. With the 
provided data, please answer the following questions.” 
 
For each participant, the hypothetical school was given the name Cedar Elementary School. 
Figure 16 indicates that the distribution of respondents by exposure group is similar. That is, 
roughly a fifth of the total sample were exposed to each possible school rating (i.e. A-F).  
 
[Insert Figure 16  here] 
 
 
OUTCOME MEASURES 
After they had read the profile for Cedar Elementary, respondents were asked two key questions 
of interest. First, participants were asked: Imagine the ideal overall school rating for you and 
your household. How well do you think Cedar Elementary compared with your ideal? Second, 
participants were asked: Imagine Cedar Elementary was your local neighborhood school. If cost 
were not an issue, how likely do you think you and your household would be to decide to enroll 
your child in Cedar Elementary School versus an Alternative School (such as a private school, 
voucher or charter)? To examine these outcomes as continuous variables on a 6-point scale, 
responses were coded so that higher scores mean closer to ones’ ideal and more likely to enroll 
in Cedar Elementary. 
 
.[Insert Figure 17 here] 
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Perceptions of school quality 
For the first outcome variable, perceptions of school quality, Figure 17 provides the unweighted 
means and corresponding confidence intervals of the distribution of respondents by exposure 
group. Relative to those that viewed a lower rated school profile (e.g. C, D or F), those that 
randomly viewed a higher rated profile (e.g. A or B) show, on average, higher rates of indicating 
that Cedar Elementary more closely aligned with their ideal school type. As shown in Figure 17, 
the average differences between those who viewed A or B rated schools relative to C, D or F 
schools appear to be distinct from one another (i.e. the confidence intervals for higher ratings do 
not overlap with lower ratings). Based on tests for independence, the distribution of participant 
responses and school rating appear to be completely independent (χ2 (20) =  65.01 ; p < 0.01). 
 
[Insert Figure 18 here] 
 
 
Likelihood of enrollment 
For the second outcome variable, likelihood to enroll, Figure 18 shows the unweighted means 
and corresponding confidence intervals of the distribution of participants by school rating. The 
pattern of distribution is similar to perceptions of school quality. Here too, tests for independence 
show that the distribution of participant responses and school rating appear to be completely 
independent (χ2 (20) =  133.41; p < 0.01). Relative to those that viewed a lower rated school 
profile (e.g. C, D or F), those that randomly viewed a higher rated profile (e.g. A or B) reported, 
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on average, a higher average likelihood of enrolling their children in Cedar Elementary. As 
shown in Figure 18, these differences are significantly different from one another. 
 
Independent Variables 
While the effects of school report card ratings should be relatively similar across various 
sociodemographic characteristics because of the random assignment of participants into exposure 
groups (Mutz 2011), I include additional independent variables to assess if there are relationships 
between controls and participant’s responses (i.e. whether responses vary by race/ethnicity, 
gender or number of children). In addition to the experiment, the survey included several 
questions to obtain pertinent demographic information.  
Political views are measured on a six-point scale, from extremely liberal (1) to extremely 
conservative (6), and were coded so that the responses with higher values correspond to stronger 
conservative identification.26  Education is measured on a six-point scale and was coded so that 
the responses with higher values correspond to higher levels of education. Age is measured in 
years and gender is a binary variable, with female equal to one and male equal to zero. 
Race/ethnicity is measured with categories for Black, White, Latinx, Asian and Other. Total 
number of children is measured with categories from 1 (1) to more than 5 (6). To examine these 
responses as a binary variable, responses were collapsed to create a dichotomous variable, with 
one equal to 1 or 2 children and 3 or more children equal to zero. The type of school that the 
respondent sent or send their child/ren to is measured with categories for Public, Private, Charter, 
Voucher and Other.27 Lastly, I capture geographic location based on the state location provided 
 
26 I utilized similar language to how this question is asked on the General Social Surveys (Smith et al. 1972-2018). 
27 For those that selected other, there was an option for a write in response. 6 respondents indicated that they 
homeschooled their child. 
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by the participants. Similar to the first study above, I collapse states into regions of the United 
States and treat region as a four-item categorical variable. 
 Table 11 shows descriptive statistics for the 414 participants in the survey experiment. 
The average age of the sample is 35, the majority are White (66 percent) or Black (23 percent) 
and most have 1 or 2 children (79 percent). A majority of respondents identify as male (62 
percent), and most indicate that they send/sent their child/ren to a public school (63 percent). 28 
 
 
ANALYTIC STRATEGY  
Perceptions of school quality 
To understand how parents’ think about the quality of Cedar Elementary, results are shown 
using continuous forms of the outcome. Perceptions of school quality are recorded on a 6-point 
scale and responses were coded so that higher scores mean Cedar Elementary is closer to ones’ 
ideal school. First, I show the average percentage of perceptions and use chi-square tests of 
independence to determine if cross-tabulations are independent. Second, I employ a series of 
ordinary linear regression models which includes sociodemographic covariates. Third, I present 
the regression results as predicted values. 
 
Likelihood of enrollment 
 
28 Males appear to be overrepresented in these data. This is not necessarily typical of data collected using MTurk 
(see Antoun et al. 2016; Cusatis and Garbarski 2018 for data with female overrepresentation) but it is also not 
uncommon and is consistent with several other research (see Boas, Christenson and Glick 2018; Krupnikov and 
Levine 2014; Levay, Freese, and Druckman 2016; for data with male overrepresentation). 
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To assess how the profile of Cedar Elementary impacts parents’ decisions to enroll in the 
hypothetical school, results are shown using continuous forms of the outcome. Enrollment 
decisions are recorded on a 6-point scale and responses were coded so that higher scores indicate 
a greater likelihood likely to enroll in Cedar Elementary. I present the results in the same manner 
described above for perceptions of school quality. 
 
 
RESULTS  
Perceptions of school quality 
 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
 
 Do school ratings impact parents’ perceptions of schools? Model 1 in Table 12 presents the 
coefficients from a linear regression. The model establishes that overall school rating statistically 
significantly predicts parents’ perceptions of schools (F(4, 416) = 22.80, p < 0.01), and that 
overall rating accounted for 18 percent of the explained variability in parents’ perceptions. 
Model 1 in Table 12 presents the regression coefficients for school ratings that predict parents’ 
chances of indicating Cedar Elementary is closer to their ideal school. This base model shows 
that compared to parents’ that viewed an overall school rating of an A, those that viewed lower 
ratings were less likely to indicate that the school profile aligns with their ideal school. 
Specifically, the coefficients for those that viewed a C rating indicate a difference of 1.03 points 
in school quality compared to those that viewed an A rating. That is, parents’ who viewed a C 
school rating report 1.03 points less than those who viewed an A school. For those that viewed a 
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D school rating, the difference between those that viewed an A school rating is 1.67 less in 
perceptions of school quality. Lastly, parents’ who viewed an F school rating, report 1.59 points 
less than parents’ who viewed an A school rating. These findings suggest that parents’ reactions 
to schools that received a D rating and schools that received an F rating are essentially similar. 
 Model 2 accounts for additional covariates reported by parents’ who participated in the 
survey experiment. Here, the coefficients for school ratings remain negative and statistically 
significant in predicting perceptions of school quality. While those that viewed a C rating 
relative to those that viewed an A rating slightly decreased from Model 1 (e.g. -1.03; -1.01) after 
accounting for sociodemographic characteristics, those that viewed a D and an F compared to 
those that viewed an A rating is strengthened (e.g. D rating: -1.69; -1.71; F rating: -1.59; -1.63).  
Model 2 shows one additional covariate that is statistically significant. Specifically, the 
coefficients for those that enroll/ed their child/ren in other forms of schooling (e.g. homeschool) 
indicate a difference of 1.33 points in school quality compared to those that selected public 
school enrollment.  
 
[Insert Figure 19 here] 
Figure 19 graphs the impact of school ratings on parents’ perceptions of schools. It 
contains the linear predictions of school quality (1-6) by exposure group (A-F). These 
predictions are computed from the regression results in Table 12 when control variables are held 
at their mean values (Long and Freese 2014). The X-axis represents the linear predictions of 
parents’ perceptions of Cedar Elementary by exposure group, represented on the Y-axis (A-F).  
Accordingly, those who were exposed to an A rating have a predicted response of 4.16 
which is statistically significantly different than the those exposed to the lowest school ratings 
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(p<.001). While there is no difference between those exposed to an A rating relative to a B rating 
(see Appendix V for differences in linear predictions), there are statistically significant 
differences between those exposed to an A or B rating relative to a C rating, D rating and F 
rating. Parents’ who viewed a D rating have a predicted response of 2.45 compared to a 
predictive response of 3.82 for those that viewed a B rating for Cedar Elementary. Notably, the 
predicted response of parents’ who viewed an F rating is 2.53 which is less than two thirds of the 
predicted response of parents’ who viewed an A rating. 
 
[Insert Table 13 here] 
 
Likelihood of enrollment 
The results from Table 12, Figure 19 suggests that school ratings impact parents’ perceptions of 
schools. But, how do they impact parents’ attitudes toward enrollment decisions? Model 1 in 
Table 13 presents the coefficients from a linear regression. The model establishes that overall 
school rating statistically significantly predicts parents’ attitudes toward enrollment (F(4, 414) = 
12.44, p < 0.01), and that overall rating accounted for 11 percent of the explained variability in 
parents’ attitudes. Model 1 in Table 13 presents the regression coefficients for school ratings that 
predict parents’ attitudes toward enrolling their child in Cedar Elementary. This base model 
shows that compared to parents’ that viewed an overall school rating of an A, those that viewed 
lower ratings were less likely to indicate that they would enroll their child in the hypothetical 
school. In particular, the coefficients for those that viewed a C rating indicate a difference of .93 
points in likelihood to enroll compared to those that viewed an A rating. Parents’ who viewed a 
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D school rating report 1.07 points less than those who viewed an A school and parents’ who 
viewed an F school rating, report 1.08 points less than parents’ who viewed an A rating. 
 Model 2 accounts for additional covariates. The coefficients for school ratings remain 
negative and statistically significant in predicting perceptions the likelihood to enroll in Cedar 
Elementary. Whereas those that viewed a C and F rating relative to those that viewed an A rating 
slightly decreased from Model 1 (e.g. C rating: -.933; -.90; F rating: -1.08; -1.06) after 
accounting for sociodemographic characteristics, those that viewed a D rating relative to parents’ 
who viewed an A rating is again marginally strengthened (e.g. D rating: -1.07; -1.15). Model 2 
includes additional covariates that are statistically significant. There is a difference in gender, 
and school type. Compared to male parents that participated in the survey, female parents are 
less likely to indicate a greater likelihood to enroll in Cedar Elementary. Moreover, those that 
enroll/ed their child/ren in charter schools (.75) or vouchers (1.07), compared to traditional 
public schools show a higher likelihood to enroll in Cedar Elementary. Below I present these 
results as linear predictions using tests of significance based on delta-method standard errors 
(Long 2009; Xu and Long 2005). 
 
[Insert Figure 20 here] 
 
Figure 20 graphs the impact of school ratings on parents’ attitudes toward enrollment 
decisions. It contains the linear predictions of likelihood to enroll (1-6) by exposure group (A-F). 
These predictions are computed from the regression results in Table 12 when covariates are held 
at their mean values (Long and Freese 2014). The X-axis represents the linear predictions of 
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parents’ likelihood to enroll in Cedar Elementary by exposure group, represented on the Y-axis 
(A-F).  
Those who were exposed to an A rating have a predicted response of 4.05, which is 
statistically significantly different than the those exposed to the lowest school ratings (p < .001; 
see Appendix V for differences in linear predictions). Again, there is no evidence of a difference 
between those exposed to an A rating relative to a B rating. However, there are statistically 
significant differences between those exposed to an A or B rating relative to a C rating, D rating 
and F rating. Parents’ who viewed a C rating have a predicted response of 3.15 compared to a 
predictive response of 4.19 for those that viewed a B rating for Cedar Elementary. The predicted 
response of parents’ who viewed a D rating is 2.91 compared to a predictive response of 4.05 for 
those that viewed an A rating.   
To summarize, the findings from aim#2 provide answers to the final questions posed in 
the introduction of this dissertation. In particular, the experimental findings show that net of 
adequate yearly progress across school performance metrics, parents’ perceptions of school 
quality is significantly less favorable when shown a school profile with a lower school rating. 
Similarly, parents indicate that they are less likely to enroll their children in a hypothetical lower 
rated school. In other words, these findings suggest that regardless of how well schools may be 
educating their students (i.e., showing adequate yearly progress by performance metric), the 
overall school rating seems to be driving parents’ perceptions of quality and influencing their 
enrollment decisions. To be clear, these results do not show significant differences among higher 
overall school ratings (A and B) and among lower school ratings (C, D, and F), but they do show 
significant differences when comparing the differences between higher school ratings (A/B) 
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relative to lower school ratings (C/D/F). Figure 19 and Figure 20 provide compelling visuals of 
these differences.  
The findings presented from aim#2 compliment the findings reported from aim#1 and 
raise serious questions about the equitability of the report card system implemented across the 
United States. I discuss the implications below.  
 
 
DISCUSSION 
The ultimate intention of this project is to inform best practices for designing, disseminating and 
interpreting measures of school quality by school authorities, elected officials and parents. I 
began this dissertation with the 2007 United States Supreme Court ruling that limited the use of 
voluntary racial classifications by school districts (Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District 2007). In so doing, I drew attention to the dissenting voice of Justice 
Breyer who argued that if educational policy causes segregation by influencing private decisions 
then there may be evidence of segregation resulting from state action. Above, I provide empirical 
evidence that contemporary accountability ratings are unevenly distributed across schools and 
districts. The distribution of this resource is patterned such that ratings appear to be reflecting 
mechanisms that produce achievement disparities outside schools, such as racial/ethnic 
inequality in financial, cultural, and social capital, more than the extent to which ratings are 
providing an accurate depiction of how schools are making efficient use of their resources to 
provide the best learning opportunities possible. In a similar vein, I show that school ratings are 
serving as a signal of school quality to key stakeholders and that school ratings impact and 
influence parents’ attitudes toward enrollment decisions. Considered together, I assert that the 
 
72 
 
current accountability rating system is diverting attention away from the disparities in resources 
associated with school segregation. Moreover, this system appears to be providing a structure of 
incentives that influence stakeholders’ decision-making and ultimately undermines the ability of 
schools to raise achievement for their students. 
To be clear, findings from aim#1 show that school ratings are associated schools’ 
demographic composition and that this association depends on the broader metropolitan 
landscape. In more highly segregated metropolitan regions, schools with higher proportions of 
Black students show greater odds of receiving a lower rating relative to a higher one, net of 
additional covariates at the school-, district- and metropolitan-levels. Critics of these findings 
may suggest that the associations documented in aim#1 do not produce a causal direction. That 
is, one could reasonably ask if segregation causes lower school ratings or if lower ratings lead to 
an increase in metropolitan segregation. As I note above, the fact that any association exists 
between school demographics and school ratings is problematic and it raises serious questions 
about the equitability of the report card system implemented across the United States.  Indeed, 
the theoretical goals of such systems were to raise achievement for all students, while 
eliminating gaps in achievement, attainment and career readiness between different student 
subgroups (No Child Left Behind Act 2002; Hess 2003), not to identify which group of students 
attend which schools. The findings presented for aim#1 are worrisome. Schools assigned to 
lower categories are often targeted for supports, reforms and occasionally even closure by state 
education officials (Brummet 2014; Logan et al. 2012; Darling-Hammond 2010; Gaddis and 
Lauen 2014; Ravitch 2010). The report card system appears to be penalizing an already 
disadvantaged group of students and schools. That is, the system is likely unfairly blaming 
schools for relatively poor achievement and obscuring the extent to which some schools serving 
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disadvantaged students outperform others.  Moreover, the overall school rating may be 
reinforcing patterns of segregation by deterring potential families from moving into certain 
schools and school districts. 
The second part of this research examined part of this latter assertion, about perceptions 
of school quality as well as the extent to which these policies influence parents’ decision-making 
to enroll their children in schools. The experimental findings from aim#2 show that parents’ 
perceptions of school quality is significantly less favorable when shown a school profile with a 
lower school rating, net of adequate yearly progress across school performance metrics. 
Moreover, parents in the experiment indicated that they were less likely to enroll their children in 
a hypothetical school with a lower rating. These findings are noteworthy. The significant 
differences documented in the experiment provide empirical evidence of the importance of 
school ratings. Indeed, school ratings are a resource that influence private decisions.  
Considering both aims, this research expands the sociological scholarships’ 
understanding of the distribution of resources and their effect on students’ education (Reardon 
and Owens 2014). I argue that educational accountability ratings are an additional resource that 
impacts students, families and schools differently in patterns that are reflective of existing 
inequality and that they play a pivotal role in parental decision-making which may contribute to 
school segregation. While the findings from aim#1 show that this resource is unevenly 
distributed among schools and districts and findings from aim#2 show that this resource 
influences decision-making, I am unable to assert that parents’ decisions directly contribute to an 
increase in segregation. Undeniably, both studies include limitations.  
Data analyzed to assess aim#1 is limited by the 14 states and the subsequent metropolitan 
regions included in the analysis. As I show in the appendix and discuss at length above, school 
 
74 
 
accountability ratings differ across state lines, making a nationwide study not only difficult, but 
potentially, biased and inaccurate. States that employ alternative metrics for the report card, such 
as “tiers of support” or “accreditation” make it difficult to collapse the overall rating on a 
meaningful and interpretable continuous or categorical scale. This should be a concern for 
methodologists and policy makers when discussing national trends of school performance 
metrics based on annual school report cards. Furthermore, in the 14 states included in this 
research, there is variation in the amount of weight given to the components that contribute to the 
overall school rating. I show this difference by state in the appendix, but it is worth noting the 
concerns that this difference raises here. For instance, states vary in the extent to which they 
emphasize performance on standardized exams. This difference is related to the current law 
(ESSA) which provides states with more authority over their accountability system. The issue 
remains however, that it continues the NCLB mandate that accountability report cards are based, 
in part, on student achievement in spite of the consistent research showing that performance 
differs by student demographics and school composition. In this sense, school ratings appear to 
be merely repackaging and reflecting inequalities in academic achievement into overall school 
ratings. Depending on the states’ weight on academic achievement in calculating school ratings, 
this may be more or less pronounced in certain states. 
Data analyzed to assess aim#2 is also limited in its’ generalizability. While the 
experimental nature of these data provide evidence of their internal validity, the concern of how 
this sentiment extends beyond these data is reasonable. These data were from parents across the 
United States and collected online. It remains less clear how parents who do not use Amazon’s 
MTurk or those who chose not to participate may differ. Even more, while these data represent a 
breadth of individuals across the United States, it is also likely that parents in this sample lived in 
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a state with a different display of the school report card and may not have been exposed to the 
same 5-point letter system previously. At minimum, these data suggest that when parents are 
provided a hypothetical option in this scenario however, school letter ratings have a substantial 
impact on their decision-making and attitudes toward school quality. While they remain distinct 
in many regards, this sentiment may also be formed by exposure to a growing online school 
rating environment (e.g. GreatSchools.org, an embedded feature on prominent home search 
websites such as Zillow.com and Trulia.com, see also Niche.com – see footnote 1). Additional 
research on how ratings impact parents’ decision-making is needed. Future research should 
employ nationally representative data and account for segregation levels within the respondent’s 
local school, district and metropolitan context. 
Throughout this dissertation, I have conceptualized school ratings as a resource vital to 
the educational experience of students which impacts students, families and schools differently 
in patterns that are reflective of existing social inequality. I’ve used empirical data to contribute 
to the sociological understanding of the relationships among race/ethnicity, schools, variations in 
accountability policies in general, and perceptions of school quality and enrollment decisions. In 
doing so, this research should prove valuable to scholars across multiple disciplines allowing 
sociologists, educational researchers, methodologists and policy makers to effectively 
collaborate. The empirical evidence presented here makes the case for the implementation and 
dissemination of alternative accountability metrics that are reliable and accurate estimates of how 
well schools and districts serve their students. To promote the spirit of raising achievement for 
all students, states may consider adjusting their educational policies more broadly and changing 
the construction of their report cards more specifically. Opponents of standardized testing and 
performance driven accountability may favor the elimination of the overall rating system 
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deployed by state departments. Such systems however, have considerable appeal across 
ideological lines – for conservatives determined to increase accountability for public spending on 
education (Moe 2003) and for progressives as an effective means to enhance educational 
opportunities for economically disadvantaged students and those belonging to racial/ethnic 
groups (Mehta 2013). Ratings offer seemingly transparent indicators of school quality that are 
supposed to be readily interpretable by legislators, state education officials, school 
administrators, educators and, perhaps most importantly, parents (Education Commission of the 
States 2016; Nunes, et al. 2015).  Proponents of such systems could argue that ratings provide 
stakeholders with more choice. But unlike charter and various choice schools, public schools are 
less able to recruit and choose their respective student attendees to influence their overall rating 
(e.g. Jennings 2010). Advocates of choice policy tend to argue that market forces will produce 
more efficient and high achieving schools because students can “vote with their feet,” (Chubb 
and Moe 1988), but the result of such policies are trending toward increasing racial/ethnic and 
socioeconomic segregation in schools and districts. This trend holds in research on perceptions 
of schools as well as in enrollment patterns in charter schools. Using an experimental design, 
Billingham and Hunt (2016) show that White parents become less likely to enroll their children 
in schools as the Black population increases, net of school quality and school characteristics. 
Nationwide, school districts that are more segregated show increased rates of Black enrollment 
in predominantly Black charter schools (Renzulli 2006). Because school ratings primarily reflect 
who attends what school, the design itself likely reinforces school segregation. By categorizing 
schools on the annual report card,  schools’ ability to attract high quality teachers is limited and 
has been shown to influence parents’ decisions about where to move or where to purchase a 
home (see also Ehlert et al. 2016; Figlio and Lucas 2004).  
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The evidence presented here suggests that school ratings may not be transparent or 
accurate indicators of school quality. Like others, these data support the argument that focusing 
on indicators of school quality for accountability purposes essentially holds schools responsible 
for achievement gaps that are largely the result of inequalities in families and neighborhoods 
(García and Weiss 2017).  This suggests that reforms focused on schools are at best insufficient 
and perhaps even harmful if the goal is to close achievement and attainment gaps between and 
among students because ratings largely reflect inequalities outside the schools themselves rather 
than providing a clear indication of the extent to which schools effectively serve their students.  
An elimination of the rating system however, may leave social scientists and policy makers 
without data to ensure that achievement is in fact raised for all students. An alternative solution 
may be to not only reconsider the weights on standardized testing but to increase the emphasis on 
growth over time after accounting for differences outside of the schools’ control (e.g. summer 
and the seasonal effects; Condron 2009; Downey 2008; Downey et al. 2004; Hippel et al. 2018). 
It would be additionally useful for states to implement, or scholars to develop, metrics of the 
report card that make cross-state comparisons much more possible.  
The evidence suggests that school accountability systems may be effectively penalizing 
relatively integrated schools while giving predominantly White, relatively affluent schools too 
much credit for closing racial/ethnic and socioeconomic gaps in achievement.  Given high levels 
of school segregation, large schools in urban districts are more likely to be evaluated on their 
contribution to closing such gaps than smaller schools in suburban or rural districts (Stiefel, et al. 
2007).  Conversely, predominantly White schools with students from relatively affluent families 
may be more likely to get credit for closing gaps because they enroll small and highly selective 
groups of students who belong to racial/ethnic minorities (e.g. upper middle class Asian 
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students), while schools that primarily serve economically disadvantaged Black and Latinx 
students may be less likely to get credit for whatever success they do achieve with students 
despite contending with challenges that arise outside the schools themselves.  
Schools and school districts should make every effort to provide students with a diverse 
environment to the extent possible, given their broader metropolitan landscape. Schools should 
be held accountable for ensuring integrated spaces. For instance, in metropolitan areas where the 
student age population presents a large share of lower socioeconomic and non-White students, 
schools could receive points on their report card, similar to the absenteeism deduction. This 
credit could be noted as a diversity metric. If a metropolitan region is relatively diverse, schools 
and districts should have representative student bodies that are within the margins of the broader 
landscape. This would be a significant change to the current system.  
School segregation has significant implications for experiences in primary and secondary 
education, along with race relations and efforts to eliminate disparities in achievement. It 
remains important that students of all racial/ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds are exposed 
to one another. As Orfield has maintained, in large part because of the peer effect findings issued 
in the Coleman Report (1966), that while there is nothing magic about sitting next to a White 
child in a classroom, there are significant advantages to doing so (Hill 2017; Orfield and Lee 
2004; Orfield and Eaton 1996). That is, an integrated classroom, school and school district has 
the potential to provide Black and Latinx students with access to social capital that may 
otherwise be outside of their network, primarily because of the history of discrimination and the 
tight linkage of minority status with poverty. For instance, high income students perform better 
in highly segregated metropolitan regions relative to low income students (Owens 2018). Access 
to these networks are significant because they effect the creation of capital in the next generation 
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(Coleman 1988) and well-connected parental networks have been shown to buffer the 
disadvantages of school and neighborhood disadvantages (Li and Fischer 2017). Additionally, 
interracial contact is crucial, though insufficient on its own, to reducing prejudice and enhancing 
racial tolerance throughout the lifespan (Clotfelter 2004). This contact proves especially valuable 
at the primary-level (Buck 2010). At minimum, integration challenges the theory of perpetuation 
which maintains that those who experience segregation will experience it across various life 
stages and throughout institutions (Wells and Crain 1994). 
Since 1995, the Supreme Court has remained largely silent on school segregation (aside 
from Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 2007) and have 
treated the issue as resolved of past wrongdoings. But, school segregation was built on the 
structure of racial inequality and liberals and conservatives alike continue to reinforce the “color 
line” in their decisions on where to live and where to send their children to school (Wells and 
Crain 1997). Today, additional mechanisms to maintain separate schools and districts seem to be 
evident with the deployment of school accountability ratings. The distribution of this new school 
resource is unequal. Its implementation appears to be driving private decisions. The nation’s 
schools are rated.   
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FIGURES 
FIGURE 1. School ratings for 14 U.S. states that use similar scales. 
 
Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: N=10,369 
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FIGURE 2. Metropolitan-level Black-White segregation (D) by region. 
 
 
 
Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Census TIGER/Line Shape Files at the State Level. Figure created 
using spmap package in STATA 15.1. Notes: N=10,369. Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when demographic 
enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100. 
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FIGURE 3. Metropolitan-level Latinx-White segregation (D) by region. 
 
 
Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Census TIGER/Line Shape Files at the State Level. Figure created 
using spmap package in STATA 15.1. Notes: N=10,369. Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when demographic 
enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100.
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FIGURE 4. District-level Black-White segregation (D): By school rating and percent Black student population. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: N=10,369. Figure shows smoothed values from a kernel-
weighted local polynomial regression of Black-White segregation within school districts on percent of Black student population within schools by school rating. 
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FIGURE 5. Metropolitan-level Black-White segregation (D): By school rating and percent Black student population. 
 
Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: N=10,369. Figure shows smoothed values from a kernel-
weighted local polynomial regression of Black-White segregation between school districts on percent of Black student population within schools by school 
rating. 
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FIGURE 6. District-level Latinx-White segregation (D): By school rating and percent Latinx student population. 
 
Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: N=10,369. Figure shows smoothed values from a kernel-
weighted local polynomial regression of Latinx-White segregation within school districts on percent of Latinx student population within schools by school rating. 
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FIGURE 7. Metropolitan-level Latinx-White segregation (D): By school rating and percent Latinx student population. 
  
Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: N=10,369. Figure shows smoothed values from a kernel-
weighted local polynomial regression of Latinx-White segregation between school districts on percent of Latinx student population within schools by school 
rating. 
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FIGURE 8. District-level Black-White segregation (D): By school rating and percent White student population. 
 
Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: N=10,369. Figure shows smoothed values from a kernel-
weighted local polynomial regression of Black-White segregation within school districts on percent of White student population within schools by school rating. 
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FIGURE 9. Metropolitan-level Black-White segregation (D): By school rating and percent White student population. 
 
Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: N=10,369. Figure shows smoothed values from a kernel-
weighted local polynomial regression of Black-White segregation between school districts on percent of White student population within schools by school 
rating. 
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FIGURE 10. Predictive Margins with 95 Percent CI. Metropolitan-level Black-White segregation (D), Black student concentration and 
predicted school rating. 
 
 
Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Figure shows predicted probabilities of school rating for 
varying levels of between-district Black-White segregation and percentage categories of Black student population within schools. Categories based on cutpoints 
in Table 2. % Black: Low (0-19%); Moderate (42-62%); High (83-100%). Seg (D): Low (0); High (70). 
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FIGURE 11. Predictive Margins with 95 Percent CI. Metropolitan-level Latinx-White segregation (D), Latinx student concentration 
and predicted school rating. 
 
 
Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Figure shows predicted probabilities of school rating for 
varying levels of between-district Latinx-White segregation and percentage categories of Latinx student population within schools. Categories based on cutpoints 
in Table 2. % Latinx: Low (0-5%); Moderate (30-55%); High (81-100%). Seg (D): Low (0); High (50). 
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FIGURE 12. Predictive Margins with 95 Percent CI. Metropolitan-level Black-White segregation (D), Black student concentration and 
A rating. 
 
Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Figure shows the predicted probability of a school receiving an 
A rating for varying levels of between-district Black-White segregation and percentage categories of Black student population within schools.
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FIGURE 13. Predictive Margins with 95 Percent CI. Metropolitan-level Black-White segregation (D), Black student concentration and 
F rating. 
 
Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Figure shows the predicted probability of a school receiving an 
F rating for varying levels of between-district Black-White segregation and percentage categories of Black student population within schools. 
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FIGURE 14. Predictive Margins with 95 Percent CI. Metropolitan-level Latinx-White segregation (D), Latinx student concentration 
and A rating. 
 
Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Figure shows the predicted probability of a school receiving an 
A rating for varying levels of between-district Latinx -White segregation and percentage categories of Latinx student population within schools.
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FIGURE 15. Predictive Margins with 95 Percent CI. Metropolitan-level Latinx-White segregation (D), Latinx student concentration 
and F rating. 
 
Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Figure shows the predicted probability of a school receiving an 
F rating for varying levels of between-district Latinx -White segregation and percentage categories of Latinx student population within schools. 
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FIGURE 16. Unweighted distribution of parents’ exposure to a school rating in the experiment. 
 
 
Sources: Original data collected on Qualtrics via Amazon Mechanical Turk Panel. Notes: N=414 
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FIGURE 17. Unweighted distributions of perceptions of school quality: By exposure to school rating. 
 
 
Sources: Original data collected on Qualtrics via Amazon Mechanical Turk Panel. Notes: N=414. Confidence intervals (95 percent). 
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FIGURE 18. Unweighted distributions of likelihood to enroll: By exposure to school rating. 
 
 
Sources: Original data collected on Qualtrics via Amazon Mechanical Turk Panel. Notes: N=414. Confidence intervals (95 percent). 
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FIGURE 19. Predictive Margins with 95 Percent CI. Parents’ perceptions of the quality of the hypothetical school: By exposure to 
school rating. 
 
 
Sources: Original data collected on Qualtrics via Amazon Mechanical Turk Panel. Notes: N=414. Confidence intervals (95 percent). 
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FIGURE 20. Predictive Margins with 95 Percent CI. Parents’ likelihood to enroll in hypothetical school: By exposure to school rating. 
 
Sources: Original data collected on Qualtrics via Amazon Mechanical Turk Panel. Notes: N=414. Confidence intervals (95 percent). 
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TABLES 
TABLE 1. Metropolitan-level Black-White and Latinx-White segregation (D) by region. 
 
 Schools Districts MSAs Total metro 
segregation 
[min,max] Within 
districts 
[min,max] Between 
districts 
[min,max] 
14 State Total 10,369 885 112       
   Black-White (D)    56.3 [32.5, 63.4] 36.8 [0.0, 70.4] 36.3 [0, 72.4] 
   Latinx-White (D)    50.8 [35.4, 54.8] 33.2 [0.1, 72.2] 30.7 [0, 54.5] 
          
8 Southern States  7,607 504 77       
   Black-White (D)    55.7 [43.2, 63.0] 40.1 [0.0, 70.4] 31.4 [0, 72.2] 
   Latinx-White (D)    51.0 [40.7, 54.3] 35.4 [0.0, 72.2] 27.8 [0, 54.5] 
          
3 Western States 842 89 6       
   Black-White (D)    47.2 [32.5, 51.7] 29.3 [0.3, 61.7] 36.9 [14.1, 45.3] 
   Latinx-White (D)    51.2 [35.4, 54.8] 32.2 [0.4, 57.9] 37.7 [10.9, 46.6] 
          
3 Midwestern States 1,920 292 29       
   Black-White (D)    62.8 [62.3, 63.4] 27.2 [0.2, 64.6] 55.5 [0, 72.3] 
   Latinx-White (D)    50.0 [47.4, 52.6] 24.6 [0.2, 64.2] 39.4 [0, 52.4] 
          
Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Segregation calculated using Dissimilarity indices 
(D). For a list of Southern states and a complete list of segregation indices by MSAs and see Appendix D. Indices based on demographic data available for 
students in grades Pre-K through 6 when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic 
enrollment>100. 
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TABLE 2. Descriptive statistics for all categorical demographic variables included in the analysis: Overall and by school rating. 
 
VARIABLES Mean/Prop St. Dev. All 
Schools 
A B C D F 
         
Percent Latinx 32.01 26.65 32.01 28.05 33.18 34.12 30.64 32.11 
Constructed Categories         
0- - - 10.08 8.35 9.37 9.76 12.26 16.22 
4.27- - - 51.57 57.36 46.90 44.71 46.93 58.22 
30.13- - - 19.66 19.43 21.75 21.37 19.30 19.33 
55.99- - - 12.64 9.54 14.39 17.12 14.47 13.78 
81.85- - - 6.06 5.34 7.60 7.04 7.04 8.67 
         
Percent Black 18.72 20.40 18.72 16.15 17.98 19.34 22.32 23.03 
Constructed Categories         
0- - - 64.78 73.96 69.34 66.83 62.31 59.56 
19.81- - - 19.67 15.41 19.25 19.48 17.89 18.89 
40.96- - - 8.89 6.01 6.14 7.47 10.75 11.56 
62.11- - - 4.84 3.43 3.85 4.29 6.13 7.78 
83.27- - - 1.82 1.19 1.42 1.93 2.91 2.22 
         
Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Categories based on SD of continuous measures of 
Latinx and Black students. Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts 
include schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100. 
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TABLE 3. Descriptive statistics for all variables included in the analysis. 
VARIABLES Mean/Prop St. Dev. A B C D F 
        
School level        
Percent Black 20.3 21.0 17.1 19.4 21.0 29.7 31.3 
Percent Latinx 30.1 25.9 27.4 31.5 31.4 26.5 26.7 
Percent White 41.2 27.2 44.9 40.8 40.1 35.5 34.9 
Percent FRL 52.9 30.3 45.1 53.5 57.1 57.8 54.1 
Charter 7.4 - 32.5 28.9 27.6 8.4 2.5 
Letter Rating 87.23 - 91.60 89.42 84.27 81.61 84.44 
South 79.7 - 21.1 31.1 32.6 10.6 4.5 
Midwest 16.3 - 16.7 32.1 27.0 16.6 7.7 
West 4.0 - 19.6 29.9 34.2 13.7 3.7 
Total Population 531.8 226.4 562.7 528.7 531.5 498.8 473.9 
        
District and Metropolis level     
B-W Metro Seg. (D) 36.2 19.2 33.7 37.8 34.7 37.1 41.1 
L-W Metro Seg. (D) 30.6 16.0 30.0 32.2 29.4 29.3 32.3 
B-W District Seg. (D) 37.0 16.8 37.2 36.9 37.9 37.8 37.3 
L-W District Seg. (D) 33.3 15.7 32.6 33.4 33.8 34.6 34.2 
B-W Exposure 8.0 10.7 7.7 8.0 7.6 7.0 7.3 
L-W Exposure 7.9 10.6 7.4 7.9 7.5 7.1 7.6 
District Poverty 812.0 88.3 801.4 811.7 819.2 814.2 805.0 
Property Tax Rev. 253.7 407.3 329.5 249.8 253.8 186.1 183.2 
Prior Mandate 3.5 - 18.7 32.0 35.0 10.5 3.7 
Recent Mandate 4.6 - 28.0 35.0 20.4 10.7 6.0 
        
Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Charter status, prior/ recent mandates and region 
variables are dichotomous. Letter rating is a dichotomous indicator of states that use A-F relative to those in the data that use another 1-5 rating system. District 
poverty is an income-to-poverty ratio and tax revenue is shown in thousands. Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 
when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100. 
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TABLE 4. Regional categorization of 14 states by region included in the analysis. 
 
South Midwest West 
Alabama Indiana Arizona 
Arkansas Ohio New Mexico 
Florida Wisconsin Utah 
Louisiana   
Mississippi   
North Carolina   
South Carolina   
Texas   
Source: Adjusted to include states in the analysis developed by Orfield and Monfort (1992). Cited in Clotfelter 2004; Logan et al. 2008. 
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TABLE 5. Multi-level ordered logistic regression results for District-level Black-White Segregation (D). 
 B-W Within (D), B-W Within (D), 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 
   
B-W Within (D) 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
20-41 percent Black -0.19 -0.10 
 (0.15) (0.16) 
42-62 percent Black -0.54* -0.59* 
 (0.25) (0.26) 
63-82 percent Black -0.32 -0.44 
 (0.38) (0.39) 
83-100 percent Black -1.21* -1.37* 
 (0.60) (0.61) 
B-W Within (D) * 20-41 percent Black -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
B-W Within (D) * 42-62 percent Black 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
B-W Within (D) * 63-82 percent Black -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
B-W Within (D) * 83-100 percent Black 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
School-level variables   
Percent Latinx (School) -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Percent Poverty (FRL) -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Charter 0.30*** 0.31*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) 
Letter Rating 0.25* 0.29* 
 (0.12) (0.12) 
South  -0.14 -0.05 
 (0.13) (0.14) 
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Midwest -0.97*** -1.00*** 
 (0.15) (0.16) 
District-level variables   
District Poverty (IPR) 0.00* 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Percent White (District) -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Recent Mandate (1990-2003) 1.19*** 1.25*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) 
Prior Mandate (1980-1989) -0.10 -0.09 
 (0.30) (0.30) 
Property Taxes  0.11* 
  (0.04) 
cut1 -3.93*** -2.81*** 
 (0.23) (0.49) 
cut2 -2.45*** -1.42** 
 (0.23) (0.49) 
cut3 -0.71** 0.31 
 (0.23) (0.49) 
cut4 0.92*** 1.92*** 
 (0.23) (0.49) 
var(_cons[district]) 0.61*** 0.56*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Observations 10,369 9,138 
Number of groups 854 759 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Percent Black thresholds are categorical based on 
Table 2. Charter status, rating, prior/ recent mandates and region variables are dichotomous. District poverty is an income-to-poverty ratio and tax revenue is 
shown in thousands. Property taxes are transformed into the natural log. based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when 
demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100. Standard errors in parentheses *** 
p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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TABLE 6. Multi-level ordered logistic regression results for District-level Latinx-White Segregation (D). 
 L-W Within (D) L-W Within (D) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 
   
L-W Within (D) 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
5-29 percent Latinx -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.15) (0.15) 
30-55 percent Latinx -0.37 -0.33 
 (0.21) (0.22) 
56-80 percent Latinx -0.77** -0.83** 
 (0.26) (0.26) 
81-100 percent Latinx -0.55 -0.66 
 (0.34) (0.34) 
L-W Within (D) * 5-29 percent Latinx -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
L-W Within (D) * 30-55 percent Latinx 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
L-W Within (D) * 56-80 percent Latinx 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
L-W Within (D) * 81-100 percent Latinx -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
School-level variables   
Percent Black (School) -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Percent Poverty (FRL) -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Charter 0.29*** 0.32*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) 
Letter Rating 0.24* 0.28* 
 (0.12) (0.12) 
South  -0.08 0.03 
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 (0.13) (0.14) 
Midwest -0.90*** -0.89*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) 
District-level variables   
District Poverty (IPR) 0.00* 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Recent Mandate (1990-2003) 1.18*** 1.22*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) 
Prior Mandate (1980-1989) -0.04 -0.07 
 (0.30) (0.30) 
Percent White (District) -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Property Taxes - 0.09* 
  (0.04) 
cut1 -3.94*** -2.89*** 
 (0.30) (0.51) 
cut2 -2.46*** -1.50** 
 (0.29) (0.51) 
cut3 -0.71* 0.23 
 (0.29) (0.51) 
cut4 0.91** 1.84*** 
 (0.29) (0.51) 
var(_cons[district]) 0.60*** 0.55*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Observations 10,369 9,138 
Number of groups 854 759 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes Percent Latinx thresholds are categorical based on 
Table 2. Charter status, rating, prior/ recent mandates and region variables are dichotomous. District poverty is an income-to-poverty ratio and tax revenue is 
shown in thousands. Property taxes are transformed into the natural log.  Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 
when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100. Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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TABLE 7. Multi-level ordered logistic regression results for Metropolitan-level Black-White Segregation (D). 
 B-W Between (D), B-W Between (D), 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 
   
B-W Between (D) 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
20-41 percent Black 0.05 0.01 
 (0.11) (0.12) 
42-62 percent Black 0.09 -0.07 
 (0.16) (0.17) 
63-82 percent Black 0.07 -0.06 
 (0.20) (0.21) 
83-100 percent Black 0.27 0.30 
 (0.30) (0.33) 
B-W Between (D) * 20-41 percent Black -0.01* -0.01* 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
B-W Between (D) * 42-62 percent Black -0.01*** -0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
B-W Between (D) * 63-82 percent Black -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
B-W Between (D) * 83-100 percent Black -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
School-level variables   
Percent Latinx (School) -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Percent Poverty (FRL) -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Charter 0.30*** 0.31*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) 
Letter Rating -0.06 0.12 
 (0.22) (0.22) 
South  -0.62* -0.60* 
 (0.25) (0.26) 
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Midwest 0.00** 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
District-level variables   
District Poverty (IPR) 1.12*** 1.18*** 
 (0.23) (0.23) 
Recent Mandate (1990-2003) 0.20 0.19 
 (0.29) (0.29) 
Prior Mandate (1980-1989) -0.01* -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Property Taxes - 0.13** 
  (0.04) 
Metropolitan-level variables   
Percent White (Metro) 0.26 0.36* 
 (0.15) (0.16) 
cut1 -4.18*** -2.55*** 
 (0.36) (0.62) 
cut2 -2.70*** -1.16 
 (0.36) (0.62) 
cut3 -0.95** 0.57 
 (0.36) (0.62) 
cut4 0.67 2.19*** 
 (0.36) (0.62) 
var(_cons[msa]) 0.11** 0.12** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
var(_cons[msa>district]) 0.44*** 0.43*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Observations 10,369 9,138 
Number of groups 112 102 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Percent Black thresholds are categorical based on 
Table 2. Charter status, rating, prior/ recent mandates and region variables are dichotomous. District poverty is an income-to-poverty ratio and tax revenue is 
shown in thousands. Property taxes are transformed into the natural log.  Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 
when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100. Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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TABLE 8. Multi-level ordered logistic regression results for Metropolitan-level Latinx-White Segregation (D). 
 L-W Between (D), L-W Between (D), 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 
   
L-W Between (D) 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
5-29 percent Latinx -0.18 -0.18 
 (0.18) (0.19) 
30-55 percent Latinx 0.01 -0.23 
 (0.21) (0.22) 
56-80 percent Latinx -0.43 -0.59* 
 (0.25) (0.25) 
81-100 percent Latinx -1.06*** -1.24*** 
 (0.30) (0.31) 
L-W Between (D) * 5-29 percent Latinx 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
L-W Between (D) * 30-55 percent Latinx -0.01* -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
L-W Between (D) * 56-80 percent Latinx -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
L-W Between (D) * 81-100 percent Latinx 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
School-level variables   
Percent Black (School) -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Percent Poverty (FRL) -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Charter 0.29*** 0.30*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) 
Letter Rating 0.20 0.29 
 (0.15) (0.16) 
South  0.05 0.22 
 (0.22) (0.23) 
 
 
1
2
9
 
Midwest -0.62* -0.59* 
 (0.25) (0.26) 
District-level variables   
District Poverty (IPR) 0.00** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Recent Mandate (1990-2003) 1.12*** 1.19*** 
 (0.23) (0.24) 
Prior Mandate (1980-1989) 0.14 0.12 
 (0.29) (0.29) 
Property Taxes  0.13** 
  (0.04) 
Metropolitan-level variables   
Percent White (Metro) -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
cut1 -3.96*** -2.43*** 
 (0.42) (0.65) 
cut2 -2.48*** -1.05 
 (0.42) (0.65) 
cut3 -0.74 0.68 
 (0.42) (0.65) 
cut4 0.89* 2.30*** 
 (0.42) (0.65) 
var(_cons[msa]) 0.12** 0.13** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
var(_cons[msa>district]) 0.44*** 0.42*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Observations 10,369 9,138 
Number of groups 112 102 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Percent Latinx thresholds are categorical based on 
Table 2. Charter status, rating, prior/ recent mandates and region variables are dichotomous. District poverty is an income-to-poverty ratio and tax revenue is 
shown in thousands. Property taxes are transformed into the natural log.  Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 
when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100. Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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TABLE 9. Average marginal effects associated with categorical comparisons of schools’ Black student composition : By 
Metropolitan-level Black-White segregation. 
VARIABLES Schools  Districts MSAs A B C D F 
All Metropolitan Regions 9,138 761 102      
Average Predictions 
Pr (y | base) 
   .225 .307 .302 .114 .053 
19.81- vs. 0-    -.034 -.015 .019 .019 .012 
40.96- vs. 0-     -.071 -.039 .036 .043 .030 
62.11- vs. 0-    -.083 -.049 .040 .053 .039 
83.27- vs. 0-    -.089 -.067 .034 .066 .057 
         
40.96- vs. 19.81-    -.036 -.023 .017 .024 .018 
62.11- vs. 19.81-    -.048 -.034 .021 .034 .027 
83.27- vs. 19.81-    -.055 -.052 .015 .047 .001 
         
62.11- vs. 40.96-    … … … … … 
83.27- vs. 40.96-    … -.028 … … … 
         
83.27- vs. 62.11-    … … … … … 
         
Metropolitan Regions with Medium to High 
Levels of B-W Between (D) Segregation:  >30 
6,616 659 60      
Average Predictions 
Pr (y | base) 
   .200 .325 .292 .121 .062 
19.81- vs. 0-    -.054 -.026 .030 .029 .021 
40.96- vs. 0-     -.101 -.066 .050 .065 .053 
62.11- vs. 0-    -.124 -.094 .054 .087 .077 
83.27- vs. 0-    -.145 -.124 .052 .110 .108 
         
40.96- vs. 19.81-    -.047 -.040 .020 .036 .032 
62.11- vs. 19.81-    -.070 -.067 .024 .058 .056 
83.27- vs. 19.81-    -.091 -.098 .022 .080 .087 
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62.11- vs. 40.96-    … … … … … 
83.27- vs. 40.96-    -.044 -.057 … .044 .055 
         
83.27- vs. 62.11-    … … … … … 
         
Metropolitan Regions with Low Levels of  
B-W Between (D) Segregation: ≤30 
2,522 102 42      
Average Predictions 
Pr (y | base) 
   .275 .263 .331 .096 .035 
19.81- vs. 0-    … … … … … 
40.96- vs. 0-     … … … … … 
62.11- vs. 0-    … … … … … 
83.27- vs. 0-         
         
40.96- vs. 19.81-    … … … … … 
62.11- vs. 19.81-    … … … … … 
83.27- vs. 19.81-    … … … … … 
         
62.11- vs. 40.96-    … … … … … 
83.27- vs. 40.96-    … … … … … 
         
83.27- vs. 62.11-    … … … … … 
         
         
Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Only significant coefficients are shown  (p<0.05). 
Based on continuous measures of Black students and 1 SD increase. Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when 
demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100. 
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TABLE 10. Average marginal effects associated with categorical comparisons of schools’ Latinx student composition : By 
metropolitan-level Latinx-White segregation. 
VARIABLES Schools  Districts MSAs A B C D F 
All Metropolitan Regions 9,138 761 102      
Average Predictions 
Pr (y | base) 
   .224 .308 .303 .113 .053 
4.27- vs. 0-    … … … … … 
30.13- vs. 0-     -.078 -.027 .044 .037 .023 
55.99- vs. 0-    -.114 -.047 .063 .059 .039 
81.85- vs. 0-    -.126 -.055 .068 .068 .045 
         
30.13- vs. 4.27-    -.057 -.023 .032 .29 .018 
55.99- vs. 4.27-    -.093 -.043 .050 .051 .034 
81.85- vs. 4.27-    -.105 -.051 .056 .059 .041 
         
55.99- vs. 30.13-    -.036 -.020 .018 .022 .016 
81.85- vs. 30.13-    -.048 -.029 .024 .031 .022 
         
81.85- vs. 55.99-    … … … … … 
         
Metropolitan Regions with Medium to High 
Levels of L-W Between (D) Segregation:  >30 
5,706 548 41      
Average Predictions 
Pr (y | base) 
   .207 .325 .289 .119 .061 
4.27- vs. 0-    … … … … … 
30.13- vs. 0-     -.087 -.031 .048 .041 .028 
55.99- vs. 0-    -.116 -.058 .059 .064 .051 
81.85- vs. 0-    -.104 .048 .055 .055 .042 
         
30.13- vs. 4.27-    -.062 -.026 .034 .032 .022 
55.99- vs. 4.27-    -.091 -.053 .045 .054 .044 
81.85- vs. 4.27-    -.079 -.043 .041 .045 .036 
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55.99- vs. 30.13-    -.029 -.027 … .023 .022 
81.85- vs. 30.13-    … … … … … 
         
81.85- vs. 55.99-    … … … … … 
         
Metropolitan Regions with Low Levels of  
L-W Between (D) Segregation: ≤30 
3,432 213 61      
Average Predictions 
Pr (y | base) 
   .255 .280 .321 .103 .042 
4.27- vs. 0-    … … … … … 
30.13- vs. 0-     … … … … … 
55.99- vs. 0-    … … … … … 
81.85- vs. 0-    -.108 -.042 .062 .056 .032 
         
30.13- vs. 4.27-    … … … … … 
55.99- vs. 4.27-    … … … … … 
81.85- vs. 4.27-    -.102 -.043 .058 .055 .032 
         
55.99- vs. 30.13-    … … … … … 
81.85- vs. 30.13-    -.076 -.035 .042 .044 .025 
         
81.85- vs. 55.99-    -.063 -.031 .034 .038 .048 
         
         
Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Only significant coefficients are shown  (p<0.05). 
Based on continuous measures of Latinx students and 1 SD increase. Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when 
demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100. 
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 TABLE 11. Descriptive statistics for all parents included in the experiment. 
 
VARIABLES Mean/Prop St. Dev./Std. Err. Min. Max 
Sociodemographic Characteristics     
Political Views (extremely liberal 
to extremely conservative) 
3.18 1.43 1 6 
Education (less than high school 
to graduate school) 
3.92 1.01 1 6 
Age 34.83 8.78 18 73 
Female .38 .02 0 1 
Race/ethnicity     
White .66 .03 0 1 
Black .23 .02 0 1 
Latinx .05 .01 0 1 
Asian .06 .01 0 1 
Number of Children     
1 or 2 .79 .02 0 1 
3 or more .21 .02 0 1 
Type of School Children Attends/ed     
Public .63 .02 0 1 
Private .27 .02 0 1 
Charter .05 .01 0 1 
Voucher .03 .01 0 1 
Other* .01 .01 0 1 
Region*     
South .35 .02 0 1 
Northeast .19 .19 0 1 
Midwest .15 .02 0 1 
West .21 .01 0 1 
Sources: Original data collected on Qualtrics via Amazon Mechanical Turk Panel. Notes: Referent for female is male. 6 respondents indicated that they 
homeschooled their child. 40 respondents did not provide state location. N=414. 
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TABLE 12. Ordinary least squares regression results from original survey experiment for perceptions of school quality. 
VARIABLES Quality 1 Quality 2 
B Rating -0.296 -0.336 
 (0.223) (0.228) 
C Rating -1.029*** -1.013*** 
 (0.221) (0.228) 
D Rating -1.686*** -1.706*** 
 (0.219) (0.224) 
F Rating -1.587*** -1.630*** 
 (0.233) (0.238) 
Female  0.016 
  (0.155) 
Political Views  0.055 
  (0.053) 
Education  -0.076 
  (0.074) 
Northeast  -0.022 
  (0.208) 
Midwest  -0.230 
  (0.225) 
West  -0.212 
  (0.203) 
US-broadly  -0.278 
  (0.281) 
Age  0.006 
  (0.009) 
Black  -0.123 
  (0.185) 
Latinx  -0.243 
  (0.331) 
Asian  0.162 
  (0.328) 
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3 or more children  -0.012 
  (0.187) 
Private School  0.201 
  (0.174) 
Charter   -0.398 
  (0.335) 
Voucher  0.207 
  (0.446) 
Other  -1.327* 
  (0.607) 
Constant 4.143*** 4.192*** 
 (0.158) (0.479) 
Observations 421 413 
R-squared 0.180 0.211 
Sources: Original data collected on Qualtrics via Amazon Mechanical Turk Panel. Notes. Referents are A Rating, Male, South, White, 1-2 children 
and Public School. N=414. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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TABLE 13. Ordinary least squares regression results from original survey experiment for enrollment decisions. 
 
VARIABLES Enroll 1 Enroll 2 
B Rating 0.118 0.138 
 (0.240) (0.237) 
C Rating -0.933*** -0.895*** 
 (0.238) (0.237) 
D Rating -1.070*** -1.147*** 
 (0.235) (0.232) 
F Rating -1.076*** -1.059*** 
 (0.249) (0.245) 
Female  -0.422** 
  (0.161) 
Political Views  -0.106 
  (0.056) 
Education  0.042 
  (0.077) 
Northeast  -0.003 
  (0.215) 
Midwest  -0.330 
  (0.233) 
West  -0.242 
  (0.211) 
US-broadly  0.158 
  (0.291) 
Age  0.002 
  (0.009) 
Black  0.342 
  (0.191) 
Latinx  -0.024 
  (0.349) 
Asian  -0.160 
  (0.340) 
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3 or more children  -0.151 
  (0.194) 
Private School  0.188 
  (0.181) 
Charter   0.751* 
  (0.353) 
Voucher  1.074* 
  (0.462) 
Other  -1.395* 
  (0.628) 
Constant 4.048*** 4.248*** 
 (0.170) (0.496) 
Observations 419 411 
R-squared 0.107 0.198 
Sources: Original data collected on Qualtrics via Amazon Mechanical Turk Panel. Notes: Referents are A Rating, Male, South, White, 1-2 children and Public 
School. N=414. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A. Key Supreme Court and congressional decisions concerning segregation. 
Plessy v Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896): The Supreme Court concluded that racial segregation did not 
constitute discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment, so long as the separate facilities were 
equal. The doctrine of “separate but equal,” meant that the federal government sanctioned 
segregation. 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (“Brown I”): The Supreme Court 
unanimously concluded that state-imposed segregated schools were “inherently unequal” and 
mush be abolished. The ruling stuck down the “separate but equal” doctrine. 
Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955): The Supreme Court attempted to define how and when desegregation 
would be achieved. The Court ruled that desegregation should occur with “all deliberate speed.” 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 (Pub. L. 102-166) (CRA): The act embodied two key aspects pertaining to 
education and segregation. First, it authorized the Attorney General to initiate class action law 
suits against districts failing to comply with Brown. Second, it provided the Secretary of 
Education to withhold federal funding if districts excluded on the basis of race. 
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968): The Supreme Court ruled that 
schools must dismantle segregated dual (or segregated) systems “root and branch” and that 
desegregation must be achieved with respect to facilities, staff, faculty, extracurricular activities 
and transportation. These factors became the standard by which to determine whether school 
districts achieved “unitary status” or fully integrated schools. 
Alexander v. Holmes County [Mississippi] Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19 (1969): The Supreme Court 
unanimously declared that desegregated systems must be achieved “at once” and “…operate now 
and hereafter only unitary schools.” 
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Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971): The Supreme Court ruled that 
desegregation must be achieved in each of a district’s schools to the greatest possible extent and 
approved bussing as a means to do so. 
Keyes v. Denver School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973): This was the first ruling to extend school 
segregation orders beyond de jure states – in the North and West where no explicit statutes 
required segregation. The Supreme Court rules that districts were responsible for policies that 
resulted in segregation in the school system, including constructing schools in racially isolated 
neighborhood and gerrymandering catchment zones. If intentional segregation was found on the 
part of the school board in a portion of the district, then the entire district was presumed to be 
illegally segregated. This was the first ruling which also recognized Latinxs’ right to 
desegregation. 
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974): The Supreme Court blocked efforts for interdistrict, city-
suburban desegregation as a means to integrate racially isolated urban schools. The Court 
prohibited such remedies unless the plaintiffs could demonstrate that the suburbs or state took 
specific actions to contribute to the segregation of the city.  
Milliken v. Bradley II, 433 U.S. 267 (1977): The Supreme Court ruled that a court could order a state to 
pay for educational programs to repair the harms caused by segregation. 
Riddick v. School Board of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1986): The first federal 
court ruling that permitted a school district, once declared unitary, to dismantle its desegregation 
plan and return to local government control. 
Board of Education of Oklahoma v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237  (1991): The Supreme Court ruled that a  
school district, once declared unitary, released the district from its obligations to maintain 
desegregation.  
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Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992): The Supreme Court ruled that school districts could be partially 
released from their desegregation obligations even if integration had not been achieved in all the 
specific areas determined in Green v. County School Board of New Kent County. 
Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995): The Supreme Court ruled that Milliken II equalization 
remedies should be limited in time and extent and that districts need not show any actual 
correction of the educational harms of segregation. 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003): The Supreme Court ruled that within Higher Education the use 
of an applicant's race as one factor in an admissions policy of a public educational institution does 
not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, the Court declared 
that, if narrowly tailored, it promotes a diverse student body and can be used as a holistic process 
to evaluate applicants along with other factors. 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007): The Supreme 
 Court ruled that the district’s goal of preventing racial imbalance did not meet the standards for a 
 constitutionally legitimate use of  race. Instead, the Court declared that voluntary race-conscious 
 student assignments to schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
 Amendment. 
Source: Adjusted from Orfield and Eaton 1996: xxi; summaries of key opinions and decisions.
 
 
1
4
2
 
APPENDIX B. Accountability and reporting current systems across the United States. 
 
States Rating system Minimum factors in elementary and middle school ratings Statute and regulation citations 
Alabama A-F Student Achievement, Achievement Gap, Student Growth Ala.Code 1975 § 16-6C-2; Alabama 
Administrative Code 290-4-1.03 
Alaska Index Student Achievement, Attendance/Chronic Absenteeism, School Growth/Progress, 4 AAC 06.812 
Arizona A-F Student Achievement, English Language Proficiency/Progress + multiple measures of 
school quality 
A.R.S. § 15-241 
Arkansas A-F Student Achievement, English Language Proficiency/Progress, Student Growth A.C.A. § 6-15-2105, -2108 
California Index Student Achievement, Attendance/Chronic Absenteeism, Dropout/Reenrollment Rates West's Ann.Cal.Educ.Code § 52052, 
52052.1 
Colorado Accreditation Student Achievement, Student Growth, Achievement Gap, Literacy/Reading (3/4th) C.R.S.A. § 22-11-204, 207 
Connecticut 1-5 Student Achievement C.G.S.A. § 10-223e 
Delaware Descriptive Student Achievement, Attendance/Chronic Absenteeism 14 Del.C. § 154; 14 Del. Admin. Code 103 
D.C. Not in policy - - 
Florida A-F Student Achievement, Student Growth, Acceleration Readiness, Achievement Gap West's F.S.A. § 1008.34 
Georgia Index Student Achievement, Student Growth, Achievement Gap Ga. Code Ann., § 20-14-33 
Hawaii Not in policy Student Achievement, Dropout/Reenrollment Rates, Attendance/Chronic Absenteeism HRS § 302A-1004 
Idaho Not in policy Student Achievement, Achievement Gaps, English Proficiency, Literacy, Readiness, 
Student/Parent Engagement 
IDAPA 08.02.03.112 
Illinois Descriptive Student Achievement, Student Growth, Readiness, Achievement Gap 105 ILCS 5/2-3.25a 
Indiana A-F Student Achievement, Achievement Gap, Student Growth IC 20-31-8-3; 511 IAC 6.2-10-3 - 6.2-10-6 
Iowa Accreditation Student Achievement I.C.A. § 256.7; Iowa Admin. Code 281-
12.8(256) 
Kansas Accreditation Student Achievement, Test Participation, Attendance/Chronic Absenteeism + 12 
quality measures. 
K.A.R. 91-31-32 
Kentucky Other Student Achievement, School Climate, English Proficiency/Progress KRS § 158.6455 
Louisiana A-F Student Achievement, Achievement Gap, Dropout/Reenrollment Rates + dropout 
accumulation 
La. Admin Code. tit. 28, Pt XI, § 301, § 
405, 409, & 413, § 1101 
Maine Not in policy Student Achievement, Readiness 20-A M.R.S.A. § 6214 
Maryland Index Student Achievement, School Climate + 3 school quality indicators MD Code, Education, § 7-203 
Massachusetts 1-5 Student Achievement, Student Growth 603 CMR 2.02-2.06 
Michigan Not in policy - M.C.L.A. 380.1280. 
Minnesota Not in policy Student Achievement, Achievement Gap, Growth + enrichment experiences M.S.A. § 120B.11, 120B.35 
Mississippi A-F Student Achievement, Student Growth, Achievement Gap, Attendance Miss. Code Ann. § 37-17-6; Miss. Admin. 
Code 7-1-10:I-2, 7-1-10:II-7 
Missouri Accreditation Student Achievement, Student Growth, Achievement Gap, Readiness, Attendance 5 Mo. Code of State Regulations 20-
100.105 
Montana Accreditation Student Achievement, Science Achievement Growth Mont.Admin.R. 10.55.601-607 
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Nebraska Tiers of support Student Achievement, Student Growth Neb.Rev.St. § 79-760.06; Neb. Admin. R. 
& Regs. Tit. 92, Ch. 10, § 010 & Appendix 
G 
Nevada Not in policy Student Achievement, Student Growth N.R.S. 385A.720, 385A.600, 385A.670 
New Hamp. Not in policy Input based and performance based system N.H. Rev. Stat. § 193-E:3-b - E:3-d 
New Jersey Tiers of support Student Achievement, Student Growth N.J.A.C. 6A:33–2.1 
New Mexico A-F Student Achievement, Achievement Gap, Attendance, School Climate, School 
Growth, Student/Parent Engagement 
N. M. S. A. 1978, § 22-2E-4; N.M. Admin. 
Code 6.19.8 
New York Tiers of support Student Achievement McKinney's Education Law § 211-a, 211-f; 
8 NYCRR 100.18(i)-(j), 100.19 
N. Carolina A-F Student Achievement, English Proficiency, Science Growth, Student Growth N.C.G.S.A. § 115C-83.15-.16; 
North Dakota Not in policy - NDCC, 15.1-02-17; Accreditation system: 
NDCC, 15.1-06-06 
Ohio A-F Student Achievement, Achievement Gap, Literacy/Reading, Student Growth Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3302.03; Ohio 
Admin. Code 3301-28-9, 3301-28-10 
Oklahoma A-F Student Achievement, Student Growth, English Proficiency, Absenteeism 70 Okl.St.Ann. § 1210.541, 1210.545 
Oregon 1-5 Student Achievement, Growth, Test Participation, Achievement Gap O.R.S. § 329.105, 329.115 
Pennsylvania Not in policy Student Achievement, Attendance 22 Pa. Code § 403.3 
Rhode Island Not in policy Student Achievement Gen.Laws 1956, § 16-7.1-5; R.I. Admin. 
Code 21-2-53:G-15-3 
S. Carolina Descriptive Student Achievement, English Proficiency, Student Growth Code 1976 § 59-18-900 
South Dakota Descriptive Student Achievement, Growth, Attendance ARSD 24:55:03:01-:05 
Tennessee Tiers of support Student Achievement, Student Growth + other T. C. A. § 49-1-602 
Texas Descriptive Student Achievement, Achievement Gap, Growth V.T.C.A., Education Code § 39.053; 19 
TAC §97.1001 
Utah A-F Student Achievement, Achievement Gap, Growth U.C.A. 1953 § 53A-1-1105 - 1108 
Vermont Not in policy Student Achievement, Test Participation 16 V.S.A. § 165; Vt. Admin. Code 7-1-
8:2500 - 2582 
Virginia Accreditation Student Achievement VA Code Ann. § 22.1-253.13:3; 8 VAC 20-
131-280 & -300 
Washington Tiers of support Student Achievement West's RCWA 28A.657.110, 28A.305.130 
West Virginia A-F Student Achievement, Achievement Gap, Growth, Attendance, Literacy/Reading 
(3/4th) + at-risk reduction 
2016 WV REG TEXT 422861 (NS) - 
Section 126.13.4, 126.13.5 
Wisconsin 1-5 stars Student Achievement, Achievement Gap, Growth, Attendance W.S.A. 115.38, 115.385 
Wyoming Descriptive Student Achievement, Achievement Gap, Growth, English Proficiency  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-2-204 
Source: Adjusted from the Education Commission of the States 2018 (http://ecs.force.com/mbdata/mbQuest6S?rep=SA171) 
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APPENDIX C. Accountability and weighting for states included in the analysis. 
 
States Rating system Categories by weight percentage of 
contribution to overall elementary rating 
State Source 
Alabama A-F achievement (40%/weighted); Growth 
(50%/weighted); Absenteeism (10%). 
Weights based on achievement levels (I-
IV: 0-1.25); Growth categories (low, 
average high: 0, 1, 1.5). 
https://www.alsde.edu/sec/acct/Resources/AL%20Technical%20Guide%20January%20
2018.pdf 
Arizona A-F Proficiency (30%); Growth (50%); ELL 
(10%, if ELL pop>20) Readiness (10%)  
https://azsbe.az.gov/sites/default/files/media/FINAL%20A-F%20Plan_1.pdf 
Arkansas A-F Achievement (35%); Growth for ELP 
(50%); Progress to ELP (weighted by 
ELP); School quality and student success 
(15%). 
http://dese.ade.arkansas.gov/public/userfiles/Legal/Legal-Current%20Rules/ade_334_--
_Rules_Governing_the_School_Rating_System.pdf 
Florida A-F Sum of points for each divided by total 
available: Math achievement (100); 
English achievement (100); Learning gains 
ELA (100) Learning gains math (100); 
Learning gains lowest 25% ELA (100); 
Learning gains lowest 25% math (100); 
Science (100); ELP Progress (100). 
http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18534/urlt/SchoolGradesCalcGuide19.pdf 
Indiana A-F Performance on English; Performance on 
Math; Growth in English; Growth in Math. 
Can not receive an A unless the school has 
reduced achievement gaps in each student 
subgroup. 
https://www.doe.in.gov/sites/default/files/accountability/f-accountability-
presentation.pdf 
Louisiana A-F Performance (75%); Student Progress 
(25%). 
https://www.louisianabelieves.com/docs/default-source/teacher-leader-summit/2018-
teacher-leader-summit/s030--what's-new-in-louisiana's-school-and-school-system-
accountability-policies.pdf?sfvrsn=2 
Mississippi A-F Out of 700 points: Reading (95); Math 
(95); Science (95); Growth in reading for 
all students (95); Growth in math for all 
students (95); Growth in reading for lowest 
25% of  students (95); Growth in math for 
lowest 25% of  students (95); English 
progress (35). 
https://msrc.mdek12.org/downloads/MSRCUserGuide.pdf 
New Mexico A-F Proficiency (25); Value-Added (15); 
School Improvement (10); Improvement of 
higher-performing students (e.g. growth, 
https://aae.ped.state.nm.us/SchoolGradingLinks/1718/Technical%20Assistance%20for
%20Educators/Technical%20Guide%202018.pdf 
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20); Improvement of lowest-performing 
students (20); Attendance (5); 
Classroom/Parent Survey (5). Bonus 
Points  (e.g. reducing truancy, engaging 
families etc. +5). 
N. Carolina A-F Achievement (80%); Growth (20%). http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/accountability/reporting/2018/documentation/busi
ness-rules/accountability-model.pdf 
Ohio A-F Achievement (20%); Progress (20%); 
Graduation Rate (15%); Gap Closing 
(15%); Improving At-Risk K-3 Readers 
(15%); Prepared for Success (15%). 
http://education.ohio.gov/getattachment/Topics/Data/Report-Card-Resources/Report-
Card-Guide.pdf.aspx 
S. Carolina Descriptive: 
Unsatisfactory 
to Excellent 
Points: Achievement (40); Preparing for 
Success (10); Progress (20); Lowest 20 
percent progress (20); School Quality (10). 
With 20+ Els: Achievement (35); 
Preparing for Success (10); Progress 
(17.5); Lowest 20 percent progress (17.5); 
School Quality (10); ELP (10). 
https://ed.sc.gov/data/report-cards/sc-school-report-card/files/accountability-manual/ 
Texas A-F Achievement (30%); Growth (50%); ELP 
(10%); Achievement STARR (10%) 
https://tea.texas.gov/sites/default/files/Entire%202018%20Accountability%20Manual.p
df 
Utah Descriptive: 
Critical Needs 
to Exemplary  
Achievement (37%); Growth (37%); EL 
Progress (9%); Growth of Lowest 25 
percent (17%). If percent of Els<10, 
weight is distributed to Achievement 
(41%); Growth (41%); Growth of Lowest 
(18%). 
https://www.schools.utah.gov/file/70235d75-cf35-4e04-9d2b-34ff388968b5 
Wisconsin 1-5 stars: 
Fails to meet to 
Significantly  
exceeds 
expectations 
Weighted average: Achievement (100); 
Growth (100) based on percent of students 
who are economically disadvantaged. 
Combined with Closing Gaps (100); On-
Track Readiness (100) and deductions. 
https://dpi.wi.gov/sites/default/files/imce/accountability/pdf/Report%20Card%20Techni
cal%20Guide%202016-17.pdf 
Source: The Departments of Education for: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: States use various measures to calculate key components. Components are often the result of various weights and 
measures. For instance, Ohio’s Progress component accounts for 20% of the overall rating, but this component is a result of multiple measures. The final 
component is a result of All Students (55%); Gifted Students (15%); Students with Disabilities (15%) and Student’s whose performance is in the lowest 20 
percent (15%). Similar methods are present across states and measures. 
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APPENDIX D. Metropolitan and district-level Black-White and Latinx-White segregation (D) by metropolis. 
 
Metropolis, State B-W Between Districts L-W Between Districts B-W Within Districts L-W Within Districts 
 
Abilene, TX 28.68 23.08 69.64 16.94 
Akron, OH 56.69 28.37 0.27 2.48 
Albuquerque, NM 14.44 10.92 34.59 40.55 
Alexandria, LA 0.00 0.00 35.01 50.86 
Amarillo, TX 30.68 23.62 11.82 12.04 
Anniston, AL 35.28 35.24 3.63 11.36 
Appleton/Oshkosh/Neenah, WI 21.36 19.19 15.92 15.17 
Asheville, NC 25.50 13.69 40.67 29.59 
Auburn/Opelika, AL 26.55 19.19 1.96 1.14 
Austin/San Marcos, TX 33.52 34.52 34.60 28.21 
Baton Rouge, LA 66.88 48.95 5.36 7.32 
Beaumont/Port Arthur, TX 72.19 54.52 6.35 5.56 
Biloxi/Gulfport/Pascagoula, MS 29.82 37.13 19.84 28.53 
Birmingham, AL 52.69 32.33 38.65 51.21 
Brazoria, TX 17.32 14.15 22.14 25.48 
Bryan/College Station, TX 30.71 42.06 40.92 44.86 
Canton/Massillon, OH 46.63 25.22 21.19 16.19 
Charleston/North Charleston, SC 10.00 8.45 62.21 70.63 
Charlotte/Gastonia/Rock Hill, NC/SC 37.27 31.25 23.59 29.89 
Cincinnati, OH/KY/IN 72.33 41.48 8.19 15.11 
Cleveland/Lorain/Elyria, OH 69.53 52.45 5.56 3.99 
Columbia, SC 44.51 30.67 27.94 19.64 
Columbus, OH 56.22 38.37 39.03 38.79 
Corpus Christi, TX 35.94 28.67 35.45 30.91 
Dallas, TX 48.04 50.48 31.87 43.90 
Dayton/Springfield, OH 47.79 28.36 20.70 13.99 
Daytona Beach, FL 2.41 7.25 20.70 17.73 
Decatur, AL 46.44 38.79 51.07 20.11 
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Metropolis, State (cont.) B-W Between Districts L-W Between Districts B-W Within Districts L-W Within Districts 
     
Dothan, AL 40.25 24.77 51.66 25.56 
El Paso, TX 9.74 27.55 26.34 37.11 
Elkhart/Goshen, IN 32.90 19.42 3.44 4.89 
Fayetteville, NC 1.75 1.13 42.03 28.03 
Fayetteville/Springdale/Rogers, AR 25.64 46.56 32.60 29.09 
Florence, AL 41.04 38.69 5.58 14.15 
Florence, SC 10.47 16.46 13.75 17.02 
Fort Lauderdale, FL 0.00 0.00 57.98 32.43 
Fort Myers/Cape Coral, FL 0.00 0.00 55.16 32.20 
Fort Pierce/Port St. Lucie, FL 37.71 14.29 33.39 19.33 
Fort Walton Beach, FL 0.00 0.00 35.96 21.11 
Fort Wayne, IN 43.36 37.70 64.61 46.03 
Fort Worth/Arlington, TX 51.46 41.16 5.56 5.17 
Gainesville, FL 1.38 1.92 38.92 20.09 
Galveston/Texas City, TX 54.01 33.65 38.57 13.05 
Gary, IN 68.88 43.73 3.74 3.18 
Goldsboro, NC 8.10 9.81 45.34 43.62 
Green Bay, WI 40.72 45.43 32.73 17.42 
Greensboro/Winston-Salem/High Point, NC 33.81 23.07 53.78 51.75 
Greenville, NC 8.96 4.50 36.73 38.07 
Greenville, SC 14.22 13.00 25.73 30.46 
Greenville/Spartanburg/Anderson, SC 32.63 22.10 11.61 11.36 
Hamilton/Middletown, OH 24.37 20.23 23.81 22.17 
Hickory/Morganton/Lenoir, NC 27.07 16.23 24.14 16.27 
Houma, LA 10.22 6.91 39.29 40.16 
Houston, TX 44.94 40.33 64.74 68.29 
Huntsville, AL 34.83 34.24 60.83 60.17 
Indianapolis, IN 64.81 52.31 32.43 44.23 
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Metropolis, State (cont.) B-W Between Districts L-W Between Districts B-W Within Districts L-W Within Districts 
     
Jackson, MS 39.64 26.44 12.27 34.39 
Jacksonville, FL 38.00 19.49 48.07 29.30 
Jacksonville, NC 0.00 0.00 36.26 20.99 
Janesville/Beloit, WI 53.47 37.08 19.88 15.98 
Kenosha, WI 20.70 19.00 47.05 36.76 
Killeen/Temple, TX 36.71 19.71 16.97 20.84 
Kokomo, IN 40.80 21.36 21.88 10.17 
Lafayette, IN 33.12 26.80 22.96 12.24 
Lafayette, LA 11.61 22.96 39.38 40.44 
Lake Charles, LA 19.96 4.93 47.53 30.39 
Lakeland/Winter Haven, FL 0.00 0.00 29.55 30.59 
Lima, OH 51.48 32.02 17.44 9.77 
Little Rock/North Little Rock, AR 54.05 34.36 58.51 67.70 
Longview/Marshall, TX 46.83 41.27 8.80 1.65 
Lubbock, TX 42.46 27.62 51.08 41.38 
Madison, WI 42.17 38.47 7.28 11.95 
Mansfield, OH 57.80 20.16 5.31 14.35 
Melbourne/Titusville/Palm Bay, FL 0.00 0.00 41.79 26.30 
Miami, FL 0.00 0.00 70.36 49.93 
Milwaukee/Waukesha, WI 66.55 48.94 19.84 12.54 
Mobile, AL 32.10 11.83 59.57 25.73 
Monroe, LA 16.70 4.20 61.39 37.30 
Montgomery, AL 56.65 52.98 57.80 59.59 
Muncie, IN 45.56 29.65 12.02 14.17 
Myrtle Beach, SC 0.00 0.00 39.72 31.25 
Naples, FL 0.00 0.00 57.02 50.66 
New Orleans, LA 44.14 48.87 57.92 44.59 
Ocala, FL 0.00 0.00 35.01 25.91 
Odessa/Midland, TX 8.51 16.13 34.43 27.29 
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Metropolis, State (cont.) B-W Between Districts L-W Between Districts B-W Within Districts L-W Within Districts 
     
Orlando, FL 15.72 16.12 34.53 19.73 
Panama City, FL 7.17 42.70 45.61 39.89 
Pensacola, FL 38.89 10.42 46.03 29.59 
Phoenix/Mesa, AZ 45.31 46.57 20.39 20.10 
Pine Bluff, AR 64.39 28.61 29.08 22.41 
Provo/Orem, UT 14.13 24.31 13.83 31.52 
Punta Gorda, FL 0.00 0.00 21.58 15.61 
Racine, WI 30.94 27.21 42.52 41.29 
Raleigh/Durham/Chapel Hill, NC 42.61 25.52 48.53 44.74 
Rocky Mount, NC 17.53 6.40 42.51 37.29 
Salt Lake City/Ogden, UT 36.14 37.17 13.66 26.53 
San Angelo, TX 5.41 0.07 23.11 24.51 
San Antonio, TX 32.54 30.59 21.91 57.60 
Sarasota/Bradenton, FL 14.68 21.02 48.22 31.21 
Sheboygan, WI 26.47 24.38 25.18 29.23 
Sherman/Denison, TX 32.14 35.23 13.85 29.31 
Shreveport/Bossier City, LA 26.32 9.29 27.45 20.26 
South Bend, IN 54.34 46.36 42.15 19.25 
Sumter, SC 0.00 0.00 31.79 32.38 
Tallahassee, FL 11.26 33.47 64.01 39.74 
Tampa/St. Petersburg/Clearwater 21.55 28.01 30.67 23.06 
Terre Haute, IN 0.00 0.00 36.74 17.94 
Texarkana, TX/AR 0.00 0.00 18.56 7.19 
Toledo, OH 57.87 28.89 20.01 16.31 
Tucson, AZ 35.13 34.41 36.34 40.47 
Tuscaloosa, AL 30.03 1.18 58.16 52.96 
Tyler, TX 39.79 42.07 44.67 65.24 
Victoria, TX 1.74 4.85 34.48 33.52 
Waco, TX 62.43 53.48 33.26 30.57 
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Metropolis, State (cont.) B-W Between Districts L-W Between Districts B-W Within Districts L-W Within Districts 
     
Wausau, WI 9.03 10.39 21.57 34.95 
West Palm Beach/Boca Raton, FL 0.47 0.37 59.36 48.80 
Wichita Falls, TX 16.94 16.14 39.77 33.89 
Wilmington, NC 12.45 6.03 56.88 40.57 
Youngstown/Warren, OH 63.89 41.89 1.58 5.20 
Yuma, AZ 17.55 21.95 33.25 15.86 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Segregation calculated using Dissimilarity indices 
(D). Notes: . Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. 
Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100. MSAs with levels (D) that exceed 60 are highlighted, indicating that nearly 40 percent of one 
student demographic (e.g. whites) would have to relocate to balance the domain (e.g. district or school). 
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APPENDIX E. Cross-tabulations of data for all schools: By fixed covariates using at(spec) option for metropolitan Black-White 
segregation. 
 
Percent Black 
Constructed 
Categories 
Total School-level 
data for All levels 
of  
B-W Between (D) 
Total School-level 
data if 
B-W Between (D) = 
0 
Total School-level 
data if 
B-W Between (D) 
<30 
Total School-level 
data if 
B-W Between (D) 
>50 
Total School-level 
data if 
B-W Between (D) 
>70 
0- 6,994 414 1,926 675 98 
      
19.81-  2,124 202 685 147 25 
      
40.96- 960 86 347 103 19 
      
62.11- 522 48 182 94 16 
      
83.27- 100 196 24 74 35 7 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Percent Black thresholds are categorical based on 
Table 2. Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. 
Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100. 
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APPENDIX F. Cross-tabulations of data for schools with an F rating: By fixed covariates using at(spec) option for metropolitan Black-
White segregation. 
 
Percent Black 
Constructed 
Categories 
Total School-level 
data for All levels 
of  
B-W Between (D) 
Total School-level 
data if 
B-W Between (D) 
= 0 
Total School-level 
data if 
B-W Between (D) 
<30 
Total School-level 
data if 
B-W Between (D) 
>50 
Total School-level 
data if 
B-W Between (D) 
>70 
0- - 5 75 103 14 
      
19.81-  - 8 30 36 3 
      
40.96- - 3 23 23 1 
      
62.11- - 1 4 25 2 
      
83.27- 100 - 1 2 10 3 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Percent Black thresholds are categorical based on 
Table 2. Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. 
Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100. 
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APPENDIX G. Cross-tabulations of data for schools with an A rating: By fixed covariates using at(spec) option for metropolitan 
Black-White segregation. 
 
Percent Black 
Constructed 
Categories 
Total School-level 
data for All levels 
of  
B-W Between (D) 
Total School-level 
data if 
B-W Between (D) = 
0 
Total School-level 
data if 
B-W Between (D) 
<30 
Total School-level 
data if 
B-W Between (D) 
>50 
Total School-level 
data if 
B-W Between (D) 
>70 
0- - 141 449 255 12 
      
19.81-  - 62 158 65 1 
      
40.96- - 27 71 31 1 
      
62.11- - 20 48 19 2 
      
83.27- 100 - 9 23 0 0 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Percent Black thresholds are categorical based on 
Table 2.Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. 
Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100. 
 
. 
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APPENDIX H. Cross-tabulations of data for all schools: By fixed covariates using at(spec) option for metropolitan Latinx-White 
segregation. 
 
 
Percent Latinx 
Constructed 
Categories 
Total School-level 
data for All levels 
of  
L-W Between (D) 
Total School-level 
data if 
L-W Between (D) = 
0 
Total School-level 
data if 
L-W Between (D) 
<30 
Total School-level 
data if 
L-W Between (D) 
>40 
Total School-level 
data if  
L-W Between (D) 
>50 
0- 1,088 40 568 268 124 
      
4.27- 5,567 349 2,467 1,894 743 
      
30.13- 2,122 221 807 930 288 
      
55.99- 1,365 88 391 678 201 
      
81.85- 100 654 76 214 292 70 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Percent Latinx thresholds are categorical based on 
Table 2. Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. 
Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100. 
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APPENDIX I. Cross-tabulations of data for schools with an F rating: By fixed covariates using at(spec) option for metropolitan Latinx-
White segregation. 
 
Percent Latinx 
Constructed 
Categories 
Total School-level 
data for All levels 
of  
L-W Between (D) 
Total School-level 
data if 
L-W Between (D) = 
0 
Total School-level 
data if 
L-W Between (D) 
<30 
Total School-level 
data if 
L-W Between (D) 
>40 
Total School-level 
data if  
L-W Between (D) 
>50 
0- - 5 56 26 11 
      
4.27- - 8 80 99 42 
      
30.13- - 4 29 56 18 
      
55.99- - 1 19 30 12 
      
81.85- 100 - 0 15 11 0 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Percent Latinx thresholds are categorical based on 
Table 2. Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. 
Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100. 
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APPENDIX J. Cross-tabulations of data for schools with an A rating: By fixed covariates using at(spec) option for metropolitan 
Latinx-White segregation. 
 
Percent Latinx 
Constructed 
Categories 
Total School-level 
data for All levels 
of  
L-W Between (D) 
Total School-level 
data if 
L-W Between (D) = 
0 
Total School-level 
data if 
L-W Between (D) 
<30 
Total School-level 
data if 
L-W Between (D) 
>40 
Total School-level 
data if  
L-W Between (D) 
>50 
0- - 8 92 44 22 
      
4.27- - 107 505 546 245 
      
30.13- - 84 194 141 38 
      
55.99- - 35 90 84 13 
      
81.85- 100 - 25 54 43 7 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Percent Latinx thresholds are categorical based on 
Table 2. Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. 
Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100. 
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APPENDIX K. Additional Cut Points: Predictive Margins with 95 Percent CI. Metropolitan-level Black-White segregation (D), Black student 
concentration and predicted school rating. 
 
Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes:. Appendix shows predicted probabilities of school rating for 
varying levels of between-district Black-White segregation and percentage categories of Black student population within schools.
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APPENDIX L. Additional Cut Points: Predictive Margins with 95 Percent CI. Metropolitan-level Black-White segregation (D), Black student 
concentration and predicted school rating (Bar). 
 
Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes:. Appendix shows predicted probabilities of school rating for 
varying levels of between-district Black-White segregation and percentage categories of Black student population within schools.
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APPENDIX M. Additional Cut Points: Predictive Margins with 95 Percent CI. Metropolitan-level Latinx-White segregation (D), Latinx student 
concentration and predicted school rating. 
 
Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes:. Appendix shows predicted probabilities of school rating for 
varying levels of between-district Latinx-White segregation and percentage categories of Latinx student population within schools.
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APPENDIX N. Additional Cut Points: Predictive Margins with 95 Percent CI. Metropolitan-level Latinx-White segregation (D), Latinx student 
concentration and predicted school rating (Bar). 
 
Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes:. Appendix shows predicted probabilities of school rating for 
varying levels of between-district Latinx-White segregation and percentage categories of Latinx student population within schools. 
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APPENDIX O. Predictive Margins from golotit2 output: Metropolitan-level Black-White segregation (D), Black student concentration and 
predicted school rating (Bar). 
 
Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Appendix shows predicted probabilities of school rating for 
varying levels of between-district Black-White segregation and percentage categories of Black student population within schools. Produced from gologit2 
command with all covariates included in Model 2, Table 7 with robust clusters at the metropolitan-level. 
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APPENDIX P. Predictive Margins from golotit2 output: Metropolitan-level Latinx-White segregation (D), Latinx student concentration and 
predicted school rating (Bar). 
 
Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Appendix shows predicted probabilities of school rating for 
varying levels of between-district Latinx-White segregation and percentage categories of Latinx student population within schools. Produced from gologit2 
command with all covariates included in Model 2, Table 8 with robust clusters at the metropolitan-level. 
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APPENDIX Q. Average marginal effects associated with a one standard deviation increase in percent Black: By metropolitan-level 
Black-White segregation. 
 
VARIABLES Schools  Districts MSAs A B C D F 
All Metropolitan Regions 9,138 761 102      
Average Predictions 
Pr (y | base) 
   .226 .306 .300 .114 .054 
Percent Black         
+SD    -.036 -.019 .018 .021 .015 
p-value    .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
         
Metropolitan Regions with Medium to High 
Levels of B-W Between (D) Segregation:  
>30 
6,616 659 60      
Average Predictions 
Pr (y | base) 
   .201 .324 .291 .121 .062 
Percent Black         
+SD    -.052 -.032 .026 .033 .026 
p-value    .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
         
Metropolitan Regions with Low Levels of  
B-W Between (D) Segregation: ≤30 
2,522 102 42      
Average Predictions 
Pr (y | base) 
   .277 .262 .330 .096 .035 
Percent Black         
+SD    -.005 -.001 .003 .002 .001 
p-value    .651 .653 .651 .651 .652 
         
         
Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Based on continuous measures of Black students 
and 1 SD increase. Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include 
schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100. 
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APPENDIX R. Average marginal effects associated with a one standard deviation increase in percent Latinx: By metropolitan-level 
Latinx-White segregation. 
 
VARIABLES Schools  Districts MSAs A B C D F 
All Metropolitan Regions 9,138 761 102      
Average Predictions 
Pr (y | base) 
   .226 .308 .301 .113 .053 
Percent Latinx         
+SD    -.054 -.027 .029 .031 .022 
p-value    .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
         
Metropolitan Regions with Medium to High 
Levels of L-W Between (D) Segregation:  
>30 
5,706 548 41      
Average Predictions 
Pr (y | base) 
   .209 .324 .287 .119 .061 
Percent Latinx         
+SD    -.051 -.031 .024 .032 .027 
p-value    .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
         
Metropolitan Regions with Low Levels of  
L-W Between (D) Segregation: ≤30 
3,432 213 61      
Average Predictions 
Pr (y | base) 
   .254 .280 .321 .102 .042 
Percent Latinx         
+SD    -.031 -.011 .019 .015 .008 
p-value    .006 .024 .004 .012 .018 
         
         
Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Based on continuous measures of Latinx students 
and 1 SD increase. Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include 
schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100. 
  
 
 
1
6
5
 
APPENDIX S. Multi-level ordered logistic regression results for district-level Black-White and Latinx-White segregation (D) without 
financial control variables. 
VARIABLES B-W Within (D) L-W Within (D) 
   
B-W Within (D) 0.01 - 
 (0.00) - 
20-41 percent Black -0.30* - 
 (0.15) - 
42-62 percent Black -0.73** - 
 (0.25) - 
63-82 percent Black -0.57 - 
 (0.38) - 
83-100 percent Black -1.38* - 
 (0.60) - 
B-W Within (D) * 20-41 percent Black -0.00 - 
 (0.00) - 
B-W Within (D) * 42-62 percent Black 0.00 - 
 (0.01) - 
B-W Within (D) * 63-82 percent Black -0.01 - 
 (0.01) - 
B-W Within (D) * 83-100 percent Black 0.01 - 
 (0.01) - 
L-W Within (D)  0.01 
 - (0.00) 
5-29 percent Latinx - -0.06 
 - (0.15) 
30-55 percent Latinx - -0.55** 
 - (0.21) 
56-80 percent Latinx - -1.10*** 
 - (0.25) 
81-100 percent Latinx - -1.06** 
 - (0.33) 
L-W Within (D) * 5-29 percent Latinx - -0.00 
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 - (0.00) 
L-W Within (D) * 30-55 percent Latinx - -0.00 
 - (0.01) 
L-W Within (D) * 56-80 percent Latinx - 0.00 
 - (0.01) 
L-W Within (D) * 81-100 percent Latinx - -0.00 
 
School-level variables 
- (0.01) 
   
Percent Latinx (School) -0.02*** - 
 (0.00) - 
   
Percent Black (School) - -0.02*** 
 - (0.00) 
   
Charter 0.35*** 0.35*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) 
Letter Rating 0.36** 0.34** 
 (0.12) (0.12) 
South  -0.20 -0.09 
 (0.13) (0.13) 
Midwest -0.95*** -0.81*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) 
 
District-level variables 
  
Recent Mandate (1990-2003) 1.07*** 1.06*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) 
Prior Mandate (1980-1989) 0.00 0.09 
 (0.31) (0.31) 
Percent White (District) -0.01* -0.01* 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
cut1 -3.85*** -3.80*** 
 (0.24) (0.30) 
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cut2 -2.37*** -2.32*** 
 (0.23) (0.30) 
cut3 -0.62** -0.57 
 (0.23) (0.30) 
cut4 1.00*** 1.05*** 
 (0.23) (0.30) 
var(_cons[district]) 0.65*** 0.63*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Observations 10,369 10,369 
Number of groups 854 854 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Percent Black and Latinx thresholds are categorical 
based on Table 2. Charter status, rating, prior/ recent mandates and region variables are dichotomous. Based on demographic data available for students in grades 
Pre-K through 6 when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100. Standard 
errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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APPENDIX T. Multi-level ordered logistic regression results for metropolitan-level Black-White and Latinx-White segregation (D) 
without financial control variables. 
VARIABLES B-W Between (D) L-W Between (D) 
   
B-W Between (D) -0.00 - 
 (0.00) - 
20-41 percent Black -0.10 - 
 (0.11) - 
42-62 percent Black -0.23 - 
 (0.15) - 
63-82 percent Black -0.38* - 
 (0.19) - 
83-100 percent Black -0.26 - 
 (0.29) - 
B-W Between (D) * 20-41 percent Black -0.01* - 
 (0.00) - 
B-W Between (D) * 42-62 percent Black -0.01* - 
 (0.00) - 
B-W Between (D) * 63-82 percent Black -0.01** - 
 (0.00) - 
B-W Between (D) * 83-100 percent Black -0.02** - 
 (0.01) - 
L-W Between (D) - 0.00 
 - (0.01) 
5-29 percent Latinx - -0.20 
 - (0.18) 
30-55 percent Latinx - -0.10 
 - (0.21) 
56-80 percent Latinx - -0.66** 
 - (0.24) 
81-100 percent Latinx - -1.37*** 
 - (0.30) 
L-W Between (D) * 5-29 percent Latinx - 0.00 
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 - (0.01) 
L-W Between (D) * 30-55 percent Latinx - -0.02* 
 - (0.01) 
L-W Between (D) * 56-80 percent Latinx - -0.01 
 - (0.01) 
L-W Between (D) * 81-100 percent Latinx - 0.00 
 - (0.01) 
School-level variables   
Percent Latinx (School) -0.02*** - 
 (0.00) - 
Percent Black (School) - -0.01*** 
 - (0.00) 
Charter 0.35*** 0.34*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) 
Letter Rating 0.37* 0.28 
 (0.16) (0.16) 
South  -0.17 -0.01 
 (0.22) (0.23) 
Midwest -0.58* -0.59* 
 (0.26) (0.26) 
District-level variables   
Recent Mandate (1990-2003) 0.98*** 1.02*** 
 (0.23) (0.24) 
Prior Mandate (1980-1989) 0.42 0.38 
 (0.29) (0.29) 
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Metropolitan-level variables   
Percent White (Metro) -0.02*** -0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
cut1 -4.46*** -4.10*** 
 (0.36) (0.42) 
cut2 -2.98*** -2.62*** 
 (0.35) (0.41) 
cut3 -1.23*** -0.88* 
 (0.35) (0.41) 
cut4 0.39 0.74 
 (0.35) (0.41) 
var(_cons[msa]) 0.12** 0.13** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
var(_cons[msa>district]) 0.48*** 0.47*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Observations 10,369 10,369 
Number of groups 112 112 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Percent Black and Latinx thresholds are categorical 
based on Table 2. Charter status, rating, prior/ recent mandates and region variables are dichotomous. Based on demographic data available for students in grades 
Pre-K through 6 when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100. Standard 
errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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APPENDIX U. Sensitivity analyses: Multi-level ordered logistic regression results for metropolitan-level Black-White segregation (D) 
with additional restrictive inclusion criteria. 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES 
Metropolitan Black 
Student Population 
>=500 
Metropolitan Black 
Student Population 
>=1,000 
Metropolitan Black 
Student Population 
>=5,000 
Metropolitan Black 
Student Population 
>=10,000 
     
B-W Between (D) -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
20-41 percent Black 0.00 -0.00 -0.10 -0.22 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.17) 
42-62 percent Black -0.08 -0.08 -0.16 -0.19 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.22) 
63-82 percent Black -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 0.07 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.23) (0.25) 
83-100 percent Black 0.29 0.29 0.23 -0.27 
 (0.33) (0.33) (0.35) (0.38) 
B-W Between (D) * 20-41 percent Black -0.01* -0.01* -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
B-W Between (D) * 42-62 percent Black -0.01** -0.01** -0.01* -0.01* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
B-W Between (D) * 63-82 percent Black -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02** -0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
B-W Between (D) * 83-100 percent Black -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
School-level variables      
     
Percent Latinx (School) -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Percent Poverty (FRL) -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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Charter 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.29** 0.29** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) 
Letter Rating 0.36* 0.37* 0.34 0.17 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.20) (0.23) 
South  0.10 0.12 -0.58 -0.65* 
 (0.24) (0.23) (0.31) (0.31) 
Midwest -0.68* -0.65* -1.49*** -1.60*** 
 (0.28) (0.27) (0.36) (0.39) 
 
District-level variables 
    
     
District Poverty (IPR) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Recent Mandate (1990-2003) 1.24*** 1.11*** 1.29*** 1.31*** 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.26) (0.35) 
Prior Mandate (1980-1989) 0.18 0.20 0.00 0.12 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.32) (0.35) 
Property Taxes 0.15*** 0.14** 0.16** 0.20*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
     
Metropolitan-level variables     
     
Percent White (Metro) -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
     
cut1 -2.36*** -2.58*** -2.85*** -2.58** 
 (0.64) (0.64) (0.77) (0.84) 
cut2 -0.98 -1.20 -1.44 -1.19 
 (0.64) (0.64) (0.77) (0.84) 
cut3 0.76 0.54 0.31 0.59 
 (0.64) (0.64) (0.77) (0.84) 
cut4 2.37*** 2.16*** 1.90* 2.22** 
 (0.64) (0.64) (0.77) (0.84) 
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var(_cons[msa]) 0.12** 0.10** 0.06 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
var(_cons[msa>district]) 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.40*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
Observations 9,035 8,904 7,085 5,972 
Number of groups 96 89 45 27 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Percent Black and Latinx thresholds are categorical 
based on Table 2. Charter status, rating, prior/ recent mandates and region variables are dichotomous. Based on demographic data available for students in grades 
Pre-K through 6 when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100. Models 
progressively restrict inclusion criteria at the metro-level from >=500 Black students in the metro to >=5,000 Black students in the mero. Standard errors in 
parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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APPENDIX V. Adjusted differences in linear predictions by exposure group. 
 lincom p 
Perceptions of quality   
A-B .336 - 
A-C 1.013 <.001 
A-D 1.706 <.001 
A-F 1.630 <.001 
B-C .677 .003 
B-D 1.369 <.001 
B-F 1.294 <.001 
C-D .693 .002 
C-F .617 .011 
D-F -.076 - 
   
Likelihood of enrollment   
A-B -.138 - 
A-C .895 <.001 
A-D 1.147 <.001 
A-F 1.059 <.001 
B-C 1.033 <.001 
B-D 1.285 <.001 
B-F 1.197 <.001 
C-D .252 - 
C-F .164 - 
D-F -.088 - 
Sources: Original data collected on Qualtrics via Amazon Mechanical Turk Panel. Notes: N=414. Notes: Based on the regression models contained in Table 12 
and Table 13 with control variables held at the means. Linear predictions shown in Figure 19 and Figure 20. Lincom is the difference in these linear predictions 
by exposure group; p is the p-value from tests of difference between predictions and delta-method standard errors. Only significant coefficients are shown  
(p<0.05). 
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APPENDIX W. Institutional review board consent. 
University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee 
Consent to Participate in Research 
 
Researchers: Marcus L. Britton, Ph.D.; Michael A. Miner, M.A., Ph.D. Candidate; Department of 
Sociology. We’re inviting you to participate in a research study. Participation is completely voluntary. If 
you agree to participate, you can always change your mind and withdraw. There are no negative 
consequences, whatever you decide. 
 
What is the purpose of this study?: We want to understand parental perceptions and attitudes toward 
school ratings.  
 
What will I do?: This survey will ask you questions about your perception of school ratings and your 
attitudes toward enrolling your child in a similar school. This will take approximately 5-10  minutes of 
your time.  
 
Risks: 
• Some questions may be very personal or upsetting. You can skip any questions you don’t want to 
answer, or stop the survey entirely. 
• Online data being hacked or intercepted: This is a risk you experience any time you provide 
information online. We’re using a secure system to collect this data, but we can’t completely 
eliminate this risk. 
• Amazon could link your worker ID (and associated personal information) with your survey 
responses. Make sure you have read Amazon’s MTurk participant and privacy agreements to 
understand how your personal information may be used or disclosed. 
• Breach of confidentiality: There is a chance your data could be seen by someone who shouldn’t 
have access to it. We’re minimizing this risk in the following ways:  
o All identifying information is removed and replaced with a study ID.  
o We’ll store all electronic data on a password-protected, encrypted computer.  
 
Possible benefits: There are no benefits to you other than to further research. Larger benefits include 
helping researchers understand how parents evaluate school ratings. 
 
Estimated number of participants: 385 parents  
 
How long will it take? 5-10 minutes 
 
Costs: None. 
 
Compensation: You will receive $0.60 for completing the survey.  
 
Future research: De-identified data (all identifying information removed) may be shared with other 
researchers. You won’t be told specific details about these future research studies.  
 
Where will data be stored? On the researchers’ computers. 
 
How long will it be kept? : De-identified data will be kept for up to 5 years. 
 
Who can see my data? 
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• We (the researchers) will have access to your responses and de-identified demographic 
information. This is so we can analyze the data and conduct the study. 
• The Institutional Review Board (IRB) at UWM, the Office for Human Research Protections 
(OHRP), or other federal agencies may review all the study data. This is to ensure we’re 
following laws and ethical guidelines. 
• We may share our findings in publications or presentations. If we do, the results will be aggregate 
(grouped) data, with no individual results.  
• Amazon: Because they own the MTurk internal software, and to issue payment, Amazon will 
have access to your MTurk worker ID. There is a possibility Amazon could link your worker ID 
(and associated personal information) with your survey responses. 
 
Contact information: 
For questions about the research, complaints, or problems please contact: 
Michael A. Miner, minerm@uwm.edu 
 
For questions about your rights as a research participant, complaints, or problems: Contact the 
UWM IRB (Institutional Review Board; provides ethics oversight) at 414-229-3173 / irbinfo@uwm.edu.  
 
Please print or save this screen if you want to be able to access the information later. 
IRB #: 20.146 
IRB Approval Date: January 10, 2020 
 
Agreement to Participate 
If you meet the eligibility criteria below and would like to participate in this study, click the button below 
to begin the survey. Remember, your participation is completely voluntary, and you’re free to withdraw at 
any time. 
• I am at least 18 years old 
• I am a parent of a child/children between the ages of 0 and 21 years old. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
177 
 
APPENDIX X. Institutional review board approval letter (exempt). 
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APPENDIX Y. Experimental survey experiment. 
 
[Insert consent form and IRB approval] 
[Programming Note: Set UWM header in Qualtrics] 
[Programming Note: Restrict to one question per page and no duplicates] 
 
Question 1. 
Are you a parent? [Please select one]. 
Radio buttons 1-2; 1=Yes; 2=No 
[Programming Note: If 2 is selected, skip to End of Survey] 
 
Question 2. 
How many children do you have? 
Radio buttons 1-6; 1=1; 2=2…6=More than 5 
[Programming Note: Randomize choice options] 
[Programming Note: Fix last option] 
 
Question 3. 
What type of school will you or did/do you send your children to? 
Radio buttons 1-5 and open; 1=Voucher; 2=Charter; 3=Private; 4=Public; 5=Other[open] 
[Programming Note: Randomize choice options] 
[Programming Note: Fix last option] 
 
Question 4. 
Which of the following best describes your race or ethnicity? 
Radio buttons 1-5 and open; 1=Black or African American; 2=Latino/a/x; 3=White; 4=Asian; 
5=Other[open] 
[Programming Note: Randomize choice options] 
[Programming Note: Fix last option] 
 
Question 5. 
Which gender do you identify with? [Please select one]. 
Radio buttons 1-3 and open; 1=Male; 2=Female; 3=Other [open] 
[Programming Note: Randomize choice options] 
[Programming Note: Fix last option] 
 
Question 6. 
How old are you? 
Open response 
[Programming Note: Fix character minimum to 2] 
[Programming Note: Fix character maximum to 2] 
 
Question 7. 
Which state in the United States do you live in? [Please use the two-letter abbreviation]. 
Open response 
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[Programming Note: Fix character minimum to 2] 
[Programming Note: Fix character maximum to 2] 
 
Question 8. 
What is your highest level of education? [Please select one]. 
Radio buttons 1-6; 1=Less than a high school degree; 2=A high school degree; 3= Two-year 
college degree; 4= Four-year college degree; 5=Graduate degree 6=Doctoral degree 
 
Question 9. 
We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Below is a seven-point scale of 
political views that people might hold. Where would you place yourself on this scale? 
Radio buttons 1-7; 1=Extremely Liberal 6=Extremely Conservative  
 
 
Introduction to School Data. Schools are required to provide the public with annual 
information on how well they are serving their students. Like how students receive report cards 
to evaluate their performance in subject areas, schools are evaluated on different areas and the 
information is issued in a school report card. School report cards are available to the public 
which allows people to judge how well schools are performing. 
 
Imagine you are asked to evaluate your satisfaction with measures used on a school’s report card. 
On the following screens, you will be asked to view school report card data for elementary 
schools.  
 
School. Below are report card data for Cedar Elementary School. The performance of Cedar 
Elementary has been measured by the school’s performance index scores and are listed for each 
area. The overall rating is a weighted combination of these measures. The overall rating scale is 
A-F. With the provided data, please answer the following questions. 
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Cedar Elementary School 
Overall School Rating (A-F) 
 
School and District Measures Performance Metrics 
Student Achievement on Standardized Tests 
(e.g. amount of students that are proficient or 
higher) 
Adequate Yearly Progress in achievement on 
reading and language exams 
Growth in Student Achievement Over Time 
(e.g. annual gains on exams) 
Adequate Yearly Progress in growth on 
reading and language exams from year to year 
Closing Achievement Gaps With Other 
Students (e.g. whites achievement scores 
compared to minority group achievement 
scores; students’ scores that receive free/ 
reduced lunch compared to those that do not). 
Adequate Yearly Progress in performance on 
narrowing these gaps in achievement 
On-Track to Graduation (e.g. graduation 
rates; attendance at other schools) 
Adequate Yearly Progress in student success 
in achieving milestones 
[Programming Note: Order of School and District Measures Should Be Randomized] 
[Programming Note: Overall School Rating Should Fixed In First Position] 
[Programming Note: Overall School Rating Should Have Performance Varying A-F Randomly] 
 
 
Question 10.  
Imagine the IDEAL overall school rating for you and your household. How well do you think 
Cedar Elementary compared with your ideal? 
 Radio buttons 1-7; 1=Extremely far from my ideal; 7=Extremely close to my ideal 
 
Question 11. 
Imagine Cedar Elementary was your local neighborhood school. If cost were not an issue, how 
likely do you think you and your household would be to decide to enroll your child in Cedar 
Elementary School versus an Alternative School (such as a private school, voucher or 
charter)?Radio buttons 1-7; 1=Extremely likely to enroll in Cedar Elementary; 7= Extremely 
likely to enroll in Alternative School 
 
Here is your ID 
[${e://Field/Create%20New%20Field%20or%20Choose%20From%20Dropdown...}] 
Copy this value to paste into MTurk. When you have copied this ID, please click the 'Next' 
button to submit your survey. 
[Programming Note: Set random embedded data to generate unique code 100-5000] 
 
We thank you for your time spent taking this survey. 
Your response has been recorded. 
 
[end]
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APPENDIX Z. Curriculum vitae. 
Curriculum Vitae
Michael A. 
Ph.D. Candidate · Distinguished Fellow · Department of Sociology  
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee  
Bolton Hall 718, 3210 N. Maryland Ave, Milwaukee, WI 53211 
 minerm@uwm.edu |      /minerm/ 
Education__________________________________________________________________ 
 
2020 Doctor of Philosophy 
Sociology, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee 
2017 Master of Arts 
Sociology, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee 
2015 Bachelor of Arts 
Sociology and Psychology, St. Joseph’s College, Brooklyn 
 
Professional Experience__________________________________________________ 
  
Facebook, Menlo Park, CA and  New York, NY 
Instagram, Menlo Park, CA and  New York, NY 
 
 
 
2020-current Research Scientist  
Summer 2019 Research Scientist, PhD-Intern  
Summer 2018 Research Scientist, PhD-Intern  
2019-2020 St. Joseph’s College, Brooklyn, Brooklyn, NY  
 Visiting Research Scholar  
 University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI  
2019-2020 Distinguished Predoctoral Fellow  
2017-2019 Predoctoral Fellow  
2015-2020 Graduate Teaching Assistant and Research Assistant  
 
Areas of Specialization____________________________________________________ 
 
Sociology of Education, Segregation/Integration and Policy, Public Trust, Science, Knowledge and 
Technology, Medical Sociology, Social Inequality, Quantitative Methodology 
 
Refereed Publications_____________________________________________________ 
 
Minor Revision Miner, Michael A. “Caught in Limbo: Mapping the Experiences of First-
Generation Students in Graduate School” at Sociological Perspectives 
 
*Honorable Mention, Educational Problems Division Paper Award, Society for the Study of 
Social Problems, 2019* 
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2019  Miner, Michael A. “Physicians, Nurse Practitioners, and the Shortage of 
Primary Care Providers: Professional Autonomy in the Public Discourse” 
Sociological Imagination 55(1):1-21. 
 
*First place, Barbara J. Johnston Paper Award, Midwest Sociological Society, 2018* 
 
2019 Miner, Michael A. “Unpacking the Monolith: Intersecting Gender and 
Citizenship Status in STEM Graduate Education” International Journal of Sociology 
and Social Policy 39(9/10): 661-679. 
 
Under Review Miner, Michael A. “Unmet Promises: Diminishing Confidence in Education 
Among College Educated Adults from 1973-2018” 
  
Under Review Miner, Michael A. and Marcus L. Britton “Repackaging Inequality? School 
Segregation and School Accountability Ratings in Metropolitan Milwaukee”  
 
Under Review Gauchat, Gordon and Michael A. Miner. “Vaccination and Polarization: A 
Cultural Authority Model of Science Controversy”  
 
 “Residential Segregation and Very Preterm Birth among Non-Hispanic Black 
Women: The Role of Maternal Immigrant Status” (with Marcus L. Britton, in 
preparation) 
 
 “The Cultural Authority of Social Science: A Study of Public Perceptions on 
Inequality.” (with Gordon Gauchat, in preparation) 
 
 “An Experiment on Parents: How School Ratings Influence Parent’s Perceptions 
of School Quality and Impact Their Enrollment Decisions.” (with Natasha 
Quadlin, in preparation) 
  
“A Nation Rated, a Nation Divided: Understanding the Association of School 
Ratings and School Segregation at the Metropolitan Level.” (with Marcus L. 
Britton, in preparation). 
  
Research and Technical Reports 
 
2019 Miner, Michael A. “Perceptions of Performance and Reliability: A 
Longitudinal Framework of People Using Instagram.” Prepared for Instagram 
and Facebook Inc. 
 
2019  Miner, Michael A. “Assessing Global Access: Perceptions of Performance 
and Reliability on Instagram Lite.” Prepared for Instagram and Facebook Inc. 
 
2019 Miner, Michael A. “Foundation Research: A Systemic Review of 
Performance and Reliability.” Prepared for Instagram and Facebook Inc. 
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2018 Miner, Michael A. “Multinational Results: The Impact of Inappropriate Ad 
Content on Trust in Instagram around the World.” Prepared for Instagram and 
Facebook Inc. 
 
2018 Miner, Michael A. “Perceptions of Transparency, Trust and Personal 
Control on Instagram.” Prepared for Instagram and Facebook Inc. 
 
2018 Miner, Michael A. “Understanding Views of and Reactions to 
Inappropriate and Trust-Violating Content on Instagram.” Prepared for 
Instagram and Facebook Inc. 
 
 
Invited Talks___________________________________________________________ 
 
2020 
 
Miner, Michael A. “From Academia to Industry: Being a Sociologist in Tech” 
Midwest Sociological Society Omaha, NE.  
  
2020 Miner, Michael A. Panelist. “"Speedgeeking": Sustaining a Career in Industry 
with a Degree in Sociology” Midwest Sociological Society Omaha, NE.  
  
2020 Miner, Michael A. Panelist. “Understanding and Unpacking the Peer-Review 
Process in Academic Publishing” Department of Sociology University of Wisconsin, 
Milwaukee. 
 
2019  
 
Miner, Michael A. Panelist. “Leveraging Graduate Study to Launch a 
Professional Career:” Department of Sociology University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee. 
 
Presentations at professional meetings _____________________________ 
 
2020  
 
Miner, Michael A. “Shifting Rhetoric, Broken Promises, and 45-years of 
Diminishing Confidence in the Institution of Education” Society for the Study of 
Social Problems, San Francisco, CA 
  
2020 Miner, Michael A. and Marcus L. Britton. “A Nation Rated? School 
Segregation and the Unequal Distribution of a School Resource in Metropolitan 
Public Schools” Sociology of Education Association, Monterey Bay, CA 
 
2019  
 
Miner, Michael A. “Declining Trust in Education Among College Educated 
Adults: 1974-2016” American Sociological Association, New York, NY 
  
2019 Miner, Michael A. “Being First: How Social Capital Intersects with the 
Socialization Processes of First-Generation Students in Graduate School” Society 
for the Study of Social Problems, New York, NY 
 
2019 Miner, Michael A. “A Conceptual Matrix of the Experiences of First-
Generation Students in Graduate School” Midwest Sociological Society, Chicago, IL 
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2018 Miner, Michael A. and Marcus L. Britton. “Repackaging Inequality: Obscuring 
School Performance through Accountability Rankings” Society for the Study of 
Social Problems, Philadelphia, PA 
 
2018 Gauchat, Gordon and Michael A. Miner. “The Credibility of Cultural 
Authorities on Vaccination Policy: A Relational Approach” American Sociological 
Association, Philadelphia, PA 
 
2018 Miner, Michael A. “A Health Policy Issue is a Social Problem Too: Who 
Should Have Professional Autonomy?” Society for the Study of Social Problems, 
Philadelphia, PA 
 
2018 Miner, Michael A. “Disaggregating the Monolithic Category: Citizenship and 
Choice of Academic Discipline Among STEM Graduate Students” Midwest 
Sociological Society, Minneapolis, MN 
  
2017 Miner, Michael A. “Separate and Unequal: Predicting School Accountability 
Ratings” American Sociological Association, Montreal, ON  
  
2017 Miner, Michael A. “Separate and Unequal: What Do School Accountability 
Labels Actually Measure in America’s Most Segregated City?” Society for the Study 
of Social Problems, Montreal, ON  
  
2017 Miner, Michael A. “Public Perceptions of Professional Autonomy in Primary 
Care Medicine,” Sociology Colloquium, Milwaukee, WI  
  
2017 Miner, Michael A. “Physicians, Nurse Practitioners, and the Shortage in 
Primary Care Medicine: A Contestation of Credentials and Experience Midwest 
Sociological Society, Milwaukee, WI 
  
2016 Miner, Michael A. “Higher Education: A Discussion of Structural Inequalities” 
Society for the Study of Social Problems, Seattle, WA 
  
2016 Miner, Michael A. “Issues in Education: Exploring the Experiences of Low-
Income College Students” Eastern Sociological Society, Boston, MA  
  
2015 Miner, Michael A. “Educational Inequalities: An Examination of Individual 
Triumphs Over Structural Barriers” Research Symposium, Brooklyn, NY 
  
2015 Miner, Michael A. “Enhancing Narcissism through Social Media Use: The 
Introduction of the Cellular Phone” Research Symposium, Brooklyn, NY 
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Local Media Attention__________________________________________________ 
 
2019 Sociology@UWM Newsletter, “Faculty and Student Accomplishments” 
(https://uwm.edu/sociology/wp-
content/uploads/sites/151/2019/06/Sociology-Newsletter-2019.pdf) 
 
2018 Sociology@UWM Newsletter, “Faculty and Student Accomplishments” 
(https://uwm.edu/sociology/wp-
content/uploads/sites/151/2018/05/Sociology-Newsletter-2018.pdf) 
2018 SJCNY Magazine, “Michael Miner ‘15 Gets Experience in Research Science 
From Social Media Giant” (https://oncampus.sjcny.edu/facebook-internship-
opens-doors-for-sjc-brooklyn-alum/) 
Grants, Fellowships and Accolades__________________________________ 
External Grants  
2020 Midwest Sociological Society, Scholarship Development Committee “A Nation 
Rated? School Ratings, School Quality and Enrollment Decisions: Evidence 
from a Survey Experiment.” 
Fellowships and Scholarships 
2019 Distinguished Graduate Student Fellowship, (UWM) 
2018 Advanced Opportunity Program Fellowship, (UWM) 
2017 Advanced Opportunity Program Fellowship, (UWM) 
2017 Chancellor’s Graduate Student Fellowship, (UWM) 
2015 Chancellor’s Graduate Student Fellowship, (UWM)) 
2013 American Red Cross Scholarship, (New York Cares) 
2011-2015 Clark Foundation Scholarship (SJC) 
2011-2015 St. Joseph’s Scholastic Scholarship (SJC) 
2011 Chief Schenevus Scholarship (SJC) 
Paper Awards  
2019 Honorable Mention, Educational Division Paper Award, (SSSP) 
2018 First Place, Barbara J. Johnston Student Paper Award, (MSS) 
Internal and Travel Grants 
2020 Graduate Student Travel Award, Sociology of Education Association (SEA) 
2019 Student Forum Travel Award, American Sociological Association (ASA) 
2019 Graduate Student Sociology Association, Student Association (UWM) 
2018 Travel Grant, Midwest Sociological Society (MSS) 
2018 Graduate Student Travel Grant, The Graduate School, (UWM) 
2018 Graduate Student Sociology Association, Student Association (UWM) 
2017 Graduate Student Travel Grant, The Graduate School, (UWM) 
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2017 Graduate Student Travel Grant, Department of Sociology, (UWM) 
2016 Graduate Student Travel Grant, The Graduate School, (UWM) 
2016 Graduate Student Travel Grant, Department of Sociology, (UWM) 
2015 Graduate Student Travel Grant, The Graduate School, (UWM) 
2015 Graduate Student Travel Grant, Department of Sociology, (UWM) 
Honorable Recognition 
2015 Social Sciences, Departmental Honors, (SJC) 
2014, 2015 Sigma Iota Chi Honors, (SJC) 
2014, 2015 Dean’s Academic List, (SJC) 
  
Research Experience_________________________________________________ 
Research Internships  
Summer 2019 Facebook, New York, New York 
Research Scientist, Ph.D.-Intern, Instagram: Infrastructure Foundation Research 
Team 
Summer 2018 Facebook, Menlo Park, California 
Research Scientist, Ph.D.-Intern, Instagram: Trust and Transparency Research 
Team 
Graduate Research Assistant  
2017-2020 Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee 
Graduate Research Assistant 
2017-2018 National Center for Distance Education and Technological Advancements 
Graduate Research Assistant 
 
Teaching Experience__________________________________________________ 
Graduate Teaching Assistant and Lab Instructor 
2017 Introduction to Sociology (Principal Instructor: Tim O’Brien) 
Teaching Assistant 
2016-2017 Department of Academic Services 
Supplemental Instructor 
2016-2017 Statistics (Principal Instructor: Aki Roberts) 
Lab Instructor and Teaching Assistant 
2015-2016 Introduction to Sociology (Principal Instructor: Jennifer Jordan) 
Teaching Assistant 
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Software and Methodology__________________________________________ 
 
 Statistical Methods and Analyses 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Logit/Probit, Ordered Logit/Probit, Structural 
Equation Models (CFA, Path, SR, MIMC, LGM), Time-Series Analysis, 
Multilevel Models, Mixed/Fixed Effects, Categorical Data Analysis, 
Multinomial, Predicted Probabilities, Negative Binomial, Poisson, Graphical 
Plots and Predictions and Model Diagnostics, Experimental Methods, Machine 
Learning and Predictive Analytics 
 
 Other Research Design Competencies: 
Coding, Content Analyses, Online Discussion Forums, Intercoderreliability, 
Focus Groups, Semi-Structured Interviewing, Unstructured Interviewing, 
Ethnographic and Participant Observation 
 
Platforms and 
Data: 
 
Amazon MTurk, GfK Surveys, TESS Surveys, State Report Cards (Education), 
Common Core Data (CCD), National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), 
Census, American Community Survey (ACS and CPS), STEM Graduate 
Students, General Social Survey (GSS), Birth Data Files 
 
Software: Stata, SPSS, Stattransfer, NVivo, Atlas.ti, Qualtrics, Microsoft Office, Google 
and Adobe Applications, (Novice: MPlus, SQL, R, Python and Tableau) 
Operation Systems: Windows, Apple 
 
Academic Membership _____________________________________________________ 
 American Sociological Association; Sociology of Education Association; 
Eastern Sociological Society; Society for the Study of Social Problems, Midwest 
Sociological Society, American Education Research Association 
 
Service To Profession____________________________________________________ 
Manuscript Reviewer 
 Family Medicine, Sociological Inquiry, Sociological Forum, Sociological 
Perspectives, International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, Social 
Problems, Sociological Focus, Journal of Higher Education Outreach and 
Engagement 
Professional 
2019-present Advisory Board Member and Associate Editor: Social Problems 
2019-2022 Student Director: Midwest Sociological Society 
2019-2022 Board of Directors, Member: Midwest Sociological Society 
2020 Organizer:  “How Technology is Transforming Education.” 
           Society for the Study of Social Problems, San Francisco, CA 
2020-2022 Chair:  Student Issues Committee, 
           Midwest Sociological Society, Omaha, NE 
2020 3MT Judge: Midwest Sociological Society  
  
 
188 
 
2019-2022 Committee Member:  Student Issues Committee, 
           Midwest Sociological Society, Chicago, IL 
2019-2022 Committee Member:  Annual Meeting Committee, 
           Midwest Sociological Society, Chicago, IL 
2019-2022 Committee Member:  Membership Committee, 
           Midwest Sociological Society, Chicago, IL 
2019 Organizer and Discussant: “Public Perceptions of Trust and  
          Inequality.” Society for the Study of Social Problems, New York, NY 
2018 Organizer and Presider: “Inter-organizational Issues in Education   
          and Policy.” Society for the Study of Social Problems, Philadelphia, PA 
2018 Committee Member:  Michael Harrington Award Committee, 
           Society for the Study of Social Problems, Philadelphia, PA 
2017 Discussant and Presider: “Educated in Whiteness: Narratives of 
Reproduction and Resistance” Society for the Study of Social Problems, 
Montreal, ON 
2017 Presider: “Health Care Practice and Patients’ Experience” Midwest Sociological 
Society, Milwaukee, WI 
University  
2017-2019 President: Graduate Student Sociology Association (UWM) 
2018, 2019 Judge: Undergraduate Research Symposium(UWM) 
2017-2020 Graduate Student Representative: Sociology(UWM) 
2016-2017 Treasurer and Founding Member: Graduate Student Sociology Association 
(UWM) 
 
 Unable to deliver, conference canceled due to SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19). 
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